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Abstract 
Partnership working within the domain of the UK public sector has been the subject of 
academic exploration in modern times. Rhodes has written in relation to tensions around 
governance i.e. the ‘hollowing out of the state’ (Rhodes, 1997), with a loss of government 
functions limiting its capacity (Weller and Bakvis, 1997), to alternative delivery systems, 
such as agencies, policy networks, or partnerships involving the public, private and third 
sector (Rhodes, 1997; James, 2001); arguably leading to a fragmented service delivery 
(Powell and Exworthy, 2002). Others have argued that while the state may be fragmented 
it is not incapacitated (Holliday, 2000) as it uses regulatory levers to steer local 
government (partnerships) towards outcomes favouring central government policy.  In 
Scotland this is achieved through Single Outcome Agreements (SOA) between central and 
local government set within a prescriptive framework advancing the notion of community 
empowerment and long term prevention; as advocated by the Christie Commission 
(Scottish Government, 2011c).  
This thesis explores the concept of partnership working by looking at the governance of 
community safety in Scotland; principally through Community Planning/Community 
Safety Partnerships during a period of significant public sector reform. Using a case study 
approach - data was obtained during a twelve month period (2013) principally through 50 
semi-structured qualitative interviews with key stakeholders and 9 non-participant 
observations of partnership meetings within three distinct localities; and analysis of 
secondary data (policy documents). 
Drawing on theories around governance/partnership working, power and social capital: 
key themes began to emerge around tensions between central and local policy; power 
differentials within partnerships – relating to organisational culture and resource 
dependency; fiscal retrenchment and the de-prioritisation of community safety; Police 
reform and the impact on localism; and accountability issues relating to participatory 
democracy, blurred boundaries, and accountability to local communities within the 
governance of community safety. This thesis concludes that despite the rhetoric of 
localism within local governance – local communities and local government have less 
voice/power compared to central government, in relation to the governance of 
community safety, and in relation to the loss of accountability within local policing. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The aim of this project is to critically examine the governance of Community Safety 
Partnerships (CSPs) in Scotland. Community Safety Partnerships evolved differently in 
Scotland compared to England and Wales, in part due to the distinctive character of the 
Scottish legal system and also because of what many academics have termed as 
Scotland’s distinctive civic culture (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008; McAra and McVie, 2010; 
Mooney and Scott, 2012; Croall, 2006; Croall et al., 2010). From 1979 to date there have 
been many areas of policy convergence and divergence, especially within criminal justice 
policy and policing (McAra, 2007; 2011; McAra and McVie, 2010; Croall et al., 2010; 
Donnelly and Scott, 2010a; 2010b; Danson and Whittam, 2011).  
 
The performance management culture inherent within Thatcher’s neo-liberal reform 
agenda was one such area of policy convergence, conversely, Scotland’s retention of 
penal welfarism during the Conservative era was also an area of policy divergence (McAra 
and McVie, 2010), as was the divergence from the deep normative core of Westminster 
hegemony in relation to policy and decision making (Heclo and Wildavsky, 1981). Yet, 
despite this in 1999 (post devolution) Scotland seemed to converge with England’s 
punitive penal agenda, with the adoption of antisocial behaviour legislation and the 
targeting of young offenders (ibid; Croall et al., 2010; Croall, 2012). However, under the 
present Scottish National Party (SNP) government it appears that Scotland may once 
again return to its penal welfare roots (Hazel, 2008; Croall, 2012; Mooney and Scott, 
2012; Henry, 2012), and situating CSPs within this changing landscape makes this an 
interesting area of study.  
 
This has all happened during an era of world-wide recession after the 2007/08 global 
credit crunch, which has led to an extensive period of fiscal parsimony being enforced on 
Local Authorities and devolved Governments by Westminster, which may impact on local 
community services and partnerships. For example, budget cuts have long been a source 
of conflict and tension within central and local government relations throughout the 
United Kingdom (UK) (Stoker, 1988; Mooney and Poole, 2004; Mackie, 2005), and many 
public and voluntary agencies may have to engage in financial juggling acts in order to 
reassign/maintain dwindling resources in the delivery of local services (Frost, 2005; 
9 
 
Danson and Whittam, 2011). Furthermore, this may lead to increased tensions between 
agencies as they compete against each other within an “environment of constrained 
public spending” (Scottish Government, 2011d: vi). This may also have an impact on the 
role agencies play within the governance of community safety insofar as more focus may 
be placed on core organisational issues at the expense of a commitment to partnership 
working in general. Additionally, how will a performance management culture with an 
emphasis on central strategic objectives/target setting - within central and local 
government austerity politics - affect the organisational culture of public sector agencies, 
such as the Police, or the third sector in particular (Hastings et al., 2015). 
 
In answer to the call for restraint, the Scottish Government put in place a number of 
reform measures including: instituting a reform of Local Authority community planning 
structures to incorporate key findings from the Christie Commission, and the 
centralisation of the former eight regional Police and Fire services into separate single 
national entities. This centralising agenda may in turn have exacerbated fears that this 
could affect localism despite government rhetoric to the contrary (Donnelly et al., 2002); 
particularly within policing, and how this may impact on the organisational culture of the 
Police overall. Tensions may also emerge between the different layers within the 
governance of community safety, for example, will changes within local governance 
structures allow for more ‘rowing’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) by actors/agencies within 
CSPs, or will increased Scottish Government regulations determine not only the direction 
- ‘steer’ (ibid) of local policy objectives, but also perform the ‘rowing’ function as well 
(ibid). Or, will future strategic policing priorities influence the strategic direction/practices 
within CSPs, or indeed the cultural aims of different agencies/actors (HMSO, 2012). 
Furthermore, how will these changes impact on Local Authority accountability to local 
communities in general? For example, much has been written about community 
participation in recent Scottish Government social policy, but that participation may be 
dependent on the capacity/social capital of those involved. 
 
Therefore looking at CSPs during a process of major structural reform of one of its lead 
agencies offers up a unique opportunity for new academic research, in terms of how do 
changes to governance arrangements affect the operation of local bodies like CSPs. 
Therefore this research study aims to explore how robust local CSPs are in Scotland 
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during this transitional period, by understanding how CSPs work, principally by asking the 
following research questions: 
 
 What role do CSPs play in the governance of community safety in contemporary 
Scotland? 
 How will the planned governance changes and reform processes affect CSPs in terms 
of local accountability? 
 How will performance management cultures within central/local government, and in 
particular within the Police, affect CSP priorities and/or goals? 
 How do the organisational aims and culture of CSP partners, who possess different 
levels of power and influence, effect or determine the strategic priorities of CSPs? 
 
These questions will try to be addressed by creating a bespoke framework influenced by 
Hudson and Hardy’s ‘assessment tool’ for effective partnership working (Hudson and 
Hardy, 2002). Hudson and Hardy produced this framework as an effective tool for 
practitioners to use during evaluations of Health and Social Care Partnerships (ibid), 
however it will be adapted to provide a useful framework for the analysis of qualitative 
interviews (discussed more in the methods section); as many of the principles within this 
framework are arguably germane to CSPs. For example, principles surrounding the need 
for partnership working in the first place, or whether there is a clarity or realism of 
purpose, or commitment and ownership, or clear and robust arrangements within them 
(ibid: 53-62). They also identify barriers to effective partnership working that could also 
apply to CSPs, such as: non-coterminosity of boundaries; fragmentation of service 
responsibilities across agency boundaries; differences in ideologies and values; 
organisational self-interest and autonomy, and threats to job security (ibid: 54). Therefore 
in this study ‘the assessment tool’ will act as a useful framework in order to explore the 
complexities of partnership working within the context of CSPs. 
1.1 The Research Strategy 
The original focus for this review was to be directed towards literature based on crime 
prevention and community safety practice. However, it soon became clear that the 
centralised policing agenda of the SNP Scottish Government in 2013 would also have an 
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impact on CSPs. However, Scottish policing and community safety policy is heavily 
influenced by legislation and policies put in place by the previous New Labour 
Government, specifically the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (i.e. how the Act enables Crime 
and Disorder Reduction Partnerships) and the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003, which led 
onto the Local Government Scotland Act 2003 and the Anti-Social Behaviour etc. 
(Scotland) Act 2004.  
Therefore, it was decided that the literature review should look at the local governance of 
crime within a UK context, which involved examining in brief: central government 
bureaucracy – principally the Westminster model of government; local government 
reform and the tensions therein. This will be a thematic rather than a narrative based 
review and it will focus on drawing out key themes in order to try and address the main 
research questions, for example, themes around organisational change, reform, culture, 
strategic decision making, localism and the tensions therein.  
Therefore, the literature review will look at how central government reform has impacted 
on crime prevention and community safety in the UK from the late 1970s to date, in an 
effort to understand how central reform has helped shape the notion of crime prevention 
and community safety within the UK. Particular attention will be paid to the processes of 
change leading up to the creation of Crime and Disorder Reduction/Community Safety 
Partnerships; drawing on concepts such as social exclusion/social capital. The impact of 
these crime prevention/crime reduction policies in England and Wales will then be 
examined in context of post-devolution Scotland. For instance, the neo-liberal reform 
agenda of the Conservative government in 1979 – including the restructure of central and 
local government, and the impact of private sector managerialism/performance 
management on the public sector. This was arguably continued under New Labour’s 
modernisation programme, which incorporated managerialism/best value within 
partnerships and networks; principally as a key governance tool to address the 
fragmented service delivery inherent within market individualism. This framework for 
partnerships was also adopted in post-devolution Scotland, wherein regulatory 
mechanisms/policy levers have helped shape Community Planning/Community Safety 
Partnerships. However, these mechanisms may also increase tensions between 
central/strategic policy direction and local accountability. It may also exacerbate tensions 
between individual agencies/organisations as they learn to navigate a turbulent changing 
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landscape incorporating diverse organisational practices, resource constraint, and 
conflicting ideological aims and objectives. It is within this context that the literature has 
been chosen, whereby key themes may begin to emerge in support of the research 
questions and the subsequent research study. 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 2.1 The Westminster Model 
The ‘Westminster model’ of government characterises the British political system as a 
unitary state1 with its focus on parliamentary sovereignty, presided over by a Prime 
Ministerial led cabinet based on a predominantly two-party majority rule electoral system 
– overhead democracy, typified by the rules of debate (Rhodes, 1997; 2000a; Stoker, 
2004b). The most dominant ideological form associated with this model is bureaucratic 
hierarchy (formally ranked structure of authority, represented by clear lines of 
accountability, and rational rules or policies) (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 147), typified 
by vertical top down control. Clarke and Newman (1997) state that since the nineteenth 
century public administration in Britain has taken the form of ‘rational bureaucracy’, 
which was intended to foster efficiency and impartiality throughout all public business, 
typified by the appliance of rules and regulations by trained staff (ibid: 5). 
For Weber there were three types of legitimate authority based on: rational grounds - on 
the principle that society has normative rules, therefore those persons elevated to 
positions of authority based on those rules are there by legal authority; traditional 
grounds – based on the sanctity of ‘immemorial traditions’ and on the legitimacy of status 
(a monarch); charismatic grounds – based on particular character traits inherent within an 
individual that brings with it a devotional compliance to any order decreed by him 
(Weber, 1997: 323).  
Rational grounds is the legitimate type of authority most associated with a Westminster 
model of government defined by Weber as “Legal authority: the pure type with 
                                                          
1 A state in which all constitutional power resides in the centre, however, sub-governmental units may exist, but are 
subject to change from the top. (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 24) 
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employment of a bureaucratic administrative staff” (ibid: 324). Weber argued that three 
institutions were necessary to cope with the modern governance process: “political 
leadership, party and bureaucracy” (cited in Stoker, 2004b: 22). Bureaucracy is thereby a 
method used by society to accomplish its goals through “control, organisation and central 
direction” (John, 2011: 64). However, it can also be associated with charismatic authority 
in terms of the strong personality of an individual – especially one in a position of 
authority such as a Prime Minister – in that they can use their will to force change within 
a one party dominated parliament, as in the case of Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair 
(ibid). 
However, by the 1970s bureaucracy was thought to be inappropriate, inefficient and ill-
equipped to respond to the complexities of change inherent within the modern world, 
especially by proponents of the New Right ideology wherein neo-liberal economics in 
both the UK and the United States of America were beginning to stress the superiority of 
market individualism (Clarke and Newman, 1997: 14).  Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative 
government of 1979 paved the way for a new lexicon of government parlance when it 
chose to forgo the dominance of hierarchical control and introduce market individualism 
throughout the peripheries of government, with the introduction of New Public 
Management (NPM) principles aimed at transforming the relationship between the public 
sector, government and society (Hughes, 1994); to be achieved by “across-the-board 
‘efficiency’ savings, performance targets and the use of competition to select the 
cheapest service producer” (Stoker, 2004b: 13). Local government reform in terms of 
contracting out and partnership working became the order of the day.  
 2.2 British Local Government Reform Post 1979   
 “the present cannot be properly understood without some appreciation of how it 
developed and differs from the past – especially in Britain, where local government has 
evolved gradually over the centuries, without any codified constitution defining its 
rights, responsibilities and relationship to central government” (Wilson and Game, 
2011: 53). 
Local government structural reform began in earnest following the Redcliffe-Maud 
reports’ published in 1969, which advocated either: structural reform based on “all-
purpose unitary Authorities embracing both town and country” (Wilson and Game, 2011: 
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61); or a “multi-tier system of provincial Councils, city regions, district and local Councils” 
(ibid). However, the new Heath Conservative Government of 1970 rejected both systems, 
favouring instead a two-tier system based on the current Counties, which many argued 
was pursued not only on philosophical grounds, but also on ideological grounds, as most 
County Councils were dominated by Conservative party members and supporters (ibid). 
Partisan politics would play a major part in future reform. For example, the 1972 Local 
Government Act from 1974 reduced the 58 County Councils in England and Wales to 47, 
and abolished all County boroughs, which meant that many of the former Labour 
controlled County boroughs were now relegated to a lower tier status (ibid: 61), this two 
tier structure could also possibly make the co-ordination of policy and administration 
challenging (Stoker, 1988). In Scotland, the Wheatley Commission also proposed a two-
tier system, which took effect in 1975, courtesy of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 
1973 (Wilson and Game, 2011: 62).  
By the mid-1970s local government in particular began to feel the economic backlash 
caused by a world-wide recession (Stoker, 1988). Unemployment rose alongside inflation, 
and public resources were stretched to the limit, and many cuts were targeted at local 
government (ibid). Nonetheless, as Stoker (1988) points out the cuts were achieved by a 
“mix of discussion, compromise and conflict within the established machinery of 
government” (ibid: 14; Mackie, 2005). However, a different picture emerges with the 
election of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government of 1979. Within weeks of 
taking office it became increasingly clear that local government was, according to Newton 
and Karran (1985), viewed as “wasteful, profligate, irresponsible, unaccountable, 
luxurious and out of control” (cited in Stoker, 1988: 14; Wilson and Game, 2011: 64).  
 2.2.1 1979 The Conservative Government or the ‘New Right’ are elected 
The election of a Thatcher led Conservative Government in 1979 signals an epoch in 
central and local government relations, characterised by a desire to control Local 
Authorities – especially Labour dominated ones – partly through a restructure of its 
institutions and partly through greater control over resources managed efficiently 
through private sector business practices. The process of structural reform began in 
earnest in 1986 with the abolition of six metropolitan Counties and the Greater London 
Council leading to the creation of a “unitary system of local government in the main 
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urban conurbations” (Stoker, 2004b: 29). At the same time a series of joint boards were 
created covering for example, the Police and Fire service, which had their own identity 
and legal status (ibid: 30). By 1998 the number of Authorities in Britain was reduced to 
441 compared to 520 in 1976 see table 1 (ibid: 31).  
Table 1: The Structure of elected Local Government in Britain, 1997/1998 
Single Tier (unitary) Two-Tier (functions split between levels) 
46 English Unitary Councils 
36 English Metropolitan Districts 
32 London Boroughs (plus City of 
London Corporation) 
22 Welsh Councils 
32 Scottish Councils 
34 English County Councils 
238 English Non-Metropolitan Authorities 
Source: Stoker (2004b:31) 
Crucially the Conservative Government also instigated many changes to the local 
government financial system. For example, during the financial year 1990/91 non-
domestic or business rates were removed from Local Authority control. This constituted a 
heavy financial blow to Local Authorities as business rates combined with local rates 
accounted for about half of their income, which was now reduced to a quarter, with 
central government providing the majority of funding (ibid: 31). This allowed central 
government to dictate the level of local spending via capping powers (ibid: 31). This led to 
some Councils initiating drastic cuts, while others chose to engage in financial juggling 
acts to make figures appear as if they matched government targets, whilst continuing to 
flow resources to local services (ibid: 31). 
A neologism borne out of that period is ‘Thatcherism’ signalling the emergence of the 
New Right and their neo-liberal reform agenda associated with ‘rolling back the state’. A 
neo-liberal agenda which advocated the superiority of individual choice set within an 
economic market exchange system (Heffernan, 2000: 2) as opposed to the collective 
political decision making of the interventionist state (ibid: 2). It was time for political 
change, in this case with the adoption of free market liberalism characterised by the 
notion of individualism, freedom of choice, privatisation and laissez-faire governance, in 
other words with the adoption of private sector business practices (James, 2001), situated 
within the “general ideology of managerialism” (Clark and Newman, 1997: 35).  
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 2.3 The increasing influence of Managerialism/New Public Management 
Managerialism or NPM is based on improving government performance and can be linked 
to the launch of the Financial Management Initiative in 1983. This initiative set out the 
principles of rational decision making, decentralisation, and management as opposed to 
administration. It was based on an assessment of value for money by measuring the 
"three E’s", economy, efficiency, and effectiveness (Shafiri and Bovaird, 1995: 469). NPM 
became increasingly influential during this period, as the promotion of ‘better 
management’ (Clarke and Newman, 1997: 35) was viewed as the solution to economic 
decline and stagnation in Western economies in the face of ‘global change and 
competition’ (ibid: 35).  McGarvey and Cairney (2008) state that NPM ideas tend to 
emphasise mechanisms such as: performance measurement, decentralisation, 
devolution, managerialism, competition and private-sector management styles, as useful 
tools in the reform of the public sector (ibid: 151).  
Dunleavy and Hood (1994) argue that NPM is mainly used as a summary description to 
explain the restructuring of public sector bodies in line with those management and 
accounting approaches related to business practices (ibid: 9). They contend it involves a 
shift in the “two basic design co-ordinates of public sector organization” (ibid: 9). Using 
social science ‘jargon’ they describe it firstly as going ‘down-group’, meaning that the 
public sector becomes less distinctive to the private sector (in terms of how personnel, 
rewards and business methods are constructed), and secondly, going ‘down-grid’ means 
limiting the degree to which discretionary power is restricted (in terms of personnel, 
contracts and money) by standardised general procedural rules (ibid: 9). This contrasted 
with traditional public administration which was founded on the notion of a “highly 
distinct public sector ‘group’ and of a dense ‘grid’ of general procedural rules governing 
the conduct of business” (ibid: 9), see Dunleavy and Hood (1994: 9) for a more specific 
description. 
The most notable use of NPM principles within the Conservative Government era was 
with the introduction of Next Steps Agencies in the late 1980s, which according to James 
(2001) exhibits two core functions: to use agencies as separate ‘organisation units’ in 
order to handle “distinct central government activities on behalf of Ministers” (ibid: 235); 
and the creation of a ‘regulatory framework’, wherein a chief executive is accountable to 
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the Minister of his/her department for performance, which the Minister has set within 
his/her own individual departments/or via central government targets (ibid: 235). In 
other words policy formulation and implementation are split between Ministers and 
agencies respectively (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 112). 
Hood (1991) has argued that NPM could be interpreted as being borne out of two distinct 
ideas, one being ‘new institutional economics’ built on the notion of user choice, 
contestability and transparency (ibid: 5). While the second idea is based on the tradition 
of the international scientific management movement – grounded on the notion of 
professional management expertise and discretionary power; basically meaning being 
free to manage (ibid: 6). 
Hughes (1994) argues that there are two main criticisms aimed at the ‘economic basis of 
managerialism’ (ibid: 78), first that economics is a flawed social science and secondly and 
more importantly is that whilst it may be appropriate for use within the business sector, 
applying it to government is ‘ill-conceived’ (ibid: 78) in that public services are more 
distinctive than any generic consumer model (ibid: 78). For example, the public 
provider/consumer relations in government are more complex and the consumer is also a 
citizen and has a “set of unique implications for the transaction” (ibid: 78). Other 
criticisms have been levelled at managerialism, for instance: it is too politicised, in that 
political leaders will tend to select agency executives or department heads based on their 
philosophical or ideological views (Hughes (1994: 82); or there are issues surrounding 
accountability, as in conflicts between balancing up managerial accountability to a 
department or to elected politicians, or how do citizens hold a public servant to account 
(ibid: 83).  
Brodkin (2011) states that a strategy used within the NPM toolkit to ‘make policy work’ 
(ibid: 254) is to link performance and outcome measurement to financial incentives, and 
is a departure from ‘old’ public management forms of command and control (ibid: 254). 
This approach constructed around incentives, implicitly accepts discretion as a necessary 
feature of implementation within a decentralised policy world (ibid: 254). However, they 
also point out that discretion can be used in a way that can either enhance or thwart 
policy decisions (ibid). Brodkin further argues, that by using the familiar ‘steering not 
rowing’ analogy, NPM allows high level officials to produce incentives  and ‘set the 
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destination’ (ibid: 254), which leaves “lower level organizations to figure out how to get 
there” (ibid: 254).   
Steering and rowing was a nautical analogy developed by Osborne and Gaebler, which 
referred to the states regulatory function as ‘steering’ through monitoring which allowed 
for alterations to any deviations from a government course or direction, through the 
setting of explicit goals “to be conveyed to those rowing” (Crawford, 2006: 453). Osborne 
and Gaebler (1992) contend that steering allows governments to make more policy 
decisions, by co-opting other organisations to deliver services to the community, which 
means less rowing – less direct public service provision by the government (McGarvey 
and Cairney, 2008: 151). These services can in turn be regulated to ensure they are 
meeting the public demand for efficient services. For example, Osborne and Gaebler 
contend that governments who steer more and row less are stronger governments, “after 
all, those who steer the boat have far more power over its destination than those who 
row it” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 32). Brodkin argues that the bottom line is that by 
using performance indicators (whether they are attached to penalties or incentives) 
(Evans, 2009), leaves street-level organisations to try and “determine how best to do the 
work” (Brodkin, 2011:254). In other words by establishing a performance framework the 
government is in effect trying to steer public sector behaviour (ibid).  
Many academic writers during the 1980s and 1990s expressed their concern that 
performance management had become a key central government tool that focused on 
prescriptive government targets favouring economy and efficiency, rather than on more 
holistic outcomes based on efficacy (see Mackie, 2005). Performance management can 
also be used as a mode of intervention by central government, which in turn challenges 
the professionalism of public sector actors (Loveday, 2006). For example, the  Police 
Reform Act 2002 gave the Home Secretary considerable powers to intervene on those 
forces adjudged to be failing by Her Majesties Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), and 
one such force - Nottinghamshire Police - were told that senior officers’ jobs were at risk 
if their performance level did not improve (ibid: 283). This means that senior officers are 
far more likely to direct their forces to adhere to prescriptive central targets, rather than 
focusing on priorities intrinsic to policing within their local areas, if their livelihood is 
threatened by central government regulatory mechanisms (ibid: 283).   
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The performance management regime inherent in NPM is there according to government 
to improve efficiency and effectiveness in public sector delivery, but it has often resulted 
in a results orientation and a cost consciousness focus on public sector reform (Mackie, 
2005). Subsequent evaluations on NPM have alluded to improvements in: performance, 
improved processes, capacity and savings (ibid: 7). But, Pollitt (2000) argues that while 
there may be savings in one area, this can be offset by increases in expenditure 
elsewhere, or by a reduction in quality or service provision, or simply by transferring costs 
somewhere else in the public sector (cited in Mackie, 2005: 7).  
The performance management culture was not restricted to the Conservatives as later 
policies under New Labour would also endorse NPM principles, such as, the use of 
performance assessment frameworks, performance indicators and a focus on ‘best value’ 
within partnerships and networks (Mackie, 2005). Upon election in 1997 New Labour also 
promised to accept many reforms of the previous administration, such as, income tax 
rates, public spending levels, inflation targets, privatisation and a ‘more selective 
approach to welfare’ (Mackie, 2005: 12). In fact there was considerable convergence 
between New Labour and Conservative Government policy, however, Prime Minister 
Tony Blair argued that he was adopting a ‘third way’ between the ‘New Right’ and the 
‘Old Left’ (ibid: 12), and this was most evident within partnership working (Gilling, 2007; 
Rummery, 2002).  
 2.4 Governance through Networks and Partnership  
Governance can be described as a ‘change in the meaning of government’ (Rhodes, 1997: 
46) or as a new method of governing (ibid: 46), primarily from hierarchical bureaucratic 
control to a new network of governing structures (Cairney and McGarvey, 2013). 
Newman (2001: 11) refers to governance as a shorthand term to describe a ‘particular set 
of changes’ within government, which potentially signify deep shifts (located in broader 
patterns of economic and social transformation) in the way in which Governments seek to 
govern. A shift that now sees local government sharing decision making responsibilities 
with other agencies (Fenwick et al., 2012: 406). The concept of governance is essential in 
order to understand Contemporary policy-making. Government as a term generally refers 
to the ‘conventional institutions and processes of the public sector’ (Cairney and 
McGarvey, 2013: 142), whereas governance can be used to describe how direction is 
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given to the public sector – in essence ‘steering not rowing’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; 
Cairney and McGarvey, 2013: 142); Bell and Hindmoor (2009: 149) state governance 
derives from the classical Greek word Kybernan – meaning to ‘steer, pilot or direct’. 
This is most apparent within local government (which for many local citizens means the 
town hall/city chamber; the local Council and the services they provide – thus local 
government is ‘what the Council does’ (Leach and Percy Smith, 2001: 1). However, in 
contemporary society in the UK many decisions and services which affect local 
communities are not under the control of the local Council but are divided into a number 
of other public bodies, including the Health Authorities, Skills Councils, Local Housing 
Associations, and in some cases other non-state actors (ibid: 1). Local governance more 
and more refers to multi-agency working, partnership, or policy networks, which ‘cut 
across organisational boundaries’ (ibid: 1). 
Leach and Percy-Smith (2001) provide a useful distinction between government and 
governance; however, Wilson and Game (2011) have expanded on it, which can be seen 
in table 2 below; 
Table 2: Government and Governance – Differing emphases 
Government Governance 
Concerned primarily with the institutions of 
the state 
Concerned more with the processes of 
governing and with the many non-state actors 
and agencies involved 
Primarily about what happens in the public 
sector 
Much more inclusive, recognising that policy-
making, service provision and problem-solving 
nowadays involve all sectors of society – 
private, voluntary, community, as well as public 
Focuses mainly on structures Concerned more with policies, outputs and 
outcomes 
Organisations are characterised by 
bureaucratic hierarchies, authority relations 
and clear lines of accountability 
About networks and partnerships, bargaining 
and exchange relations between individuals 
and organisations, and blurred accountability 
About providing, directing and ‘rowing’ 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) 
About broader, but less involved, roles of 
government – enabling, facilitating and 
‘steering’ 
 Source: Leach and Percy Smith (2001) in Wilson and Game (2011: 152) 
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In Rhodes view, the concept of ‘self-organising networks’ (Rhodes, 1997: 53) provide the 
most meaningful analysis of change within British government (ibid: 53). This is 
characterised by an organisational interdependence within and out-with government to 
include non-state actors (ibid). Networks are typically used to describe the relationship 
between diverse types of actors within different walks of political, social or economic life, 
who often have to engage in a ‘collective action’ in order to pursue similar goals 
(Peterson, 2003: 1). John (2011) states that the most powerful networks are the ones that 
“link decision-makers in government to other actors” (ibid: 139), these actors can be 
within different levels of government, or beyond the state in terms of voluntary 
organisations, interest groups, citizen groups or private companies (ibid: 139). John 
asserts that the most important commodity that links all of these groups together is 
‘mutual trust and knowledge’ (ibid), which will hopefully persist over time (ibid: 139).  
Kjaer (2011: 103) argues that many other scholars would disagree with Rhodes view that 
networks are an “unintended consequence of public sector reforms” (Ibid: 102) stating 
that networks have always existed in the form of a multiplicity of ‘interest groups’ (ibid: 
102), and instead view governance to broadly mean “steering, or as managing a 
government’s resources” (Kjaer, 2011: 103).  
Rhodes (1997) however, argues that central government’s ability to act unilaterally has 
diminished, in that the privatisation/commercialisation of public service delivery 
combined with a loss of functions to higher tiers of government (for example, the 
European Union), has meant that it no longer has the knowledge or information required 
to solve complex public policy problems (ibid: 148). This has led to what he describes as 
the ‘hollowing’ out of the state, leading to a fragmented public service delivery, 
culminating in a weakened central government capacity to steer policy networks or 
partnerships (ibid: 146).  
Holliday (2000) refutes this by asserting that the British core is now more ‘integrated and 
substantial’ than before. While he concedes that it operates within a complex 
environment, he nonetheless argues that this has always been the case, and while it may 
be fragmented it is not disabled (ibid: 175). The state still retains the power to control 
agencies through resource allocation, regulation and legislation (ibid: 175; Marinetto, 
2003). Bell and Hindmoor (2009: 150) reject the notion that the state has lost its capacity 
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to govern and instead argue that governance is about seeking to govern better rather 
than to govern less. Rhodes acknowledged that central government has extended some 
power through financial control, by reasserting its control over financial resources, but 
argues that this may not provide enough leverage for the “centre to steer networks” 
(Rhodes, 1997: 16). However, he did concede that, although networks are self-organising 
and enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy, the government can “indirectly and 
imperfectly steer networks” (Rhodes, 1997: 53).   
This was most evident under New Labour and their flag-ship crime control policy, insofar 
as the government ultimately chose to ‘steer’ local crime prevention policy via target 
setting, despite the localism rhetoric inherent within local governance of crime control 
policy (Gilling, 2007; Crawford, 1997). It became increasingly clear that partnership 
working underlined this New Labour ideology (Rummery, 2002: 229). 
 2.4.1 Partnership Working 
Within social policy and political science literature, working in partnership or networked 
governance, was often linked with New Labour’s promotion of an ‘ambiguous third way’ 
(Gilling, 2007: 37) rhetoric, - defined by what it was not, neither the old right nor the old 
left (ibid: 37). For New Labour it moves beyond the ‘old’ philosophical adversarial 
arguments of the lefts ‘statism’ versus the new rights ‘market individualism’ (Clarke and 
Glendinning, 2002: 33). Instead it espoused the notion that ‘there was no right answer’ to 
finding solutions to problems, which did not fit neatly into any one administrative 
department, but rather crossed boundaries to “provide ‘cross-cutting’ themes for 
governmental bodies” (Gilling, 2007: 51).  
Modernisation and working in partnership were both key terms espoused by the Blair 
Government, and to collaborate or work in partnership with others is often suggestive of 
some type of positive action – sounds inclusive (Fenwick et al., 2012), or as one 
government Minister declared partnership was “one of those nice feely words beloved by 
politicians” (Boateng, 1999 cited in Hudson and Hardy, 2002: 51). The New Labour 
government were keen to promote the concept of partnership or  multi-agency co-
operation within local government as a natural solution to solving those ‘wicked issues’ or 
long standing policy problems (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008), that no one single agency 
or department  can tackle on its own (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998;  Hudson and Hardy, 
23 
 
2002; Durose and Rummery, 2006). For example, issues such as, drugs, crime and social 
exclusion, often require the involvement of many individuals and/or organisations 
working together in a co-ordinated approach to try and find solutions to these ‘wicked 
problems’, a prime example would be CSPs (Ferlie et al., 2011: 308; McGarvey and 
Cairney, 2008).   
Like the Conservatives before them New Labour set its modernisation process against the 
backdrop of past political failures, for example, rejecting the command and control of ‘old 
Labour’, and the market mechanism of the last Conservative government, which arguably 
led to a fragmented service delivery (Powell and Exworthy, 2002: 15). This was 
highlighted in the White Paper Modernising Government, which suggested that problems 
inherent within the policy process were in part due to ‘earlier managerial reforms’ (ibid: 
61). The White Paper acknowledged that in some areas productivity, quality of service 
and value for money had improved, but it also asserted that too little effort went into the 
policy process itself, in terms of ensuring that the needs of the people are met. The report 
advocated the delivery of policies in an effective way across institutional boundaries, not 
only between departments but also between different levels of government (ibid: 61). 
In other words the report was suggesting that ‘wicked issues’ such as crime and social 
exclusion could not be tackled on a departmental basis, but rather needed to be tackled 
in a more holistic fashion: 
“Too often the work of Departments, their Agencies and other bodies has been 
fragmented and the focus of scrutiny has been on their individual achievements rather 
than on their contribution to the government’s overall strategic purpose” (Cabinet 
Office, 1999a cited in Newman, 2001: 61). 
Consequently, the concept of partnership working or multi-agency co-operation became 
the order of the day within the New Labour government.  Many terms have been used by 
New Labour to typify this ‘collaborative discourse’ (Powell and Exworthy, 2002: 15), such 
as: inter-agency working, joined-up government, multi-agency collaboration and 
networks (ibid: 15), though many academic writers associate most of these terms, 
including networks with partnerships (ibid: 16).  
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However, Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) state that analytical differences exist between the 
term network and partnership as modes of governance.  They argue for example, that 
being a member of a partnership board, does not necessarily infer that an actor has 
entered into a relationship based on “mutual benefit, trust and reciprocity” (ibid: 314), 
which are common characteristics associated with a ‘network mode of governance’ (ibid: 
314). Rather, partnerships can be associated with many different forms of co-ordination, 
including hierarchy and market (ibid: 314).  
Similarly, partnership or collaboration is often put together in the same sentence to mean 
the same thing, however Carnwell and Carson (2009: 11) point out that although both 
define ‘working together’ as a key aim, they do not necessarily mean the same. For 
example, it is possible to differentiate between the two concepts as in attributing 
‘partnership’ to mean ‘who we are’ and ‘collaboration’ to mean ‘what we do’. Huxham 
(2000) also states that within the New Labour ‘Modernising Government’ initiative a key 
term used was “collaboration between central and local government” (ibid: 339). 
However, collaboration can have different meanings for different organisations and 
individuals within them, you can collaborate with someone or work in collaboration with 
a particular department, but it does not necessarily mean that you are working in 
partnership with them.  Collaboration also suggests equal relationships, rather than a 
directive from one collaborative partner to the other, as in the directives set down in 
legislative form from central government to Local Authorities (ibid).  
Partnership in terms of political rhetoric has the virtue of being fairly ‘non-specific’ whilst 
simultaneously extolling the notion of ‘community’ and ‘collaboration’ – virtuous 
concepts as opposed to conflict; which no ‘sensible’ person would knowingly choose 
(Clarke and Glendinning, 2002: 33). Its non-specifity centres around the ‘who’, ‘what’, 
‘where’ or even ‘why’ partnerships exist, for example: between organisations; 
government departments; the third sector and local government; central and local 
government; or between citizens and government and so on, basically partnerships can 
exist between and beyond government (ibid: 33). Partnership also suggests a co-
operation between actors (Mackintosh, 2007), by working towards specific goals and 
objectives, managing risk, or sharing resources in order to tackle complex problems, and 
has subsequently become a useful governance tool within the social welfare arena  
(Douglas, 2009).  
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There have been many discussions surrounding the theory of partnerships within 
governance literature, and Powell and Dowling (2006) tried to match conceptual models 
of partnership with existing forms, by examining for example: Snape and Stewart’s (1996) 
three types of partnership (facilitating, co-ordinating and implementing) (Powell and 
Dowling, 2006: 306); Stoker’s (1998a, 1998b) (principal-agent relations, inter-
organisational negotiation, and systemic co-ordination) (ibid: 306); Mackintosh’s (1992) 
(synergy, transformation, and budget enlargement) (ibid: 306) and Hasting’s (1996), who 
further developed Mackintosh’s synergy and transformation concepts (ibid: 307). It is not 
possible in this review to discuss all of these theories in-depth; however, within the realm 
of CSPs, some of the above theories are perhaps more pertinent. For example: Snape and 
Stewarts ‘co-ordinating partnerships’, which agree on priorities, but also accept that each 
partner has their own specific organisational demands (ibid: 306); Stoker’s ‘systemic co-
ordination’, which characterises partnerships through the development of mutual trust 
and shared vision leading to the “establishment of self-governing networks” (ibid: 306); 
Mackintosh’s ‘synergy’ and ‘transformation’ models both have relevance in that the 
former increases the value of the partnership by combining resources, and the latter 
stresses that aims and occupational cultures within organisations can change depending 
on the power of the individual partners (ibid: 306). Similarly, Hasting’s views the 
transformation model as being unidirectional, in that it involves an unequal power 
relationship, whereby the public sector ‘is transformed against its will’ (ibid: 307).  
New Labour ideology proposed that there was only one clear way to tackle social 
problems and that was to promote the idea of a networked form of governance between 
the public sector, the private sector and the ‘third sector2’ (the voluntary sector). A point 
supported by Perri 6 who argued that “wicked problems can be solved only by more 
‘holistic’ government – that is, horizontal integration and linkage between field and 
function” (cited in Powell and Exworthy, 2002: 18). 
However, working in partnership is not a new concept, and there have been many 
examples of it in the UK central and local government history (Douglas, 2009), and more 
recently there has been many examples of problems within partnership working across 
the social welfare spectrum. For example, Clarke and Rummery (2002) examined front-
                                                          
2The office for the third sector has been renamed, and government policy is now managed by the Office for Civil Society 
(OCS), (Alcock, 2011). 
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line Health and Social Care Partnerships and found that problems stemmed from inter-
organisational as well as inter-professional issues, in terms of insufficient planning, 
location of social workers within primary care settings, and an inherent mistrust between 
the two professions (ibid: 69). A point reiterated by John (2011: 141) who states that 
although networks may be established on trust, they can also deteriorate through a lack 
of it. For example, previous cordial relationships may deteriorate due to 
misunderstandings, or if an action is taken that benefits only one party but not the other 
(ibid: 141). However, subsequent evaluations found that working together can help 
overcome historical barriers, through the prioritising of goals aimed at achieving better 
services for users (Clarke and Rummery, 2002: 69; Hudson and Hardy, 2002). 
Lack of communication has often been cited within the Criminal Justice System (and the 
media) as a reason for many multi-agency system failures (Watson, 2010; Nash, 2010). 
High profile examples include cases such as ‘Baby P’ who died in 2007 due to months of 
physical abuse (Watson, 2010; Nash, 2010). The case called attention to the fact that over 
sixty professionals from different agencies saw Baby P, but singularly failed to join-up 
thinking and action, leading to a gross breakdown in communication (Watson, 2010; 
Nash, 2010). What this highlights is that professionals need to be clear about their roles 
and responsibilities within a partnership setting, opinions need to be voiced and 
partnership meetings need to be attended on a regular basis, by key workers in order to 
forward their views (ibid). 
Hudson and Hardy (2002) have developed a “working tool – The Partnership Assessment 
Tool” (ibid: 53), based on empirical research over the past two decades into the success 
and failure of partnership (principally within the field of Health and Social Care) (ibid). 
However, it could arguably be applied to any multi-agency partnership within the public 
sector, especially CSPs. They discuss how overcoming barriers to joint-working is one of 
the key areas to be addressed within successful partnerships. However, they stress that 
some barriers may be more difficult to overcome than others, therefore it is necessary to 
identify them and seek steps to overcome them, by minimising their influence on the 
partnership process (ibid: 53). Barriers may be external or internal to partnerships, see 
Table 3 below:  
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Table 3: Five categories of barriers to coordination 
Structural 
. Fragmentation of service responsibilities across agency boundaries, both within and between           
sectors; 
. Inter-organisational complexity; 
. Non-coterminosity of boundaries; 
. Competition-based systems of governance. 
Procedural 
. Differences in planning horizons and cycles; 
. Differences in accountability arrangements; 
. Differences in information systems and protocols regarding access and confidentiality. 
Financial 
. Differences in budgetary cycles and accounting procedures; 
. Differences in funding mechanisms and bases; 
. Differences in the stocks and flows of financial resources. 
Professional/cultural 
. Differences in ideologies and values; 
. Professional self-interest and autonomy; 
. Inter-professional domain dissensus; 
. Threats to job security; 
. Conflicting views about user interests and roles. 
Status and legitimacy 
. Organisational self-interest and autonomy; 
. Inter-organisational domain dissensus; 
. Differences in legitimacy between elected and appointed agencies. 
Source: Hudson and Hardy (2002: 54) 
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Multi-agency collaboration and networked forms of partnership had following recent 
trends in central government reform focused more on the necessity of local governance 
as opposed to local government.  Both the Conservative Government and the New Labour 
Government in the past two decades have placed an emphasis on the importance of local 
solutions to local problems. However, as previously discussed the Conservative solution 
focused more on freeing up the markets, in terms of ‘rolling back the state’ (Heffernan, 
2000). However, within this agenda there appeared to be very little space for manoeuvre 
for Local Authorities, the Conservatives quickly chose to reduce their powers through a 
series of reforms, which saw them more as enabler than service provider (Gilling, 2007).  
When New Labour came to power they began a modernisation process which sought to 
reduce the fragmentation inherent within the previous government’s ideology of market 
individualism (Stoker, 1999). They sought to do this through a process of ‘third way’ 
politics, which sought to encourage private enterprise whilst simultaneously controlling 
its excesses by virtue of regulation, evaluation and evidence led practice couched within 
the ethos of best value (Rhodes, 1997). New Labour intended to return some control back 
into the hands of local government, but it was to be held in check by the tight reigns of 
partnership working and the regulatory systems that came with it (Carnwell and Carson, 
2009). It could be argued that partnership working in this sense is used primarily to 
counter the fragmentation caused by previous market reforms in public services, rather 
than a desire to improve the care and experience of service users (Dickenson and Glasby, 
2010).  
This was most evident within the local governance of crime control, when New Labour 
sought to stamp their popular driven penal policy agenda on both policing and local 
government, in the guise of local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships. Although at 
first glance New Labour may have promoted localism, it soon became apparent that it 
was couched within the rhetoric of a centrally controlled performance management 
culture, which will now be briefly discussed below, by first looking at the development of 
British policing, and secondly looking at the impact of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.  
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 2.5 British Policing 
The term ‘policing’ can be associated with a plurality of sources insofar as private or 
public individuals and/or organisations can utilise resources to protect themselves or 
their property (Emsley, 1996).  The primary aim for most of these organisations is to 
prevent crime and protect property and therefore ‘policing’ as a process is distinct from 
‘the Police’ as a public organisation (Mawby, 2008). However, in this review ‘policing’ for 
the most part will refer to the public Police, which Emsley (1996: 1) defines as those 
“bureaucratic and hierarchical bodies employed by the state to maintain order and 
prevent and detect crime” (ibid: 1). They arguably also exist as a form of social control, in 
that the Police much like the military have the potential to use ‘legitimate force’ when 
necessary (Reiner, 2010).  
Many authors have written about the development of British policing (see for example: 
Reiner, 2010; Donnelly et al., 2002: Donnelly, 2008; Donnelly and Scott, 2005; 2010a; 
2010b; McLaughlin, 2001; Jones, 2008; Dinsmor and Goldsmith, 2010; Newburn, 2002; 
2003; 2008; Mawby, 2008; Mawby and Wright, 2003; 2008), all of whom would agree 
that the Metropolitan Police Act 1829 is generally regarded as the birth of the ‘new 
Police’ (Emsley, 1996; 2009). Other authors such as, Donnelly and Scott and Dinsmor and 
Goldsmith however, state that Glasgow established the first locally funded constabulary 
by Act of Parliament in 1800 (Dinsmor and Goldsmith, 2010: 49).  
This review however, will briefly describe the tri-partite structure of policing 
accountability and then focus on some key policy changes in policing from the 1980s 
onwards, including how the government’s responsibilisation agenda impacted on the 
policing of communities and, how their performance management culture had an effect 
on Police professionalism.  
In 1962 a ‘Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Police Service’ report argued for greater 
Police accountability, Police reform on pay and conditions and an amalgamation of 
smaller forces with their bigger neighbours (Donnelly, 2008; Reiner, 2010; Emsley, 2009). 
The report led to major organisational changes within the Police leading to the Police Act 
of 1964 and the Local Government Act of 1972, which reduced the number of Police 
forces outside London to forty-one (Emsley, 2009: 254).  
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The Police Act of 1964 also established the tri-partite partnership wherein policing 
accountability was shared between: “the Home Office, the local Police Authority and the 
Chief Constable of the force” (Mawby and Wright, 2008: 241). Marshall (1978) stated that 
the Act put each force under the control and direction of its Chief Constable, wherein the 
manner of accountability to external bodies was ‘explanatory and co-operative’ rather 
than ‘subordinate and obedient’ (cited in Jones, 2008: 698). However, Reiner argues that 
the Police Act strengthened the powers of the Home Office and Chief Constables “at the 
expense of Local Authorities” (Reiner, 2010: 79), it also strengthened the powers of the 
Home Secretary (Jones, 2008: 698). A similar structure existed in Scotland, which was 
established under the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 wherein: Scottish Ministers retained 
overall responsibility for policing policy; local Police Authorities and Joint Boards set 
Police budgets and ensured best value was obtained; and Chief Constables were 
responsible for all operational policing aspects within their respective areas (Donnelly, 
2008: 146; Scottish Government, 2009a: 55). 
Further legislation has endorsed the tri-partite structure (although critics have argued 
that it further reduces local government power in favour of greater central control and 
direction), for example, the Police Magistrates and Court Act (PMCA) 1994 set the tri-
partite structure of Police accountability within a performance management framework, 
which focused on achieving efficiency and effectiveness on local Police forces (Jones, 
2008: 699).  
Since the nineteenth century crime prevention has always been at the forefront of 
government policy. However, since the 1980s the Conservatives and indeed the New 
Labour Government that followed realised that the Police alone could not cope with nor 
prevent crime on their own; spiralling crime statistics testified to that fact (Reiner, 2010). 
Crime prevention was heavily influenced by the neo-liberal policies of Thatcher’s 
Conservative Government, which advocated and promoted what O’Malley (1992) 
referred to as ‘private prudentialism’ (cited in Gilling, 2007: 3); insofar as local citizens, 
communities and businesses should adopt practices conducive to reducing the risk of 
crime. Practices such as establishing Neighbourhood Watch schemes within communities 
and “the private consumption of security goods and advice” (Gilling, 2007: 3), setting the 
scene for the local governance of crime control (Crawford, 1997). 
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 2.5.1 Responsibilisation and Crime Prevention 
Responsibility has been a buzzword within criminological and sociological discourse, 
thanks in part to the continued use of the concept by both the Conservatives and New 
Labour (Gilling, 2007). The Conservatives first put forward the notion of community 
responsibility for crime prevention by advocating Neighbourhood Watch schemes (Tilley, 
2002; Jones et al., 2009: 286). The Cornish Committee (1965) on the ‘Prevention and 
Detection of Crime’ first proposed the idea of training ‘specialist’ Police officers in the 
area of crime prevention, to liaise with other organisations and networks outside the 
Police, to take on some of the responsibility for crime control (Crawford, 1997: 26; Berry 
et al., 2011: 2; Hughes and McLaughlin, 2002: 149). Responsibility sits comfortably within 
a conservative communitarian discourse, where citizens’ rights are commensurate with 
their civic obligations “conducive to the neo-liberal economic order” (Gilling, 2007: 40).  
 
In 1980 inter-organisational partnerships for crime prevention first found resonance in 
the Gladstone Report ‘Co-ordinating Crime Prevention Efforts’, which sought to induce a 
problem oriented and project focussed approach to crime prevention (Hope, 1995: 31).  
The Home Office quickly recognised the importance of crime prevention in crime control 
and following a booklet titled ‘Crime Prevention: A Co-ordinated Approach’ they set up 
the Crime Prevention Unit in 1983 (ibid: 31; Hughes and McLaughlin, 2002: 152; Liddle 
and Gelsthorpe, 1994: ii).  
However, as far as influential publications go, there are arguably none as influential as the 
Home Office circular 8/1984 not only for the Conservative administration but also on the 
subsequent New Labour Government, especially the following quote: 
“A primary objective of the Police has always been the prevention of crime. However, 
since some of the factors affecting crime lie outside the control or direct influence of 
the Police, crime prevention cannot be left to them alone. Every individual citizen and 
all those agencies whose policies and practices can influence the extent of crime 
should make their contribution. Preventing crime is a task for the whole community”. 
(Home Office, 1984 cited in Hughes and McLaughlin, 2002: 152). 
The ‘responsibilisation strategy’ (Garland, 2001) inherent within this circular sat well with 
a Conservative Government that wished to distance itself from the failures of its own 
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crime control policy (Hughes and Gilling, 2004: 133), whilst simultaneously maintaining 
“its rejection of the welfare state” (Edwards and Hughes, 2002:7). The tool for delivering 
this responsibilisation agenda was primarily within the Five Towns Initiative in 1985 
(Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994; Crawford and Jones, 1995; Gilling, 2007), followed up by 
the Safer Cities Projects in 1988 (Gilling, 2007; Crawford and Jones, 1995; Hughes, 1998: 
85; Crawford, 1997; 98), which combined the focus on crime prevention with a 
partnership approach (Rogers, 2006).  
The Conservatives were convinced that their approach to crime prevention was successful 
(despite crime rates increasing significantly) as demonstrated by a 1990 circular ‘Crime 
Prevention – the success of the Partnership Approach’. However, the Home Office also 
commissioned James Morgan to review the development of crime prevention 
partnerships since the 1984 circular to find out why it was not being as successfully 
adopted as the Conservatives had hoped, which perhaps casts doubt on the veracity of 
the previous report (Crawford, 1997; Gilling, 2007). 
The Morgan Review produced a report titled ‘Safer Communities: The Local Delivery of 
Crime Prevention through the Partnership Approach’ (Rogers, 2006: 5), which represents 
an “important milestone” (Crawford, 1997: 39) in the development of crime prevention 
partnerships, insofar as it recommended that Local Authorities be given ‘statutory 
responsibility’ (ibid: 39) with regard to Crime Prevention Partnerships aided by sufficient 
resources from central government (Rogers, 2006: 6). The report also suggested that 
partnerships should be conceived in the “more inclusive notion of community safety” 
(Gilling, 2007: 65; Hughes and McLaughlin, 2002: 155).  
 2.5.2 Performance Management and the Police 
Under the Thatcher era performance management was a key ingredient within the 
governments’ “value for money culture” (Golding and Savage, 2008: 737), and the public 
sector was an immediate target for reform. However, the Police “remained for some 
considerable time a privileged sector” (ibid: 737) due in no small part to the Police 
Federation’s support of the Conservatives in the run up to the 1979 election (ibid: 747). 
However, by the early 1980s the Police service was no longer immune to public sector 
reform, this was due in no small part to a perceived ‘crisis on performance’ in that the 
Police were failing to deliver on the crime front, despite the many financial settlements 
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bestowed on them (Golding and Savage, 2008: 738). The Conservatives produced a 
number of circulars designed to increase efficiency within the Police service, for example: 
Home Office circular 114/1983, which informed Chief Constables and Police Authorities 
that any future resources would be subject to “improvements in efficiency and 
effectiveness in achieving objectives” (ibid: 88); and Circular 114/1983 focused on 
efficiency and ‘resource management’ (Crawford, 1997: 88).  
This continued until the end of the 1980s whereupon, the Criminal Justice System as a 
whole was subjected to a bombardment of inquiries and investigations by the National 
Audit Office, the Public Accounts Office and the Audit Commission regarding effective 
practice (ibid: 91). The Sheehy (1993) ‘Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards’ 
and a Government White Paper on ‘Police Reform’ (1993) both, “sharpened the 
managerialist agenda for policing” (ibid: 88; Butterfield et al., 2004), regarding internal 
restructure, managerial control and flexible working patterns. Similar, reorganisation also 
occurred along these lines within the probation service, and these organisational changes 
were met with resistance from both sets of public sector workers (ibid: 88). The Police in 
particular operate within a hierarchical structure, which in turn is dependent on a degree 
of operational discretion in lower ranks, which can be hindered if there is a demand to 
meet operational targets (Butterfield et al., 2004: 399).  
Furthermore, the Police Reform Act 2002 initiated a National Policing Plan, which set key 
priorities and national standards and the operational tools to deliver them over a three 
year period (Hope, 2005: 377). The plan places priority on achieving Government targets 
for local Police performance, the first of which was published in October 2005 (Jones, 
2008: 708). The Police Performance Assessment Framework allowed for the comparison 
of ‘similar forces’, which in turn attracts local and national media interest, further 
increasing the pressure on Police to follow those central government targets highlighted 
in the media (ibid: 708).  
This resultant focus on performance management within the public sector can lead to 
negative developments, as actors are driven to focus their attention on measurable 
outcomes, rather than on more holistic (less measurable outcomes) (Jones, 2008). For 
example, the Police may adopt a simplistic focus on:  enforcement and arrest as opposed 
to the less measureable aspects of problem solving policing; or a focus on relatively minor 
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crimes to the detriment of those complex cases that may not produce positive results, 
such as fixed penalty notice offences (Jones, 2008: 708). Jones also points out that there 
has been an increase in resources devoted to the ‘performance of performance’ and 
‘target meeting’, which could result in figures being manipulated rather than an emphasis 
on improving service delivery (ibid: 708). Lipsky (1980) referred to street-level 
bureaucrats as those individuals in public services (Police, Welfare Departments, Schools 
etc.) whose workers have “wide discretion over the dispensation of benefits or the 
allocation of public sanctions” (ibid: xi). He problematizes the measurement of 
performance within these street-level bureaucracies insofar as performance is often 
related to strategic goals as opposed to better performance. For example, are increased 
arrest rates an indication of success, an increase in criminal activity, or merely changes in 
the focus of Police policy? (ibid: 51).  
The Police operate within an environment commensurate with risk and isolation from the 
public at large, and therefore develop a strong organisational culture, which has been 
described as a major “impediment to change” (Hope, 2005: 399). This trend towards the 
‘micro-management’ of policing via performance management arguably continued and 
accelerated under New Labour (Jones, and Van Sluis, 2009). First with the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998, which put in place national objectives and performance indicators 
primarily within the statutory setting of Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships 
(CDRPs) (Donnelly and Scott, 2010a), and secondly by the initiation of a Best Value 
framework, which  was applied to Police Authorities and forces from April 2000 (Jones, 
2008: 707). However, it is towards a key governance tool within policing that this review 
now briefly examines – CDRPs. 
 2.6 Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships/Community Safety Partnerships 
CSPs in the UK were for England and Wales borne out of, and arguably still are, Crime and 
Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP), established by New Labour after they came to 
power in 1997, in part response to the Conservative accusation that New Labour were 
‘soft on crime’ (Muncie, 2002: 154), but also in line with their desire to control Local 
Authority spending (Gilling, 2007). One of the first legislative acts to be created by New 
Labour was the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA), as Hughes (2002: 128) states it is 
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perhaps telling to note that we have “community safety in a crime and disorder act rather 
than crime and disorder in a community safety act”.  
 
The CDA was heavily influenced by many of the Morgan Review’s recommendations – 
including making it a statutory responsibility on ‘responsible authorities’ (Divisional Police 
Commanders and Local Authority Chief Executives) to establish a CDRP under section 5 of 
the Act (Ashby, 2005; Hope, 2005). Crucially, however they decided not to give Local 
Authorities the lead role arguing that it would “give them undue influence over the 
resource deployments of other agencies, notably the Police” (Gilling, 2007: 68). It was 
decided that both the Police and Local Authorities should share responsibility for 
community safety strategies (Loveday, 2006: 112). Responsibility for the Police would be 
overseen by a Home Secretary who had the power to set Police targets thanks to the 
1994 Police Magistrate and Courts Act (PMCA), which New Labour had chosen to retain 
(Gilling, 2007: 68). However, the CDA offered a ‘win-win’ solution for the Police by 
bringing Local Authorities (enhancing community accountability) and other agencies onto 
the Police side to fight crime, who in turn could share the blame if things went wrong 
(Hope, 2005: 374-377).  
 
Problems concerning structure and control existed within CDRPs right from the start. For 
example, CDRPs were to be based on evidence of ‘what works’ or ‘evidenced-based 
practice’. Consequently, ‘responsible authorities’ were inundated with guidance 
pertaining to how they would be able to meet those statutory duties placed on them 
based on a government approved ‘best practice’ guide, such as, ‘Guidance on Statutory 
Crime and Disorder Partnerships’ (Home Office, 1998). 
Most of the statutory guidance deliberated around issues thought to promote ‘successful 
partnership working’, such as:  informal networking with CDRP partners, sufficient 
reporting mechanisms, and representation from senior personnel (Home Office, 1998). 
The Home Office guidance also identified those who they thought to be key players 
involved in the implementation of the legislation, including local Police Commanders, 
Chief Officers, Councillors and representatives from the private and voluntary sector 
(Home Office, 1998: 6.1).     
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The aforementioned guidance referred to the fact that it was ‘not intended to be 
prescriptive’ (Home Office, 1998: Introduction) or that it sought to impose a structure on 
partnerships. Nevertheless, it stated that a CDRP should develop a shared strategy with 
the right level of people, who are able to put effective and accountable decision making 
mechanisms in place, which is more or less a recipe for a structural framework (ibid). 
Similarly, the Guidance gives pointers regarding the levels of representation on the 
partnerships, stating that it should be left for each agency to decide, providing they have 
the authority to make decisions (ibid). This brings into question whether it will be a top-
down or bottom-up approach to partnership, and if it is a top-down approach, then how 
will that impact on the capacity of local community representatives in terms of 
involvement in the decision making process.  
The guidance referred to the “Home Secretary's powers under sections 5(2)(c) and 5(3) of 
the Crime and Disorder Act respectively to specify other bodies which either must 
themselves contribute directly to the work of the partnerships, or must be invited to do 
so” (ibid). A diverse range of groups are included within the category of those who must 
be ‘invited’ to take part ranging from youth  and community groups to shopkeepers, 
Neighbourhood Watch and other groups (ibid). It is within this diversity that structural 
problems exist, for example, as legislative accountability cannot be enforced on non-
statutory groups, which ultimately creates “two classes of CDRP membership” (Gilling, 
2007: 73); which is also germane to CSPs in Scotland.       
Crawford (1997; 1998) argues that partnership working in general is often subject to 
‘differential power relations’. At the structural level there are often deep potentially 
divisive power relations between different agencies within multi-agency partnerships 
(Crawford, 1997; Hope, 2005). These differences in power relations often manifest as 
organisational access to resources, be it human or material, information sharing or ‘claims 
to expertise’ (Crawford, 1997: 127), which can ultimately affect organisations capacity to 
achieve their desired outcome (ibid: 127).  Crawford (1997) argues that large agencies like 
the Police can deploy resources in a fairly rapid and flexible manner compared to others 
who do not have the same hierarchical structure or resources easily at hand (Crawford, 
1997: 127).  They arguably are perceived to have more social capital in terms of being 
able to deploy resources quickly (Coleman, 1988). This in turn can lead to conflict as the 
Police adopt a ‘lead’ agency status, and voice their frustration at the slow decision making 
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process and resource deployment of other agencies, especially in areas where they have 
no interest, which can in turn lead to the withdrawal of Police resources (ibid: 127). 
Critics such as Gilling (2007) and Phillips, (2002) have also highlighted that when the 
Crime and Disorder Act came into existence in the summer of 1998, CDRPs were expected 
to produce their first three yearly crime and disorder reduction strategy by the beginning 
of the following April. They argue that from the outset this can be viewed as particularly 
problematic, given that there was a lack of initial funding and public sector resources 
available to produce an effective strategy within such a short timescale in the first place. 
The strategy also had to allow for effective communication between all the agencies 
involved and more importantly with the local community. As Phillips (2002: 173) states it 
“put an inordinate amount of pressure on partnerships”. Time pressures in particular 
affected the ability to consult with ‘hard to reach’ (Newburn, 2002: 111) sectors of the 
community leading to questions regarding the representativeness of community 
consultation (Phillips, 2002: 173). During an analysis of the first round of audits and 
strategies the Home Office found that target-setting if it happened at all, was a 
‘haphazard affair’, with many CDRPs resorting to the use of ‘umbrella strategies’ that 
repackaged initiatives already in place under the ‘CDRP brand’ (Gilling, 2007: 80).  
 
By 1999 New Labour  initiated the Crime Reduction Programme, which aimed to provide 
funding over a three year period in support of ‘what works’ projects in crime reduction in 
a number of ‘distinct themed areas’ (Gilling, 2007: 81; Homel et al., 2004; McLaughlin, 
2002b: 47). Projects granted funding were subject to an “overhauled performance 
management regime” (Gilling, 2007: 79), which required them to set five year targets for 
the reduction of specific crimes, such as burglary, robbery and vehicle crime (Hope, 2005: 
376). This was subject to a best value performance regime and the results used to 
promote best practice across the country (ibid: 376). One of the major recipients of the 
fund were to be CDRP’s who could apply for funding on a competitive basis, providing of 
course that they could demonstrate they had a disproportionate problem within one of 
the themed area, and an understanding of ‘what works’ principles (Homel et al., 2004). 
The dilemma faced by most CDRPs was that their strategies had already been conducted, 
and if they had not included one of the government’s themed areas in their report, then it 
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would be difficult for them to claim they had a disproportionate problem in that area 
(Gilling, 2007: 84).  
In the end not all CDRPs secured funding from the Crime Reduction Programme, as most 
of it was given to high crime urban areas (ibid: 83). Those who lost out on funding began 
to lose enthusiasm and in real terms the programme began to undermine the 
infrastructure put in place by the CDA (Gilling, 2007: 83). Central government rhetoric 
advocated a localised approach to crime reduction within CDRPs, and it soon became 
apparent that continual reforms of the Criminal Justice System often meant that what 
existed in real terms, was central control couched in the language of localism, which often 
came with strings attached (Keith, 2004; Gilling, 2007; Crawford, 2008). For example, the 
White Paper ‘Strong Leadership, Quality Public Services’, asserted it wished to allow for 
more ‘entrepreneurial government’ (Gilling, 2007:113) under the guise of the 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment, which rated Authorities performance; with 
better performing Authorities earning a degree of autonomy (Wilson, 2004: 117). In other 
words autonomy is earned if you met central rather than local government or community 
targets (ibid). Target setting/monitoring was also reinforced within CDRPs by both the 
Crime Reduction Directorates created in 2000, and by the 2004 Prolific and Other Priority 
Offenders Strategy, which utilised the National Intelligence Model for CDRPs to find on 
average 15 to 20 offenders in their areas (Gilling, 2007; Davies, 2009). Many other 
reforms were enacted during this period which on the face of it often promoted localism. 
On paper it may have looked like ‘rowing’, however, it was more often than not central 
government ‘steering’ (Gilling, 2007; Crawford, 2006).  
  2.6.1 Social Exclusion 
Addressing and tackling the fear of crime and social disorder became high on the New 
Labour agenda, set within a discourse of social inclusion. However, as critics such as 
Crawford (1997) and Gilling (2007) have highlighted social inclusion often translates 
within the discourse of crime control as the social exclusion of the ‘other’. For example, 
within CDRPs there is an inherent problem in that, some voluntary, public and private 
sector agencies have very different organisational aims, priorities and interests to those 
agencies involved within the Criminal Justice System (Skinner, 2010). Some partner 
agencies may prefer to adopt a social welfare approach to crime prevention rather than a 
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more reactive situational based approach, which in turn can lead to tensions amongst 
partner agencies (Hughes, 2002). The CDA for example, created Youth Offending Teams, 
to replace Local Authority social workers within social services (Pamment, 2010: 217) 
primarily to deal with youth criminality, which could lead to an overlap of responsibility 
and possible conflict with regard to how young people are  targeted within the criminal 
justice arena (ibid:225). 
 
Other fundamental problems exist within CDRPs in terms of how young people in general 
are often the target of antisocial behaviour enforcement and exclusion (Flint, 2002; 
Hughes, 2002). New Labour’s crime prevention policies were heavily influenced by 
Etzioni’s ‘third way’ communitarianism which argued that societies moral values were 
being eroded as a direct result of social policies from the left and the New Right’s 
“privileging of self-interest over the needs of social order” (McLaughlin, 2002a: 89). The 
core message that New Labour took was the need for responsibility and obligation and a 
return to ‘core moral values’ (ibid: 89). The Coalition Government elected in 2010 also 
stressed that reforms involve “significant transfers of responsibility from the state to the 
private sector and to the citizen” (Taylor-Gooby and Stoker, 2011: 4); a trend that has 
continued under the present Conservative led UK government. But, a question that must 
be answered is what community or whose community is this based on? Coleman et al., 
(2002: 101) found that in a study in Liverpool a series of formal and informal networks 
were established within partnerships, which were directed towards the “construction of a 
politics of responsibilisation” (ibid: 101), wherein coordinated efforts were made within 
the partnership to channel funds to those thought to be reliable, responsible and credible 
partners (ibid: 101). Furthermore, an ‘unwritten and unofficial’ (ibid: 101) condition for 
inclusion into the partnerships may in fact exclude those organisations and community 
interests that are vital and in most need of help (ibid: 101).  
Many critics argue that not everyone has an equal voice at community meetings, and that 
they are often attended by the same people, the usual suspects (Lowndes and Sullivan, 
2004), who often speak for their own narrow agendas, which do not always include 
notions of security from the perspective of the wider community (Edwards, 2002; Farrow 
and Prior, 2006). A quote by Hart et al., (1997) discusses the perceived issue of the lack of 
community empowerment within partnerships and it is worth repeating in full:  
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“The prime stakeholder who will ultimately determine the success or failure of the 
project is the community. Yet, at the strategic level, they have little or no real say in 
what happens to the area. Whilst they were consulted at the beginning of the project 
to determine what they assessed to be the prime targets for regeneration, time and 
again they are thwarted in their efforts to exercise real control. In the final analysis of 
the level of power holding, the inter-dependent relationship between agencies and the 
citizen is still top down” (Hart et al., 1997: 193 cited in Foster 2002: 186). 
 
How much power you have within communities is often related to the notion of social 
capital. Bourdieu locates social capital within the fields of cultural reproduction; the field 
in this sense is a social space where agents are situated with certain resources, defined as 
four forms of capital: economic, cultural, social and symbolic (Bourdieu, 1986: Flint and 
Rowland, 2003), and “the field structures actions for control over these resources” (Flint 
and Rowland, 2003: 214). Coleman (1988) on the other hand locates social capital within 
the field of economics and rational action, whereas Putnam (2000: 21) has tried to 
identify two different strands of social capital - bonding (or exclusive) and bridging (or 
inclusive) social capital. While all theories in relation to social capital are useful in 
highlighting how elite groups/government utilise all forms of capital to arguably dominate 
others; in terms of partnership working – bonding and bridging social capital (or lack 
thereof) is perhaps more useful within the governance of community safety to describe 
the difference in capacity/power that exists between organisations within the governance 
of community safety. The following section will briefly discuss the aforementioned 
concepts. 
  2.6.2. Social Capital 
To have ‘capital’ per se has long been associated with the notion of economics, for 
example, capital in the sense of property, reified objects and money. Economic capital 
reproduces other forms of capital, for example, cultural capital and human capital (skills 
and knowledge embodied in labour). Bourdieu (1986: 6) refers to cultural capital as “in its 
fundamental state it is linked to the body and presupposes embodiment” – the embodied 
capital in this sense is intrinsic to the person who holds it; integral to the habitus - 
“systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to 
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function as structuring structures...” Bourdieu (1990:53). In other words how the outer 
social world or externalised structures are internalised resulting in internalised 
dispositions, which enable individuals or groups to acknowledge the boundaries set 
within a stratified social world (Swartz, 1997: 103); as a means of communication 
(Bourdieu, 1991) and how they help shape each other (Maton, 2012).  
 
According to Bourdieu (1986) cultural capital can to varying degrees be acquired, (for 
example, through academic qualifications) but, internalised dispositions through, for 
example, language (pronunciations, accent etc.) may determine its value. In essence it 
takes time to cultivate, and it is often made evident through the use of language and 
social class. It is symbolic and effective only insofar as how it is appropriated by agents in 
the various fields of power (economic, political, cultural, scientific etc.).  
 
Social capital is a well discussed concept amongst academics, policy-makers and 
practitioners (Flint and Rowland, 2003), and there are many ways to measure it, through 
for example, social networks, participation in organisations, social support and arguably 
through the most important measure of all – trust (Wallace and Pichler, 2007). It has also 
been associated with the embedded social norms within a given society, indeed in a 
report from the World Bank it is referred to as: 
 
 “The internal social and cultural coherence of society, the norms and values that 
govern interactions among people and the institutions in which they are embedded” 
(Wallace and Pichler, 2007: 29).  
 
Social capital is also as the result of the combined real or possible resources which are 
related to the association or membership of a resilient network made up of relationships 
of mutual ‘acquaintance and recognition’ (Bourdieu, 1986). Bourdieu when discussing the 
‘forms of capital’ describes these relationships as existing: 
 
“Only in the practical state, in material and/or symbolic exchanges which help to 
maintain them. They may also be socially instituted and guaranteed by the application 
of a common name (the name of a family, a class, or a tribe or of a school, a party, 
etc.)” (Bourdieu, 1986: 13). 
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James Coleman locates the notion of social capital within the theory of rational action 
insofar as he states that - every actor has control over a certain amount of resources, and 
has an interest in particular resources, actions or events. Social capital therefore signifies 
certain resource availability to an actor (Coleman, 1988: 98). Much like Bourdieu he 
believes “unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations 
between actors and among actors” (Coleman, 1988: 98). An actor need not be an 
individual, but can also be a ‘corporate actor’, whereupon ‘relations’ exist in terms of the 
sharing of information that can lead to a mutual advantage. However, Coleman asserts 
that while this information exchange may be a beneficial form of social capital for some, it 
may not be viewed as such by others, for example, it may be used to fix market prices or 
restrict the production of some goods.  
 
What is critical to social capital is the notion of trust that exists with (varying degrees) 
within a group or network of individuals. For example, a group that has extensive 
trustworthiness and trust will achieve far more than a similar group where it is absent 
(Coleman, 1988). Putnam (2000: 19) also reinforces the notion that social capital refers to 
the relations between individuals and networks, but also highlights the “norms of 
reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them”. In relation to informal crime 
control - social capital can reinforce a strong sense of collective social norms by making 
possible certain actions whilst restricting others (Rose and Clear, 1998). In this sense a 
prescriptive norm must be adhered to by a community in the belief that it is in the 
interests of collectivism (Coleman, 1988). However, this does not take into account the 
existence of competing sources of community norms; particularly within closed 
communities where low level criminality is tolerated and in some cases encouraged - drug 
use, illegal money-lending, distribution of counterfeit goods etc., (Flint, 2002). Notions of 
trust may still exist within these communities, however, it is more likely to be a ‘narrow 
radius of trust’ (Fukuyama, 2001: 9) where outsiders are viewed with suspicion. The type 
of social capital in existence in this case may more readily be associated with bonding 
social capital. 
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  2.6.3 Bonding and Bridging Social Capital 
Some theorists, such as Putnam (2000: 21) when discussing the collapse and revival of the 
American community have tried to identify two different strands of social capital; 
referred to as bonding (or exclusive) and bridging (or inclusive) social capital. Bonding 
social capital is characterised as most prevalent in people who are likeminded in 
important aspects, most often associated with strong family type groups or groups of 
ethnic minorities (Putnam, 2000; Campbell and Sacchetti, 2014). It is also associated with 
smaller dense groups, which are bound together by strong ties (Wallace and Pichler, 
2007). Some examples may be homogenous type groups such as faith groups based on 
gender, Country clubs or ethnic fraternal associations (Putnam, 2000: 21). 
 
Bridging social capital on the other hand is characterised by weaker ties, heterogeneity; 
and by linking to a broader network of external assets in the course of information 
sharing etc., (Putnam, 2000: 22). Examples, may include business colleagues, or other 
interested groups (Campbell and Sacchetti, 2014), or civil rights organisations, youth 
groups or other politically affiliated groups (Putnam, 2000). Mark Granovetter points out 
that weak ties that have the possibility of linking a person to a useful social or political 
contact, are actually more valuable than strong ties that link an actor to family and friends 
(Granovetter, 1983; Putnam, 2000: 23). This is reinforced by Briggs who points out that 
while bonding social capital is good for getting by, bridging social capital is vital for getting 
ahead; and is particularly crucial within diverse societies (Briggs, 2004: 154); especially 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Vidal, 2004; Rohe, 2004; Gress, 2004).  Furthermore, he 
points out that not all forms of social capital are good for everyone – citing the networks 
that helped facilitate Timothy McVeigh in the bombing of the Federal building in 
Oklahoma City (Putnam, 2000: 23). This can also be true for mafia type networks, criminal 
organisations and other groups associated with crime or deviant behaviour (Fukuyama, 
2001).  
 
Linking social capital is also associated with bonding or bridging social capital, 
characterised by relationships of trust and respect between people across networks; or 
connections to people in positions of authority when there is low access to public or 
private institutions, for example, relationships between citizens and Council 
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representatives within community organisations (Woolcock, 2004). Szreter and Woolcock, 
(2004) describe it as “people who are interacting across explicit, formal, or 
institutionalised power or authority gradients in society” (cited in Campbell and Sacchetti, 
2014: 225). What is apparent from the literature is that social capital is closely associated 
with relations of trust that exist between individuals, groups or networks and is heavily 
influenced by the accepted or dominant norms, rules or regulations set within it.  
 
It is clear that social capital exists in many forms, and in terms of networks and 
partnerships it is a useful theoretical tool to employ to describe the relationships that 
exist between actors and organisations within them. Within crime and disorder and 
community safety partnership working, Coleman’s (1988) economic approach is useful to 
describe how resource dependency may force some organisations to acquiesce to the 
demands of more powerful partners. Partners who may for example, have more symbolic 
power within a particular field (Bourdieu, 1986); for instance policing or community 
planning. However, Putnam’s (2000) concept of bonding and bridging social capital is 
perhaps more useful in explaining why some actors/organisations may fair better in terms 
of acquiring resources in the first place through their extensive connections to 
knowledgeable others.  
Although, CDRP/CSP’s previously discussed, did not statutorily apply to Scotland through 
the CDA enacted in 1998, it nonetheless became increasingly apparent that the newly 
elected Labour dominated Scottish Executive, were keen to absorb and adapt some of 
New Labour’s legislation and policy on crime control; in contrast to a previous penal 
welfare policy divergence from England and Wales, which will now briefly be discussed 
below.  
   2.7 Devolution and the Scottish Government 
The Scotland Act 1998 set in motion the devolution process in Scotland (Danson and 
Whittam, 2011). Hazell (2000) described devolution as a series of decisions that 
transformed “a highly centralised unitary state into a devolved and quasi-federal system 
of government” (cited in Cairney, 2011: 1). This has allowed for a more consensual style 
of politics, wherein the Scottish Government (or the Scottish Executive as it was known 
then) could enact policies tailored to meet the specific needs or interests of Scottish 
45 
 
communities (Cairney, 2011). It was hoped that devolution would reinforce or help 
maintain those institutions that reflected a particular Scottish identity, such as separate 
legal, education, church and local government systems (ibid: 1). Therefore devolution also 
meant the acquisition of the administrative autonomy necessary to put in place policies 
specific to Scotland with the opening of a Scottish Parliament; replete with the legislative 
powers to do so (ibid: 2). Cairney argues that this took place “within a wider system of 
multi-level governance”(ibid: 2), when power was distributed across different levels of 
government, and it is within this framework that the Scottish Government needs Local 
Authorities to deliver services in line with ‘national political and financial priorities’ 
(McConnell, 2004: 211). 
 
McGarvey and Cairney (2008) state that regulation has been one of the main tools used 
by central government in answer to key governance problems, such as the lack of 
accountability and control inherent within ‘arms-length’ external organisations in central 
and local government (ibid: 150). The ‘regulatory state thesis’ (ibid: 150) suggests, that as 
arm’s length agencies take over from public sector agencies to directly serve the public, 
there is a shift away from ‘high trust’ to ‘low-trust’ as more emphasis is placed on the use 
of “authority, rules and standard setting” (ibid: 150). Scrutiny and oversight in Scotland is 
conducted by a variety of bodies, including the Auditor General and Audit Scotland 
(Cairney and McGarvey, 2013). Much of this regulation is based on NPM principles such 
as establishing priorities and targets by use of performance management. In Scotland this 
has become more apparent within the policing of crime and disorder, especially since 
New Labour came to power in 1997, which set in motion the devolution process. For 
example, many academics have commented on how devolution initially circumscribed 
Scotland’s ‘distinctiveness’ in terms of supplanting Scotland’s welfarist principles’ within 
the Criminal Justice System, with an increasing punitive approach focusing on targets and 
objectives  (McAra 2007; McAra and McVie, 2010; Croall, 2006; 2012; Mooney and Scott, 
2012; Maxwell, 2007).  
 
Although there was an initial convergence with England in terms of criminal justice policy 
and partnership working, there is evidence to suggest that Scotland was once again 
returning to a more welfare driven approach, which will briefly be discussed below.  
46 
 
 2.7.1 Divergence and Convergence 
Scotland it has been argued retained a distinctive civic culture within the UK, despite the 
dissolution of the Scottish Parliament in 1707 (McAra 2007; McAra and McVie, 2010; 
Croall, 2006; 2012; Mooney and Scott, 2012; Maxwell, 2007). Scotland’s youth justice 
system in particular has been heralded for its ‘child centred approach’ (McAra, 2007; 
McAra and McVie, 2010; Croall, 2006). The most ground-breaking welfarist approach to 
juvenile justice emerged from the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, which eradicated the 
existing juvenile courts system and replaced it with the Children’s Hearing System (CHS) 
(McAra, 2007; Croall, 2006; Mooney and Scott, 2012). The CHS was based on the 
‘Kilbrandon philosophy’ (McAra and McVie, 2010: 69), borne out of the Kilbrandon 
Committee in 1964, which sought to decriminalise and remove children under the age of 
sixteen from the courts system (Croall, 2006). The philosophy advocated that young 
people (more often than not) were the victims of social circumstances conducive to 
offending behaviour, and therefore sought to rectify this where possible, through the 
care and protection of the child (ibid; McAra and McVie, 2010).  
In contrast to this England and Wales (which had initially attempted to follow Scotland’s 
lead by focusing on child welfare) established the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 
(McAra, 2011). Wherein a more punitive stance was adopted despite the welfarist 
rhetoric enshrined within the Act (McAra, 2011; McAra and McVie, 2010). Scotland 
differed somewhat from other Criminal Justice Systems in Europe and in the USA during 
the 1970s until the 1990s, with its continued commitment to penal welfare values. 
Institutions such as the CHS and Criminal Justice Social Work were according to McAra 
(2007: 107) “emblematic of a distinctively Scottish approach to crime and punishment”, 
which was based on an obligation to promote social justice (ibid). Whilst social justice is 
an ambiguous term to define, in Scotland it has been associated with the need to 
eradicate poverty and inequality as witnessed by an address to the reconvened Scottish 
parliament in 1999 by Donald Dewar who stated “we are committed to promoting social 
justice and equality of opportunity for everyone in Scotland...which lies at the heart of 
political and civic life...” (Dewar, 1999, cited in Mooney and Scott, 2012:1).   
Whilst it is true that the Scottish system tried to avoid the more punitive criminal justice 
policies driven by Thatcher’s neo-liberal agenda in England, it cannot however maintain 
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that it was never affected by them.  For example, the CHS was criticised for being ‘too 
soft’ and in 1983 the Health and Social Services and Social Security Adjudications Act 
allowed for a child to reside in secure accommodation if it was in the public interest 
(McAra and McVie, 2010). In 1995 the Children (Scotland) Act overruled the ‘child 
centred’ approach if the child posed a significant risk to the public (ibid; Croall, 2006).  
On the whole punitive policies were resisted more in Scotland, partly because tight 
criminal justice policy networks made up of Directors of the Judiciary and Social Work, 
and senior civil servants from the Crown Office, were not intrinsically part of the UK 
government, which had a major impact on policy (Croall, 2006). This was combined with 
the unpopularity of the Westminster Conservative government, which in turn led to fewer 
Conservative politicians north of the border, which impacted on Scotland’s ‘ideological 
climate’ (ibid: 591) leading to a divergence from the more popular driven pressures 
inherent within English crime policy (ibid: 591).  
 2.7.2 Convergence 
In spite of a creeping managerialist agenda, Scotland for the most part retained its 
welfarist principles, especially within Criminal Justice Social Work (McAra, 2011). 
However, from the mid to late 1990s core aspects of penal-welfarism in Scotland were 
abandoned as a whole new range of institutions were embedded onto the Criminal 
Justice System, such as: the National Criminal Justice Board, specialist Drug and Domestic 
Violence Courts, and CSPs (ibid: 281). This became more pronounced in the post-
devolution period as the New Labour Westminster government sought to achieve a 
consensus with the newly elected Labour/Liberal coalition Scottish Executive (Croall, 
2006; 2012; McAra and McVie, 2010; Dumbleton and McPhail, 2012). Many argue that 
the dominance of the Labour party at the UK and Scottish Government level, led to a 
‘detartinisation’ of Scottish social policy (McAra, 2011; Croall et al., 2010), partly due to a 
lack of ‘political will’ to go against the ‘Blair orthodoxy’ (Croall, 2006), and partly from a 
lack of political capacity within this ‘fledgling’ Scottish Executive (McAra, 2007), which 
arguably put a brake on innovative policy making (Croall et al., 2010).  
This was most evident within policies directed towards crime and disorder reduction, as 
Scottish Ministers like their English counterparts, began to be driven by a view that 
antisocial behaviour was on the increase (McAra, 2007: 108). Although Crime and 
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Disorder Reduction Partnerships were statutorily imposed on Local Authorities in England 
and Wales, this was not the case in Scotland, and it was not until the Local Government 
(Scotland) Act 2003 that Community Planning Partnerships (incorporating community 
safety) were given statutory force in Scotland (Henry, 2009). McAra (2007) argues that 
this overhaul of the Criminal Justice System placed a (somewhat contradictory) (ibid: 109) 
emphasis on both centralisation and localisation. On the one hand Local Authorities were 
being granted greater autonomy and policy freedom in the guise of multi-agency 
partnerships, but on the other hand, it was also set within a centrally controlled 
managerialist agenda based on best value (ibid: 109; McConnell, 2004).  
It could be argued that convergence with England continued up until and beyond the 
election of the SNP minority government in 2007, as they too lacked, perhaps not the 
political will, but certainly the majority support to diverge too far from the previous 
dominance of Westminster policies. However, prior to the election, there was evidence 
that Scotland would re-emphasise its penal-welfarist principles. For example, the report 
‘Getting it Right for Every Child: Proposals for Action’ once again advocated ‘high quality 
children’s services’ (McAra and McVie, 2010:73), and the SNP government followed it up 
with, ‘Preventing Offending by Young People: A Framework for Action’, which contained 
an uneasy mix of welfarist, risk-assessment, and punitive measures (ibid: 73; Croall, 
2012). In spite of this it was becoming clear that the SNP government were more willing 
to listen to the concerns of ‘policy and practitioner elites’ (McAra and McVie, 2010: 74) 
and were choosing to adopt a less punitive tone towards young offenders (Croall, 2012). 
Ministers withdrew the previous administrations performance targets directed towards 
persistent offenders, quietly set aside pilot youth courts, and more crucially abandoned 
the more punitive aspects of the antisocial behaviour agenda directed towards twelve to 
fifteen year olds (McAra and McVie, 2010: 74-76). 
It could be argued that an area of policy convergence in the UK was within Community 
Safety Partnerships, although Scotland did not begin on the same statutory footing as 
England and Wales, it was nonetheless closely linked to influential New Labour 
Westminster policy, inherent within community planning and antisocial behaviour 
legislation (McAra, 2011; Henry, 2009).  Community Safety in Scotland has been 
subsumed under the remit of Community Planning Partnerships since the 2003 Local 
Government Act, which will be briefly discussed below. 
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 2.8 Community Safety Partnerships within a Scottish Context 
As previously mentioned the CDA, which imposed community safety structures in England 
and Wales (Henry, 2009), called for multi-agency/public co-operation in order to ‘make 
communities safer’ (Gilling, 2007). Although not a statutory requirement in Scotland its 
influence was far reaching within central and local government policy such as section 
15(1) of The Local Government in Scotland Act 2003, which required Local Authorities to 
act as ‘facilitators, to consult and co-operate with community bodies and with other 
public sector bodies as appropriate in a community planning process’ (HMSO, 2003). 
Although, this put partnerships on a statutory footing in Scotland, it was linked to a 
‘broader agenda of good public governance’ (Henry, 2012: 12) rather than focusing solely 
on crime and disorder (ibid: 12).  
Community safety as a concept is hard to define as it encompasses a variety of issues, 
which means it is covered by a wide range of legislation, such as the Antisocial Behaviour 
etc. (Scotland) Act 2004 and the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010. Many 
other Acts contribute to community safety based around for example, Housing, the 
Environment, Road Safety and Child Protection amongst others (Scottish Community 
Safety Network, 2012a). It also has to evolve over time to take on board new 
developments and reports such as the ‘Commission on the Future Delivery of Public 
Services’ (also known as the Christie Commission produced in 2011), which advocates a 
stronger focus on outcomes and long term preventative action (Scottish Government, 
2011c); or the Strategy for Justice in Scotland outlining the aims of the Justice System to 
secure the safety of people and communities in Scotland (Scottish Government, 2012g). 
Since devolution there have been many key moments which have affected the 
development of Community Safety Partnerships in Scotland (Audit Scotland, 2000), for 
example: when the Scottish Executive, and the Association of Chief Police Officers in 
Scotland (ACPOS), and the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) agreed an 
approach in 1998 on how to deliver a partnership model; recommending that they should 
be under the leadership of Local Authorities and/or the Police (Scottish Community Safety 
Network, 2012a); the Scottish Local Authorities Community Forum formed in 1998 
became the Scottish Community Safety Network in 2005, which provided a forum for 
officers responsible for the strategic development of community safety at both the local 
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and national level (ibid); and the Concordat between the Scottish Government and local 
government in 2007, which introduced the Single Outcome Agreement within every Local 
Authority. The Concordat had a major impact on CSPs insofar as it removed ring-fenced 
funding (put in place between 2004-2007), which resulted in a reduction in CSP funding as 
partnerships had to bid against other significant Local Authority priorities and statutory 
duties. Furthermore, as CSPs became more integrated within Local Authorities, there is an 
argument that there is reduced autonomy and more restricted work practices (ibid).  
Nevertheless, CSPs have continued to evolve within this process, wherein a number of 
agencies work together to resolve community safety issues, in line with National 
Outcome nine of the Scottish Government’s National Performance Framework: ‘We live 
our lives safe from crime, disorder and danger’ (Scottish Government, 2011d). 
Nonetheless, there has also been a continuing emphasis on managerialism, audits, 
preparing annual reports etc., which has arguably led to more time being devoted to 
bureaucratic administration, rather than time spent on creative community safety 
strategies (Henry, 2012: 14). A number of reports have been published, for instance, 
relating to how to achieve best value in partnerships, including: ‘Best Value in Public 
Services - Guidance for Accountable Officers’ and a number of Audit Scotland ‘Best Value 
Toolkits’ (Scottish Government, 2011b; Audit Scotland, 2010). This further highlights the 
performance management culture within central and local governance, which could lead 
to the adoption of strategies deemed more readily quantifiable, for example, strategies 
based on reducing specific crimes already identified on National Policing Plans, rather 
than on more holistic social objectives that are difficult to quantify (Henry, 2009).  
 
Henry’s (2012: 14) study on Community Safety Partnerships viewed partnerships as being 
transformative over time, he also viewed partnerships as ‘constellations of communities 
of practice’, rather than a single ‘community of practice’, for example, focused on specific 
domains, such as CCTV, youth initiatives or road safety (ibid: 15). He warns that within 
CSPs areas of work have to continue to be valued/and or resourced in order for 
people/organisations to maintain a commitment to them. This is further complicated by 
the ongoing fiscal crisis and whether or not budget cuts will affect communities of 
practice, or how much it will affect an ongoing commitment to partnership working in 
general (ibid: 16).  However, while highlighting the significant pressures on public 
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spending, the Christie Commission also reinforces that “unless Scotland embraces a 
radical, new collaborative culture throughout our public services, both budgets and 
provision will buckle under the strain” (Scottish Government, 2011c: viii); which suggests 
that partnership working in Scotland is the only feasible way forward (Walklake, 2001).  
Partnership working will also have to be viewed in the context of the Scottish 
Government’s centralisation agenda. For example, as of April 2013 Scotland is the first 
nation within the UK to have one national Police and Fire Service under the Police and 
Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 (Oag, 2012a); which effectively replaced the previous 
eight Scottish Forces (ibid).  However, the former Chief Constable Sir Stephen House in 
the Apex Annual Lecture (2013) made clear that while the Police as an organisation were 
committed to partnership working no ‘partnership should go unreviewed’ (ibid: 9); 
further stipulating that effective partnerships would be reinforced whilst weak ones 
(capable of doing good things) would be strengthened. In effect partnerships would need 
to be ‘proved to be relevant, not simply historic’ (ibid: 9).   
One of the main concerns surrounding a National Police Service is how greater central 
control will affect local policing (Donnelly et al., 2002; Scott, 2013), for instance the shift 
from a tri-partite structure of policing to a structure that arguable favours more central 
control. For example, now governance and oversight of Police Scotland will exist under a 
new Scottish Police Authority (SPA), which will also be responsible for holding the Chief 
Constable to account, and for the provision of forensic services. The Act also gives 
Scottish Ministers the power to direct the SPA, but not the Chief Constable (Scottish 
Government, 2012d).  
 
Scott (2013: 142) highlights that a key comment on policing in the UK is the political 
neutrality of the Police, however there have been concerns expressed that this could 
potentially change under a single Police force. Other concerns have been expressed 
regarding Police accountability and the declining role of Local Authorities, which further 
fuelled the perception of a loss of localism and a decline in local policing (Scott, 2012). For 
example, the SPA will be made up of appointed rather than elected members, who will be 
responsible for the National Policing Plan, which on the face of it signals a move towards 
greater centralism (Fyfe, 2014). Scott (2013: 142-143) argues that as the SPA chair and 
membership are chosen by Scottish Ministers and the Police Service of Scotland will be 
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funded directly by the Scottish Government through the SPA, together with the fact that 
under the Reform Act the “Authority ‘must comply’ with any direction (general or 
specific) given by the Scottish Ministers” means that this creates a potential for “political 
interference in policing”.  
Scott (2013: 143) also pointed out that when the new Chief Constable of Police Scotland 
was appointed by the ‘unelected’ SPA (Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015) (which under the Reform 
Act must be approved by Scottish Ministers) the SPA board only had in place the Chair, 
which granted was a unique circumstance, but it also left the appointment open to 
speculation of political interference from the centre. Under Chapter 7 of the Reform Act 
local policing has been made a statutory requirement with 32 Police areas aligned to 32 
Local Authority areas each with their own Local Commander (although a Local 
Commander may cover more than one Local Authority area) who will draw up the Local 
Police Plan (Legislation.gov.uk, 2012).  
However, Donnelly et al., argue that larger scale policing does not necessarily mean ‘a 
weakening of local community links’ (ibid: 301), by citing how the local divisional 
strategies and community policing initiatives of the largest force in Scotland – Strathclyde 
Police - successfully operated at the neighbourhood level (ibid: 301). The Scottish 
Government also state that the new procedures in place will ensure local accountability, 
by the appointment of Local Commanders and senior officers for each Local Authority, 
which could arguably lead to enhanced localism (Oag, 2012a:5; 2012b). 
The Chief Constable of the new Police Scotland will be given clear authority over the 
direction and control of officers within the force. Other responsibilities will include 
helping to prepare the Strategic and Annual Police Plans, and the new Scottish Police 
Authority’s (SPA) Annual Report. Information on policing and crime will also be sent to 
the SPA (Oag, 2012a: 19). 
This may impact on CSPs in terms of Local Authority and community planning 
involvement or degree of influence over policing in particular. For example, under the 
Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012, Scottish Ministers will determine the strategic 
priorities for the SPA; the SPA will in turn prepare a Strategic Police Plan setting out the 
main objectives for the policing of Scotland (HMSO, 2012: 33-34). On this basis the new 
Chief Constable of Scotland will then prepare an Annual Policing Plan (ibid: 35). Both the 
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SPA and the Chief Constable are required to provide a copy of the Plans to Local 
Authorities, and invite comments, however, it fails to make clear what will happen if a 
Local Authority or Community Planning Partnership, disagrees with a Local Policing Plan, 
which opens up debates surrounding local accountability, which may lead to future 
conflict within CSPs (Oag, 2012a: 5). 
It is not clear how far this policy divergence/convergence process will continue, or how it 
will continue to impact on the community planning process. CSPs in particular, will have 
to adjust to this new fiscal climate, and also to the centralisation agenda of the Scottish 
government. Whether they can, or continue to function in partnership with other 
agencies all ‘singing to the same hymn sheet’ (Nash, 2010) can only be established by 
future research, which looks not only at how partnership functions within a community 
safety context, but also why it is necessary to continue to do so.  
 2.9 Conclusion 
Multi-agency collaboration and network forms of partnership has, following recent trends 
in central government reform, focused more on the necessity of local governance as 
opposed to local government.  Both the Conservative Government and the New Labour 
Government in the past two decades have placed an emphasis on the importance of local 
solutions to local problems. However, as previously discussed the Conservative solution 
focused more on freeing up the markets, in terms of ‘rolling back the state’ (Heffernan, 
2000). This neo-liberal agenda advocated individual choice set within an economic market 
exchange system, which advanced private sector business practices in the guise of new 
public management principles (Stoker, 2004b). However, within this agenda there 
appeared to be very little space for manoeuvre for Local Authorities, the Conservatives 
quickly chose to reduce their powers through a series of reforms, which saw then more as 
enabler than service provider (Gilling, 2007).  
When New Labour came to power they began a modernisation process which sought to 
reduce the fragmentation inherent within the previous government’s ideology of market 
individualism (Stoker, 1999). They sought to do this through a process of ‘third way’ 
politics, which sought to encourage private enterprise whilst simultaneously controlling 
its excesses by virtue of regulation, evaluation and evidence led practice couched within 
the ethos of best value (Rhodes, 1997). New Labour intended to return some control back 
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into the hands of local government, but it was to be held in check by the tight reigns of 
partnership working and the regulatory systems that came with it (Carnwell and Carson, 
2009). Collaboration with central and local government was the order of the day, within a 
framework of networks, partnerships and joined-up services. For New Labour, one of the 
most influential forms of legislation geared towards partnership working was the CDA, 
which made it a statutory requirement for Local Authorities and the Police to work in 
partnership with other public, private and  third sector agencies together with other local 
community groups and organisations (Gilling, 2007). Borne out of this legislation was the 
Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships or Community Safety Partnership’s as they 
have now become known (Crawford, 1997). 
Community safety can trace its roots back to the preventive practices inherent within 
Crime Prevention Partnerships developed during the 1980s, such as the Five Towns 
Initiative and the Safer Cities project (Hendry, 2012, Liddle and Gelsthorpe 1994; 
Crawford and Jones, 1995; Rogers, 2006). There has existed since the influential Home 
Office circular 8/1984 (Hughes and McLaughlin, 2002: 152), and the Morgan Review (ibid; 
Crawford, 1997; Gilling, 2007) a tacit cross-party agreement that ‘wicked issues’ such as 
crime and social deprivation can no longer be tackled by single departments or agencies 
(Gilling, 2007; Crawford, 1997; Edward and Hughes, 2002; Rogers, 2006).  
However, it has not been without its problems. There is no doubt that working in 
partnership may in principal be a ‘good thing’ if it leads to:  public sector agencies working 
together to benefit the public and individual service users; or if it addresses the gaps and 
overlaps in services; and allows for the development of greater accountability to local 
communities, while addressing how to tackle crime and disorder for example. It should 
also be noted that the evidence base for better services for users and communities is 
small; most benefits appear to be felt by practitioners/agencies (Rummery, 2002). The 
literature has shown that partnership working is often problematic in terms of, historical 
distrust between agencies, especially between those agencies that have different 
perceptions about how to tackle crime and disorder, such as the Police and social welfare 
agencies (Crawford, 1997; Crawford and Jones, 1995; Pamment, 2010).  
In this sense, within the governance of crime control, partnerships need to: find ways to 
enhance greater collaboration; address the concerns of all agencies involved within a 
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partnership or network; improve co-ordination and information sharing practices to avoid 
unnecessary duplication of effort; and above all treat the communities they service as 
equal partners within the local governance of crime. Of course within the present 
economic climate some actors/agencies may find it more difficult than others to continue 
within a collaborative discourse; particularly if negative perceptions on status impact on 
trust – a defining element of social capital crucial to partnership working. Therefore 
finding innovative ways to increase capacity/social capital may be advantageous to multi-
agency partnership working; or finding ways for a more equitable distribution of 
resources, perhaps by co-locating agencies (Frost, 2005: 17), although co-locating may 
not necessarily overcome confidentiality issues when it comes to information sharing 
(ibid: 31). 
The above discussion has focused on how changes within central and local government by 
both the Conservatives and New Labour have led to an increase in multi-agency 
partnerships within the UK. CSPs in Scotland are arguably more distinctive than their 
counterparts in England and Wales; particularly during an ongoing public sector reform 
process, and it is within this context that the research questions are set;  
 
 What role do CSPs play in the governance of community safety in contemporary 
Scotland? 
 How will the planned governance changes and reform processes affect CSPs in terms 
of local accountability? 
 How will performance management cultures within central/local government, and in 
particular within the Police, affect CSP priorities and/or goals? 
 How do the organisational aims and culture of CSP partners, who possess different 
levels of power and influence, effect or determine the strategic priorities of CSPs? 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
 3.1 Introduction  
Within the governance/criminology field there is a great deal of literature surrounding 
Community Safety Partnerships/Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships in England 
and Wales (see for example, Crawford, 1998; Hughes, 1998; Hughes et al., 2002; Carnwell 
and Buchanan, 2009; Berry et al., 2011). However, there is comparatively less literature 
on Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) or criminal justice policy in Scotland. This was a 
point addressed by Croall et al., (2010), in ‘Criminal Justice in Scotland’, when they stated 
there had been a “general neglect of Scotland in many key criminology and criminal 
justice texts” (ibid: 6). Henry (2012) has tried to address this by looking at communities of 
practice in CSPs in Scotland, or more particularly the transformative potential in 
partnerships (however, this was based on PhD research conducted during 2000-2004).  
 
As a result this PhD study endeavoured to look at the governance of community safety 
within a broader Scottish context (for example, as part of the wider Community Planning 
Partnership process), by adopting a comparative case study approach in order to explore 
how CSPs work within different localities; especially during periods of major structural 
reform. For example, much has been written around concerns about the loss of local 
autonomy with respect to an ongoing centralisation agenda (Donnelly et al., 2002; Scott, 
2012; Fyfe, 2014; Fyfe and Terpstra, 2015). Other key issues were examined around: 
agenda setting; organisational culture; co-location; community engagement; third party 
policing and accountability, which allowed for further theoretical explorations around 
perceptions on social capital and power, and how this may impact on partnership working 
within the domain of community safety. Furthermore, the study was conducted during a 
period of significant change within the governance of community safety in Scotland 
(namely during a period of sharp fiscal retrenchment; including the reform of the Police 
and Fire Services into two single services). This allowed participants to put forward their 
views and opinions based on past and present experiences, and to speculate on how this 
may affect future partnership working in Scotland, which in turn would help to answer 
the main research questions. 
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 3.2 Bespoke Partnership Assessment Framework 
In order to ascertain how the Partnerships worked an interview schedule/bespoke 
framework was created to enable questions to be framed within particular contexts. This 
was influenced by Hudson and Hardy’s (2002) ‘Partnership Assessment Tool’ (ibid: 53), 
which was produced as an effective framework for the evaluation of Health and Social 
Care Partnerships (ibid). The framework looked at six key principle areas: acknowledging 
the need for partnership; clarity and realism of purpose; commitment and ownership; the 
development and maintenance of trust; clear and robust partnership arrangements and 
monitoring, review and organisational learning (ibid: 53-61).  
 
This framework was developed with Health and Social Care Partnerships in mind, but, it 
has been acknowledged that it could be adapted to evaluate many public sector 
organisations (ibid; Halliday et al., 2004).  Although there are acknowledged difficulties 
within partnership self-assessment tools (see Halliday et al., 2004, regarding lack of 
reflexivity, and difficulties around ranking), it can however provide a useful framework as 
a guide for analysis of qualitative interviews. For example, Hudson and Hardy’s six key 
principle areas, listed above, could be germane to CSP’s; not least, the 
difficulties/benefits of working with a multitude of agencies. Therefore it was decided to 
create a similar framework (not for evaluation purposes) but to assist in the analysis of 
qualitative data, and to provide a more explanatory approach to the research process. 
Consequently a semi-structured interview schedule was created3 (see Appendix A) to ask 
questions around the key areas listed below. It also helped increase internal validity by 
ensuring that each participant within the different case study areas were asked the same 
initial questions in order to elicit a sort of constant comparison between each case study 
area (Corbin and Strauss, 2015).  
 Partnership Origins 
 Power Structure/ control 
 Co-ordination and Steering  
 Communication/commitment  
                                                          
3 The interview schedule for Burnside used Partnership as a descriptor instead of CSP 
58 
 
 Organisational culture 
 Responsibility/Accountability 
 Benefits to the community 
 
This semi-structured interview template allowed participants to give more in-depth 
answers to the questions posed (when appropriate) and encouraged other areas of 
interest to be brought into the sphere of community safety. It also allowed the researcher 
to understand more fully this complex governance arena, by ascertaining amongst other 
things: the types and numbers of partners involved, and who are considered to be the 
main collaborators; how the command structure is organised; who sets the strategic 
goals; tensions surrounding distinct organisations with distinct organisational practices; 
the impact of one national Police service on partnership working; the efficacy of data 
sharing/communication and commitment; accountability issues; and the benefit (if any) 
of community safety partnership working to local communities in terms of engagement. 
 3.3 Design: The Case Study Process 
In order to interpret how these complex issues affect partnership working it was decided 
that a qualitative comparative case study approach was the most appropriate research 
method. By adopting a comparative case study approach it allowed for an in-depth 
analysis of the complexities around partnership working within the governance of 
community safety across three distinct geographical areas thereby increasing validity and 
reliability (see 3.4 and 3.6 for further discussion). Gerson and Horowitz (2002: 199) state 
qualitative research involves a “direct encounter with ‘the world’, whether it takes the 
form of ongoing daily life or interactions with a selected group” (ibid). Yin (2003) argues 
that although there are several ways to conduct a study, for example, surveys or 
experiments, in the case of explanatory research that seeks to understand how or why a 
phenomenon happens, then a case study approach is the more suitable strategy. A case 
study also allows you to look at a specific ‘institution’ or ‘practice’ in detail (Thomas, 
2011), by continually asking “what is this a case of” (Becker cited in Thomas, 2011: 20), 
thereby allowing for potential explanations or theories to emerge around specific 
phenomena (ibid: 20).  
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This involved looking at different kinds of evidence in order to ascertain how local policy 
and practice - within the different layers throughout organisations and their partner 
agencies - impact on local CSPs. Consequently this involved: conducting 49 semi-
structured qualitative interviews with key stakeholders throughout the case study areas; 
who were arguably in a position to provide explanations that may answer the research 
questions (Yin, 2014: 28). This included participants from the public sector, third sector 
and from local communities (Community Councils); Nine non-participant observations of 
Community Safety/Community Planning Partnership meetings in order to try and 
compare the rhetoric of CSPs with the reality; One telephone interview was conducted 
with a participant from the Scottish Government Community Safety Unit (to principally 
provide information on useful policy documents to access (such as: the Christie 
Commission, The Strategy for Justice in Scotland, and links to further Scottish Community 
Safety Network publications); Documentary analysis of Scottish Government, Local 
Government, and Community Safety policy documents, in order to understand the policy 
terrain with respect to governance/partnership working and community safety. This 
involved using qualitative content analysis; not to interpret every aspect of a policy 
document, but to look at how particular words (partnership, engagement, community, 
reform, localism, harm, safety etc.) are being said or expressed within policy documents 
(Schreier, 2012) - in an effort to understand the ‘strategic intention’ and to compare how 
‘intention’ manifests at an operational level. Lipsky (1980) argues that public policy is not 
best understood as it is made by high ranking administrators, but how it is realised “in the 
crowded offices and daily encounters of street-level workers” (ibid: xii).  
As this study looked at a range of criteria, including how different organisational 
priorities/and or cultures affect partnerships, it was decided that it would be prudent to 
conduct a comparison between three CSPs within three distinct geographical Local 
Authority areas, such as: a large densely populated urban area (Burnside); a smaller 
urban/commuter – hinterland (Cartside); and a small urban/remote rural/islands 
dispersed geographical area (Avonside). A comparative case study approach allowed the 
researcher to look for any differences or similarities within the three distinct case study 
areas. This provides a more comprehensive analysis in that any thematic conclusions 
arising from all three case studies would be stronger than ones emanating from a single 
unique case study. This is especially so if ‘common conclusions’ (Yin, 2003: 53) arise from 
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all cases to the point that it will have greatly expanded the analytic generalisability of the 
findings compared to a single case study (ibid: 53). This was done in an effort to 
counteract claims that a lack of generalisability is a common limitation associated with 
the case study approach (Zainal, 2007; Flyvbjerg, 2013; Starman, 2013; Yin, 2014). Other 
limitations include arguments around ‘a lack of rigour’ and possible selection or 
researcher bias (ibid). The case study areas were ‘selected’ because of their distinct 
geographic/demographic characteristics in an effort to increase rigour/validity (see 3.4 
and 3.6 below for further discussion).    
 3.4 The Case Study Areas 
The case study areas were chosen in order to try and obtain a geographical balance in 
terms of the types of areas covered by local CSPs. This in turn would increase the 
generalisability of any similarities/differences found between the different case study 
areas: for example, examining if complex governance/structural issues are similar within 
different Local Authority areas despite the diversity/geography of the area; or if 
actors/agencies respond to a particular phenomenon in a similar way. Consequently, 
three areas were chosen to represent the distinct geo-political landscape within Local 
Authority areas, which will be described more fully below.  
The three case study areas were all in the process of local government organisational 
reform; though they were at different stages of reform (Burnside was more advanced 
than Cartside, but Cartside was more advanced than Avonside). All of the interviews/non-
participant observations occurred during 2013; formal interviews within each case study 
area were digitally recorded and fully transcribed to allow for accuracy and increase 
rigour, whereas, written notes were used for non-participant observations due to issues 
relating to consent, for example, taking notes at public meetings (Angrosino, 2004). The 
advantage of this is it allows the researcher to take notes discreetly, while observing how 
and what issues are discussed in a public setting (Kellehear, 1993). All place names and 
names of individuals within the specific case study areas were changed; this included 
agency names if they contained the name of the case study area (in the bibliography all 
URL online addresses were deleted if they contained the name of the case study area; 
however, examiners will be supplied with a separate complete list if requested). In order 
to further anonymise the identity of the case study areas - only general descriptions will 
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be given with respect to population and crime. Participant interviews were referenced 
with the initial of the case study area and given a number in order to identify the 
participant for research purposes. For example, the first participant interviewed in 
Avonside = A001.  
 3.4.1 Avonside/Avon Isle. 
Avonside covers a vast (mainly coastal) geographical area with a largely rural population. 
The population is sparse compared to the Scottish average; with 45% of its population 
classified as remote rural, and 7% classified as accessible rural (Avonside, 2016); in terms 
of ethnic diversity 1.2% of the total population is made up of minority ethnic groups (NRS, 
2013).  The number of recorded crimes by the Police per 10,000 population by Local 
Authority area in 2013-14 was 1212 (Scottish Government, 2014b). There are 23 
inhabited island communities; including Avon Isle, which was chosen for the case study. 
The main town in Avon Isle is called Viewside; which is included in the 15% most overall 
deprived data zones in Scotland with a declining population (ibid). Avon Isle was chosen 
as a case study, not only because of familiarity with the island, but because it had 
experienced radical economic changes since the late 1970’s. Avon Isle used to be a 
popular holiday destination for the traditional working classes; however, it had witnessed 
a rapid decline in tourism, linked in part to the collapse of industrial industries, and to 
changing patterns in holiday destinations. As a result the main town Viewside had 
drastically altered, from a bustling, vibrant, economically viable town to one that was 
visibly in decline and suffering from economic neglect.  
 
Participants were mainly based on Avon Isle (situated in Viewside), however, some 
participants were based in Troy in the mainland (the largest settlement in Avonside), and 
covered a number of neighbouring localities; including Avon Isle (ibid). Inter-agency 
partnerships were generally based in Viewside, and this is where all of the interviews 
were conducted; apart from the original access interview, which was conducted in a 
Council office in Troy.  
15 semi-structured interviews were conducted (13 face to face, and 2 by phone). Two 
interviews were conducted with the same person (once as a gatekeeper for access, and 
then as a formal member of the CSP). Consequently, their interview reference will be 
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either (A001 -1st) (if the information refers to the first interview) or (A001 – 2nd) (if the 
information refers to the second interview). Two meetings were also observed: one CSP 
meeting in June, 2013; and one Area CPP meeting in December 2013 (see Figure 1); 
Figure 1: list of participants and non-participant observations in Avonside/Avon Isle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3.4.2 Burnside 
Burnside is a large urban city with one of the largest populations in Scotland. It has a large 
ethnically diverse population in comparison to the other two case studies; 11.6% of the 
total population is made up of minority ethnic groups (NRS, 2013). The number of 
recorded crimes by the Police per 10,000 population by Local Authority area in 2013-14 
was 3001 (Scottish Government, 2014b). Burnside was principally chosen because of its 
size and the fact that it has a unique co-located ‘arms-length’ external organisation, 
known as Community Safety Burnside, which operates alongside existing crime 
prevention agencies, such as the Police. Initially it was decided to focus on Burnside’s 
strategic CSP with regard to interview data etc. However, as this no longer existed and 
community safety was to be incorporated within the new wider CPP a new plan had to be 
devised. The new CPP structure included 21 Area Partnerships covering the multi-
member wards in Burnside. One Area Partnership was chosen (Burnpark/City) as it 
bordered the city centre and Burnpark and included community representatives from 
both deprived and middle class areas. For example, Burnwood is a middle class area 
 
(A001) Community Safety Co-ordinator 
(A002) Rape Crisis 
(A003) Group Commander Fire Service 
(A004) Senior Police Officer 
(A005) Council Area Housing Officer. 
(A006) Environmental Health Officer 
(A007) Housing Officer – R&S Homes 
(A008) Local Councillor 
(A009) Street Scene Warden 
(A010) Housing Manager – Avon Homes 
(A011) Avon Isle Forum for Older Voices 
(A012) Avon Isle Community Council 
(A014) Child Protection 
(A015) Licensing Standards Officer 
 
CSP meeting June, 2013; 
Area CPP meeting December, 2013 
Participants 
 
Non-participant observations 
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within the city centre populated by a thriving business and night time economy, and 
representatives from Burnwood Community Council sit on the Burnpark/City Area 
Partnership. In comparison Burnpark borders the city centre and is characterised as an 
area of deprivation; 86% of the population are of working age, however, the percentage 
of people in employment is lower than the average for both Burnside and Scotland, and 
the ethnic minority population has steadily increased in size from 12% in 2001 to 26% in 
2011 – which was double the Burnside average (Understanding Burnside, 2012).  
20 semi-structured face to face interviews were conducted (more conducted in this case 
study in relation to its size and in order to cover the newly formed CPP structure), and 5 
non-participant observations of partnership meetings took place within the new CPP 
structure: 2 Burnpark/City Area Partnership meetings (May and September, 2013); North 
West CPP (August, 2013); Strategic CPP (November, 2013); and Safe Burnside Group 
(August, 2013). (See Figure 2); 
Figure 2: List of participants and non-participant observations in Burnside 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A number of local Councillors and Police Officers were interviewed in comparison to the 
other case study areas in order to cover the different structures and services they 
represented; for example, B005 was the overall Police Commander who sat on the 
(B001) Partnership and Development Manager  
(B002) Principal Officer  
(B003) Police Chief Inspector  
(B004) Local Councillor  
(B005) Area Police Commander  
(B006) Local Councillor  
(B007) Burnside Housing Association   
(B008) Chair of Community Health Partnership  
(B009) Senior Officer Fire Service  
(B010) Chair of Third Sector Forum 
(B011) Local Councillor  
(B012) Police Superintendent  
(B013) Burnwood CC 
(B014) Performance and Information Manager              
(B015) Local Councillor   
(B016) Chair/Burnpark CC  
(B017) Burnpark CC  
(B018) Child Protection   
(B019) VAW Co-ordinator 
(B020) Chair of City Centre Alcohol Action Grp 
 
Burnpark/City Area Partnership meeting 
May, 2013; September, 2013 
 
North West CPP meeting August, 2013; 
 
Strategic CPP meeting November, 2013; 
 
Safe Burnside Group meeting August, 
2013 
 
Participants 
 
Non-participant observations 
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strategic CPP, whereas B003 sat on the Safe Burnside Group, and B012 sat on the 
ADP/Licensing Board/One Burnside. B004 sat on an Area Partnership and was the Chair of 
CSB4; B006 was the Chair of both the Safe Group and VAW5 Partnership; B011 sat on the 
North West CPP; and B015 sat on the Burnpark/City Area Partnership. Similarly, three 
Community Councillors were interviewed; B013 represented Burnwood CC on the Area 
Partnership and all CC’s on the NWCPP; and B016 was the Chair of Burnpark CC; B017 
represented Burnpark on the Area Partnership. 
 3.4.3 Cartside 
The city of Cartside (where most of the research took place) is surrounded by a mix of 
smaller urban and commuter – hinterland areas. Its population is about one sixth the size 
of Burnside, but covers a larger geographical area. Cartside was chosen because of its 
geographic diversity, and locality, in relation to Avonside and Burnside. In terms of ethnic 
diversity 3.2% of the total population is made up of minority ethnic groups (NRS, 2013).  
The number of recorded crimes by the Police per 10,000 population by Local Authority 
area in 2013-14 was 1439 (Scottish Government, 2014b). The Cartside Council area is 
relatively affluent in comparison to the other case study areas, for example, the level of 
income deprivation in Cartside is 9% compared to 12% across Scotland as a whole. 
However, there are some areas of deprivation including Hanes (one participant 
interviewed represented this area on the Community Council).  
Participants were mainly based in Cartside city centre, however, one participant was 
situated just outside the city centre, and another was situated in Camber, which was part 
of NHS Crawley’s Regional Health Board area covering both Camber and Cartside.  
14 semi-structured face to face interviews were conducted. One of the interviews was a 
joint interview (however, each participant responded to the questions independently, 
therefore, this was recorded as two interviews for analysis purposes). Two interviews 
were with the same person (once as a gatekeeper for access, and then as a formal 
member of the CSP). Consequently, their interview reference will be either (C001 – 1st) (if 
the information refers to the first interview) or (C001 – 2nd) (if the information refers to 
the second interview). Two meetings were observed of the Cartside CSP; both in 
                                                          
4 Community Safety Burnside 
5 Violence Against Women 
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September 2013 (the second meeting was called to inform partnership members of a 
change in structure to the CSP). (See Figure 3);  
Figure 3: List of participants and non-participant observations in Cartside 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3.5 Access 
 
Access was sought for the chosen case study areas after ethical approval for the research 
process was granted in November 2012 by the Ethics Committee for Applied Social 
Research in Stirling University. Achieving access was an ongoing laborious process, which 
involved utilising existing contacts, searching online Council databases, and  sending out 
numerous emails – with follow up phone calls (if necessary). An initial meeting was set up 
with a ‘gatekeeper’ in all three case study areas – usually a Council officer involved with 
governance and partnerships - in order to obtain access to Council agencies involved with 
the partnership process. The research study was explained, and copies of consent 
forms/information sheets were handed over for their perusal. This was a key element to 
the research process as the Council through the Community Planning Partnership process, 
are generally thought to be the key partners (next to the Police) involved with CSPs.  
 
Once access was obtained, ‘gatekeepers’ were asked for a list of other agencies involved 
in the partnership process; who were then contacted – either by email or phone. A 
number of agencies/individuals can be involved with different CSPs over either long 
(C001) CPP Manager  
(C002) Third Sector Forum  
(C003) Child Protection   
(C004) Group Manager Fire Service  
(C005) Rape Crisis  
(C007) Addiction Support  
(C008) Community Safety Projects Manager  
(C009) Lead Officer for Cartside ADP 
(C010) Youth Services   
(C011) Area Commander Police   
(C012) Cartside Licensing Forum/Hanes CC 
(C013) Housing Manager for Crawley Housing  
             Association 
(C014) Local Councillor  
 
 
CSP meeting 2nd September, 2013  
 
CSP meeting 30th September, 2013 
 
 
Participants 
 
Non-participant observations 
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periods or short periods of time, for example, with regards to issue specific or area 
specific initiatives. Therefore – in order to achieve some sort of parity within the case 
study areas – agencies were chosen who appeared to have either a statutory basis for 
attendance, or through longevity/consistence, and relevance: see figure 4 on page 67. 
Descriptions of the types of participants’ in each Box in figure 4 are provided in the key 
below: 
 
Key to figure 4: 
 
 
  
Avonside (A); Burnside (B); Cartside (C). 
Box 1  -  represents the main statutory agency participants’ - including 
representatives who sat on either the Alcohol and Drug Partnership or 
Partnerships associated with antisocial behaviour within each case study 
area 
Box 2 – agencies involved in youth services/offending 
Box 3 – Licensing Forum/Board 
Box 4 – overarching connecting structures 
Box 5 – issue specific third sector representatives 
Box 6 – mixed third sector representatives on different case study areas;                       
including Housing in all three           
Box 7 – Community Council representatives 
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Figure 4: Types of organisations represented in the three case study areas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(A) (B) (C) 
Police Service  
Fire Service  
Senior Council Officers 
Local Councillors 
Alcohol and Drug 
Partnership  
Antisocial Behaviour 
Partnership  
 
Youth Services (C) 
Child Protection (A) (B) 
(C) 
One Burnside (B) 
Violence Against 
Women (B) 
Rape Crisis (A) 
Rape Crisis (B) 
Third Sector Forum 
(C) (B) 
Avon Isle Forum for 
Older Voices (A) 
Addiction Services 
Cartside (C) 
Community Safety 
Burnside (B) 
Housing (A) (B) (C) 
Licensing Forum (A) 
Licensing Forum (C) 
Licensing Board (B) 
Avon Isle 
Community Council 
(CC) (A) 
Burnpark CC (B) 
Burnwood CC (B) 
Hanes CC (C) 
Overarching Structures 
 
Community Planning 
Partnership (A) (B) (C) 
 
Community Safety Partnership 
(A) (C) 
 
Area CPP (A) (B) 
 
Safe Burnside (B) 
 
Area Partnership (B) 
Box: 1 
Box: 5 
Box: 6 
Box: 4 
Box: 7 
Box: 3 
Box: 2 
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 3.5.1 Problems with access 
Once initial access was granted a number of agencies were contacted to take part in the 
research process. Similar problems emerged in all three case study areas, for example, 
some agencies never responded to emails, or if they did, they did not think they had 
anything relevant to discuss around the concept of community safety. This was especially 
the case with agencies associated with Health and Social Care. For example, some 
participants from Alcohol and Drug Partnerships (ADPs) did not initially link their 
agency/role to community safety – despite being members of the CSP.  However, once 
the clear links between alcohol/drugs to crime/anti-social behaviour etc. were pointed 
out, participants from those agencies (in Burnside and Cartside) consented to be 
interviewed. This was not the case in Avonside. Despite repeated emails/phone calls; no 
key individual from the Avonside ADP was interviewed formally (a brief email discussion 
occurred – outlining the ADP structure in Avonside). However, once the interview process 
started it was clear that a number of participants wore different ‘hats’. For example, 
participants in Avonside from the Licensing Forum and Avon Isle Forum for Older Voices 
also sat on the ADP. Therefore, questions were addressed to them about their roles on 
the different partnerships where relevant.  
This was also the case for some other agencies, for example, one representative in 
Cartside was interviewed from Youth Services, but there were no comparable agencies in 
Avon Isle or Burnside. However, individuals who sat on the Anti-Social Behaviour Forums 
(Housing, Child Protection, Police with regard to ‘One Burnside’, ‘Burnside Life’) were 
judged to be comparable with regard to youth initiatives etc. Where possible parity across 
the case study areas was sought, however, when this proved impossible, other 
participants were chosen who wore a number of ‘hats’ who could cover a number of 
areas. 
One other problem occurred during the interview phase regarding Burnside (which was 
chosen because of its unique co-located ‘arm’s-length’ external organisation - Community 
Safety Burnside). After the initial ‘gatekeeping’ interview Burnside decided to implement 
radical changes to its governance structure; including disbanding the CSP groups. After an 
initial ‘gulp’ moment it was decided to go ahead with Burnside as a case study as it would 
provide a unique view of how community safety would be dealt with within the 
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community planning structures as a result of this change; given that CSPs in all case study 
areas were part of the Community Planning Partnership (CPP) process. In this instance, it 
was decided to interview agencies/individuals from one of the new local Area Partnership 
and Safe Burnside structures, and from within the reformed CPP; incorporating those 
agencies previously involved with the old CSP structure. Interviews in Burnside also had to 
be deferred until after the summer break, as it was decided by organisational 
‘gatekeepers’ that there was too much organisational upheaval to grant immediate 
access. 
Access on the whole (through Council gatekeepers) proved difficult and I had to resort to 
contacting some participants personally via email and subsequently relying on a 
snowballing effect; or through utilising an opportunistic approach (Bryman, 1992) via 
personal contacts within the Council. However, difficulties occurred with respect to 
accessing Community Council members (who were necessary in order to gain some 
insight from local communities; albeit a selective viewpoint) who were not immediately 
identifiable on the Council website.  Consequently a number of emails were sent to a 
Senior Council officer in Burnside asking them for the contact details of Burnpark Area 
Partnership members. The request was ultimately refused citing data protection with 
regard to sensitivity issues involved in supplying private addresses as opposed to business 
ones. However, contact could also presumably be made by email or by phone in which 
case this would not be an issue; for instance, guidance for Community Councils states that 
‘subject to the provisions contained within the Data Protection Act 1998; contact details 
of Community Council members must be provided’ (Scottish Government, 2009b: 2).  
This consequently led to a suspicion that contact with Community Council members was 
being obstructed in some way by some key officials. Therefore using an opportunistic 
approach - community representatives were approached directly at a sectoral Community 
Planning Partnership (CPP) meeting, and asked to participate in the research study. This 
approach was also used in Avon Isle, whereupon two community representatives were 
asked to participate in the research after attending a CSP meeting; although this was not 
principally related to obstructed access; just being in the right place at the right time – 
particularly as this was an island community.  
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Cartside had a different difficulty to overcome in that they did not have any community 
representatives formally represented on the CSP. In this case I tried to contact 
Community Council representatives directly via information provided online (email 
addresses); but, no one replied. However, owing to time pressures and utilising the more 
than one ‘hat’ scenario it transpired that the participant from the Licensing Forum was 
also a recently retired member of Hanes Community Council. Therefore, their views were 
sought regarding questions about community engagement.  
 3.6 Analysing and Presenting the Data 
All of the data collected through interviews, non-participant observation, and phone-
call/email information were input into QSR Nvivo 10 – a computer assisted qualitative 
data analysis software (CAQDAS) programme (Bringer et al., 2006). In total there were 50 
(on average one hour duration) interviews: 15 in Avonside; 20 in Burnside; 14 in Cartside; 
and 1 Scottish Government (phone interview – 30 minutes duration) to the Community 
Safety Manager. Two pieces of data concerned information on the structure of ADPs: one 
email regarding the structure in Burnside; and one phone call (notes taken) regarding the 
structure in Cartside. 9 non-participant observational notes of partnership meetings: 2 in 
Avonside; 2 in Cartside; and 5 in Burnside. A number of memos were created in NVivo 
including a research diary and write up notes.  
 
24 of the interviews were transcribed by the researcher (mostly verbatim; except for 
instances when the participants drifted off track to discuss mainly personal information), 
however, as this was exceedingly time consuming; the remaining interviews were 
transcribed verbatim by a University of Stirling approved transcription service. The 
analysis itself used an interpretivist approach in order to try and understand the collective 
knowledge of participant’s perceptions, beliefs and organisation/social norms within a 
particular context (Mason, 2002).  
A common critique associated with qualitative research methods usually concerns 
problems surrounding validity and replicability or the lack of ability to generalise the 
research findings from a research sample to the wider population, compared to the 
scientific approach usually associated with positivist/quantitative research (Bryman and 
Burgess, 1999; Marshall, 1999). However, many qualitative researchers have contested 
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assertions of the lack of ability to generalise by specifying the positive uses of CAQDAS 
programmes (such as NVivo), which may enable researchers to generate categories and 
themes, by looking for patterns within the data (Marshall, 1999). This in turn may allow 
the researcher to interpret and develop theories based on the aforementioned patterns 
and themes; including searching for other interpretations/meanings; which in turn could 
reinforce rigour (Marshall, 1999: 152). Mason (2002) argues that qualitative interviewers 
should be able to demonstrate to others that the data collection methods used (coding 
and analysis) were applicable to the research questions and that the data analysis is 
“thorough, careful, honest and accurate (as distinct from true or correct)” (Mason, 2002: 
188).   
With this in mind, the interview and non-participant observation data were input 
incrementally (as it was transcribed) into NVivo 10. The data was then analysed by 
identifying blocks of text for initial coding (Gibbs, 2007); for example, in relation to 
particular questions or themes. Nodes and sub-nodes were created in order to categorise 
the initial codes; including creating sub-nodes for each individual case study. For example, 
three sub-nodes were created for Avonside; Burnside; and Cartside under themes created 
during an axial coding phase; when categories were refined and developed further (ibid). 
This allowed for a selective phase where categories were placed under a general theme in 
order to connect and relate to each case study area. For example, issues relating to 
national outcomes, single outcome agreements, or managerialism were coded under the 
concept of governance; or issues around partnership challenges, barriers to partnership 
working or conflict were coded under either conflict or tensions. Each category was then 
systematically analysed in order to look for patterns and themes and to identify 
commonalities or different perspectives of the same phenomena in each case study area.  
 3.6.1 Presentation 
Explanations and key findings from the data are presented in three key sections; 
Governance, Partnership Working and Accountability. Key literature relevant to the 
findings are presented in the introductory text as part of a thematic rather than a 
narrative analysis, and throughout the findings (including new literature added after the 
literature review was conducted, which further supported or helped to provide 
theoretical explanations for the key findings). Direct quotes from participants are left 
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indented, italicised, and referenced to identify the participant by number and case study 
area; for example, A001 (Avonside), B001 (Burnside) or C001 (Cartside); including their 
titles. In some cases short quotes are interwoven throughout the findings, in which case 
they will be italicised and identified by number and case study area if their title has been 
given in the previous sentence or paragraph. Notes from non-participant observational 
data is also identified within the text and referenced with the name and date of the 
meeting. Participants from Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service will 
be referred to as representatives from the Police or Fire.  
 3.7 Ethics and Safety 
All three case study areas or named places were given pseudonyms. Participants were not 
named in order to ensure anonymity and confidentiality in line with ethical guidelines as 
set out by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC, 2012). This included 
protecting participants from harm (ibid) – for example, during the initial 
access/gatekeeping period it was made clear who I wanted to talk to – therefore great 
care was taken not to discuss any contributions each participant made with any other 
participants, nor to identify specifically who I had spoken to. There were occasions where 
general policy information may have been referred to, for instance, in discussion around 
the SOA – some participants may have said something along the lines of – well you will 
have discussed this with others in the partnership. In which case it would be 
acknowledged, but not discussed. The same care was taken in reference to the identity of 
the case study areas. 
All of the interviewees were key personnel from partner agencies engaged within the 
community planning/community safety process; and they were sent consent forms and 
an information sheet informing them of the research study prior to each interview. 
Participation was optional, and prospective interviewees were informed they could 
withdraw from the research process at any time, before, during or after the research 
process. Participants were asked to read and sign the consent form at the initial meeting 
in order to allow them an opportunity to withdraw or continue with the research study, 
they were also asked if the interviews could be digitally recorded (all of them consented).  
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Most of the interviews took place on Council premises (usually in a private room set aside 
for the interview; two took place in a Council canteen), however, a number of interviews 
took place in private settings in other areas, such as:  a University; Business premises; 
third sector premises; Police Divisions and Fire Stations. Three interviews took place in 
the homes of participants (in each case details were given to an external source 
regarding, the time, address, and expected duration of the interview); including phone 
calls before and after the interviews took place in order to ensure the safety of the 
researcher.  
As it was not possible to obtain consent from everyone at a public meeting, non-
participant observational data was limited to general notes taken around the topics being 
discussed (Angrosino, 2004); particular note was taken of any themes which may have 
begun to emerge from initial analysis of previous interview data. 
 3.8 Reflexivity 
It is important within the research process to reflect on any difficulties encountered and 
any potential biases the researcher may bring to the research process; despite their best 
intentions towards maximising reliability and validity. For example, many academics have 
written about the role of the researcher in the construction of knowledge (Gibbs, 2007); 
or how all research will be influenced by the researcher, including their role and 
behaviour throughout the process (Ritchie et al., 2014).   
Studying formal institutions within local governance structures can often lead to 
problematic issues; such as access and how to ‘get behind the rhetoric’ of social policy 
discourse. In my case I initially achieved access in Burnside through personal connections 
within the Council, Community Safety Burnside and the Police. I had knowledge of the 
social policy terrain through previous research for example:  as an undergraduate in 
Criminology as part of a ‘Community Links’ project I was assigned to work with the Police 
to produce a report on ‘designing out crime’. My dissertation was based on ‘actions plans’ 
within community planning; examining how partners work together to tackle antisocial 
behaviour within a given area. I later worked as a research assistant on a project looking 
at the legacy of Enhanced Policing Plans and Dispersal Orders - dealing with youth on-
street disorder and violence (Frondigoun et al., 2010). I was also a research assistant on 
two local government/academic research projects; evaluating two female offender 
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initiatives designed to provide assistance and routes out of offending behaviour; and my 
Masters involved looking at Police practice during a period of fiscal austerity. This meant I 
had established many contacts, and built up considerable knowledge of the terrain I was 
researching; especially the policy language from a Council and a policing perspective.  
This proved advantageous to the research, for instance, while I may have presented as an 
‘outsider’ my tacit knowledge of the terrain (Nutley et al., 2007) – and linguistic 
knowledge of the policies being discussed meant that quite often I could present as a sort 
of insider/outsider (Mullings, 1999), which in turn allowed me to probe further beneath 
the exterior of social policy rhetoric or in this case ‘partnership speak’ or ‘jargon’ that has 
often baffled outsiders (Sparrow, 2008). Mullings (1999: 340) refers to the ‘positional 
spaces’ researchers can occupy that is - those areas where the ‘situated knowledge’ of 
both parties allows for the development of a certain level of ‘trust and co-operation’ (ibid: 
340). This familiarity of the social policy terrain also allowed me to identify and recognise 
different reactions, silences, or asides as a point to probe further and ask more pertinent 
questions, in order to elicit a response out-with the standard normative responses 
associated with partnership working. Other factors may have helped in breaking down 
the rhetoric: being a mature student combined with my knowledge of the terrain often 
helped to establish a rapport between myself and some participants; and quite often the 
candid responses of participants themselves further enriched the research process.  
 
Although achieving access was at times problematic throughout the case study areas, one 
of the strengths of the case study approach was that it allowed me to compare attitudes 
and perspectives towards community safety policy from a number of actors from three 
distinct geographic locations, who were situated in similar/or the same organisations; 
thereby increasing the generalisability of key findings. This meant that the participants 
who took part were in the main limited to those directly involved in the local community 
planning/community safety process. However, the analysis may have benefited from a 
central government strategic perspective on community safety via a participant from the 
office of Community Safety and Legal Affairs; however, I was unable to achieve access 
during the field work period. Nonetheless, I did manage to make contact with someone 
from the Scottish Government Community Safety Unit, who provided a background to the 
community safety policy terrain principally through signposting pertinent Scottish 
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Government and Scottish Community Safety Network publications; although they were 
not involved in any strategic decision making.  
In hindsight this case study approach may have been strengthened further with data from 
community focus groups (although this was not part of the original design) with respect 
to questions around engagement, localism, and community representation. This became 
apparent halfway through the analysis, however, due to time constraints it was not 
possible to organise this; although it should be noted that this could provide useful data 
with respect to any future research involving community planning. Nonetheless, the 
number of participants who did take part in the research process provided valuable 
insight with respect to the main research questions.  
Participants may have enriched the research process, but it is also pertinent to 
acknowledge some problematic issues that may have occurred with reference to the 
types of participants engaged within the study, for example, key actors within the social 
policy arena (Council, Police, and Fire) may unintentionally revert to a dominant 
organisational ethos when answering probing questions. Therefore, I was aware from the 
start of the research process to try and identify early on any contaminating factors – for 
example, during the interview phase, if participants were resorting to buzzwords, or 
focusing on specific issues (austerity, Police reform) and veering off track, in which case 
they would be guided back to the points in discussion. If this happened, although I do not 
recall it as a particular issue, participants were told that questions on austerity and 
reform would be covered by particular questions later. Other issues to be aware of was 
taking on board that some actors from the third sector in particular may feel constrained 
when discussing partnership working if they are resource dependent on a dominant 
partner. But, again this did not appear to be a particular issue. Finally, it should be 
acknowledged that participants from Community Councils do not necessarily offer up a 
representative view of local communities, as quite often they could arguably be viewed as 
the usual suspects (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2006); those select few who engage with the 
public sector (quite often around single issues). However, these were the available actors 
- who sat on the partnerships, therefore their contributions were valid if arguably 
unrepresentative.  
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One other difficulty encountered was the amount of data accumulated to be analysed; 
not least the amount of policy documents accessed. Transcribing and analysing 50 
Interviews and 9 non-participant observations is incredibly time consuming for one 
researcher, and therefore upon reflection, some relevant points may be missed due to 
the sheer volume of material. Yin (2003; 2014) has highlighted this as a traditional area of 
concern within case study research; however, I am fairly certain that I have captured the 
key issues generated by the data. There were also some occasions when participants may 
arguably have been given a leading question, for example, if a participant said they did 
not understand the question, then an explanation would be given, which may upon 
reflection, have unintentionally guided their response. However, despite these 
difficulties, every effort was taken during the interview process to project a neutral 
stance, and to behave in an ethical manner towards all participants. 
 3.9 Conclusion 
Transparency is a crucial element of the research process and every effort has been taken 
to provide the methodological details of the aforementioned research study. Including, 
outlining the assessment/interview framework, the case study design process, how access 
was achieved and the inherent difficulties therein. Every effort has been taken to ensure 
that the data presented is an accurate and true description of what transpired between 
the researcher and the researched (Mason, 2002). An explanation and description of the 
case study areas was also provided, including an explanation on how and why 
agencies/participants were chosen.  A brief description was given on how the data was 
presented, and potential ethical/safety issues were explored, before, finalising, the 
methods section with some reflexive points about the research process. 
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Chapter 4: Governance 
 
 4.1 Complexity and the governance of community safety 
 
A central government UK wide policy focus on crime prevention and community safety 
can be traced back to some key national policies initiated during the Thatcher 
conservative era of the 1980s referred to in the literature review. This was continued and 
reinforced under New Labour who made working in partnership a statutory requirement 
under the Crime and Disorder Act (in England and Wales) wherein the Police and Local 
Authorities share responsibility for community safety strategies (Loveday, 2006: 112). In 
this sense the New Labour rhetoric around partnership working reinforced how mutual 
co-operation (Mackintosh, 2007) between agencies would enable organisations to reach 
hitherto unachievable organisational goals by working together on overlapping outcomes, 
thereby increasing efficiency and effectiveness within the realm of crime reduction and 
community safety.  
 
In Scotland, this was embedded within the Local Government in Scotland Act 2003, which 
put working in partnership on a statutory footing within a community planning structure 
designed to reinforce public accountability (HMSO, 2003; Scottish Executive 2004). A 
Community Planning Partnership is a body led by each Local Authority in Scotland, which 
brings together key representatives from the public, private, voluntary and community 
sector, with the aim to adopt a more joined-up approach in the delivery of public services 
(Audit Scotland, 2013a: 3). However, for Scotland situating community safety within the 
community planning process allowed for a much broader interpretation of community 
safety for communities, rather than the much narrower focus of crime reduction as set 
out in the Crime and Disorder Act in England and Wales (Henry, 2012).  
 
Community safety in Scotland is therefore viewed in terms of a much wider policy arena 
within Community Planning Partnerships (CPP), and thereafter situated firmly within a 
prescriptive framework drawn up by central government ministers and civil servants. This 
makes for a complex governance arena where long term preventative outcomes are a 
core feature, underpinning a collaborative culture within the existing public sector reform 
agenda (Cairney and St. Denny, 2015: 36). Collaboration or working in partnership has 
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long been viewed as the natural solution to tackling difficult or so called ‘wicked issues’, 
whereby multi-agency partnerships could work together to provide a more joined up or 
effective service delivery (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008). Partnerships in this sense could 
improve outcomes by combining resources in order to achieve inter-agency objectives 
within a drive for efficiency, effectiveness and best value (Scottish Government, 2011b).  
 
There has always been a drive for efficiency within the public sector – a term usually 
associated with the desire for fiscal restraint – since the latter half of the twentieth 
century (Stoker, 2004b). However, since the 2008 financial crisis this has become more 
pronounced. Partnerships are now viewed - more than previously – as the only way to 
achieve objectives due to severe financial restraint brought about by a dramatic drive in 
public sector spending cuts. For example, in 2010 the UK Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition government announced far reaching state spending cuts with the planned loss 
of around ‘900,000 public sector jobs between 2011 and 2018’ (Oxfam, 2013: 2).  
 
At the same time in Scotland the report from the Independent Budget Review also 
highlighted the underlying challenges that faced the Scottish Government in light of the 
financial and economic crisis. The report pointed out how the pressure on the budget 
would be intense and unlikely to return to 2010 levels ‘in real terms’ probably for the next 
fifteen years or so (Scottish Government, 2010). This would have an adverse effect on 
public spending, which would ultimately affect the people of Scotland in terms of a much 
depleted public service delivery. The report set out quite clearly the challenges ahead for 
the public sector in view of expecting more for less, as the following quote highlights – 
there must be a;  
 
“focus on the most significant priorities of the nation, to reject the notion that lower 
cost must inevitably mean lesser service and to embrace an ethos of doing more with 
less” (Scottish Government, 2010:2).  
 
Accordingly, around 51,700 public sector jobs have been lost in Scotland since the 
financial crisis, with local government taking up 66.7% (34,500) of workforce cuts (Unison 
Scotland, 2012). Unison have since stated that based on the Office of Budget 
Responsibility and the Institute of Fiscal Studies – a further 60,000 jobs could be lost in 
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the next five years (Unison Scotland, 2014). There is no doubt that this has had a 
significant impact on the public sectors ability to carry out its core functions to the same 
level prior to the onset of fiscal constraints. Furthermore, being expected to do more with 
less will also have an impact on those agencies and organisations involved within the 
community planning/community safety process in terms of available funding, resources 
and key personnel. This point was highlighted by a number of respondents in both 
Burnside and Cartside who had commented on their lack of funds for initiatives and on 
being expected to do more with fewer resources; 
 
 “[...] you've got less people doing the same job, but expectations are more and 
demands are more. So, it’s just very difficult [...]” (B014) - Senior Performance and 
Information Manager CSB – Burnside. 
 
“[...] you know, people are being asked to do more for less and it’s having an impact on 
people’s ability to generally sit down and look at what the kind of issues are” (C010) - 
Youth Services – Cartside. 
 
In the case of partnership working this may mean that agencies retrench back to their 
core issues - as this participant from the third sector in Cartside suggests;   
 
“ [...] under the pressures that the - well all public sector agencies are facing at the 
moment to do more with less -some of the partnership working, which is even more 
necessary than ever, is tending to get squeezed out, and agencies are retrenching back 
to what they see as their core stuff (C002) - Third Sector representative on EDG/CSP – 
Cartside. 
It is clear that the public sector in particular throughout the UK and Scotland is facing a 
period of significant reform in order to cope with the fallout from fiscal austerity 
measures, not only at the local level, but at a national level too (in Scotland in particular) 
with respect to key reforms of the Police and the Fire service; both leading agencies 
within Community Safety Partnerships. In terms of community safety being expected to 
do more with less may have a significant impact on the effectiveness of partnership 
working within this policy arena, for example, will cut backs in services and personnel 
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result in more effective partnership working or a retrenchment back to the core aims and 
objectives of individual agencies? Therefore it makes sense to examine the policy 
documents framing the governance of community safety within the three case study 
areas, in order to put into context how the UK and Scottish Government reform agenda 
has impacted on Local Authorities and local communities, and what this means in terms 
of accountability within complex governance structures. 
 
 4.2 The Policy Framework for Community Planning Partnerships in Scotland 
 
In recent years many authors have commented on how government governs within the 
UK; as referred to in the literature review. One key point of discussion centred on the 
belief that Britain had become a ‘hollowed out’ state (Rhodes, 1997), through a loss of 
functions limiting its capacity (Weller and Bakvis, 1997), with functions flowing upwards 
to the European Union, and outwards from central and local government departments to 
alternative delivery systems, such as agencies, policy networks, or partnership’s (Rhodes, 
1997; James, 2001). Saward (1997) however, argues that some functions were not lost as 
such, but given away via privatisation; arguably contributing to a fragmented service 
delivery (Powell and Exworthy, 2002). A point echoed by Holliday (2000) who argued that 
while the state may be fragmented, it was not disabled. In effect Britain is now more 
subject to local governance as opposed to local government (Chandler, 2009). In Scotland, 
local government is essential to understanding local governance; it has increasingly grown 
in scale, and employs approximately 45% of the public sector workforce (Cairney and 
McGarvey, 2013: 135). Scottish central and local government have an inter-reliant 
association, whereupon central government expects Councils to deliver efficient services 
in line with their national priorities in return for financial resources (Cairney and 
McGarvey, 2013). 
There has been a potential for tensions to exist in the past between central and local 
government due to the Council’s subordinate status to the Scottish Parliament, which has 
the power to restructure, or abolish Local Authorities. It also provides 80% of its finance 
(Cairney and McGarvey, 2013: 139). This is made more evident as local government in 
Scotland, unlike other jurisdictions throughout Europe, does not have a constitutional 
status or protection and remains subject to the will of parliament (McAteer, 2014). 
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However, there has also been, on the whole, a professed genuine desire to work 
together, which prompted COSLA and the Scottish Government to enter into the 
Concordat in 2007 (Cairney and McGarvey, 2013). This promised in the main to reduce 
ring-fenced funding and the central monitoring of Local Authorities, and in return 
Councils would deliver on an explicit set of commitments underpinned by ‘agreed 
national indicators and outcomes’ as set out in the National Performance Framework 
(Ibid: 140). This arguably significantly altered the accountability mechanisms within the 
governance framework of community planning. 
The National Performance Framework (NPF) as a policy lever is a single framework 
designed to unite all public services in Scotland in line with the Governments ten year 
vision to improve public service delivery, whereby success is measured via long-term 
outcomes (Cairney et al., 2015).  However, the outcomes are set within the governments 
core purpose; to create a more successful country (Cairney, 2015b), and a purpose 
framework linked to targets set within its five strategic objectives (Cairney, 2015b; 
Cairney et al., 2015). See table 4 below:  
Table 4: The National Performance Framework 
 
The Scottish Government’s Purpose Sets out the direction and ambition for 
Scotland 
The Purpose Targets –  Are high level targets that show progress6 
towards the Purpose such as: growth; 
productivity; participation; population; 
solidarity; cohesion; and sustainability. 
5 Strategic Objectives –  Describe where we will focus our actions - 
wealthier and fairer; smarter; healthier; safer 
and stronger; and greener. 
16 National Outcomes -  Describe what the Scottish Government wants 
to achieve in terms of making a difference to 
                                                          
6 See Scottish Government (2011a) ‘An Introduction to Scotland’s National Performance Framework’, Available online: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/933/0124200.pdf  
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people, business and communities across 
Scotland – e.g. (Outcome nine) we live our lives 
free from crime, disorder and danger –  
50 National Indicators Enable us to track progress towards the 
Purpose and National Outcomes  
Source: Scottish Government (2011a) ‘An Introduction to Scotland’s National Performance Framework’ 
 
The NPF works alongside another policy lever known as the Single Outcome Agreement 
(SOA) between the Scottish Government and local Community Planning Partnerships; 
produced in line with the NPF’s overall vision and strategic objectives (Cairney et al., 
2015; Cairney, 2015b), it is stated however, that Local Authorities will have the discretion 
to determine how they achieve a balance between a range of priorities and meeting 
those objectives (Cairney et al., 2015:6).  
 
However, within the context of community safety the strategic objective – safer and 
stronger, and the national outcome ‘we live our lives free from crime, disorder and 
danger’ - highlighted in ‘The Strategy for Justice in Scotland’ as particularly relevant 
(Scottish Government, 2012g) - should help determine/or steer the direction that 
individual Community Planning Partnerships take in respect of community safety issues. 
Furthermore, this will possibly be directly influenced by at least seven of the listed 
National Indicators in respect of; alcohol related hospital admissions, problem drug use, 
perceptions of crime rates in local areas, reconviction rates, victimisation rates, road 
safety, and improving people’s perceptions of their neighbourhoods. Indirectly, this may 
also be linked to child deprivation, poverty, housing need, improving mental health, and 
also improving Scotland’s reputation.7  
Therefore a question arises regarding the interpretation of the word ‘discretion’ in policy 
terms, for example, are Local Authorities truly able to steer the direction of community 
safety within their own localities, or are they merely rowing in the direction of 
prescriptive top down central government policy levers that arguably reinforce crime 
                                                          
7 See Scotland Performs link for list of outcomes, indicators, and objectives: 
http://www.gov.scot/About/Performance/scotPerforms 
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reduction as opposed to community safety? Martin and Guarneros-Meza (2013: 586) 
highlight the role of external steering on partnerships developed to tackle ‘wicked issues’, 
and make a distinction between hard steering and soft steering. The former refers to how 
governments dictate how partnerships operate through the use of performance 
management mechanisms and target setting, whereas the latter refers to the provision of 
funding, information and knowledge (ibid: 586). It could be argued therefore that local 
Community Planning Partnerships (CPPs) are subject to both hard and soft steering in 
terms of having to secure best value within the NPF’s objectives, outcomes and 
indicators, but set within the language of guidance, discretion and local accountability. 
For example, although the 2007 Concordat was conceived in part as the Scottish 
Government taking a step back from control from the centre in terms of local governance 
(soft steer), it was still set within the regulatory frameworks of the NPF and SOAs (hard 
steer). However, since the financial crisis there may now be an argument that the Scottish 
Government has been more inclined towards hard steering (ibid: 586). For example, in 
2013 Audit Scotland produced the report Improving Community Planning in Scotland, 
which makes clear that CPPs could not continue in their present fashion, and listed five 
areas in need of reform:  
 “Creating stronger shared leadership;  
 Improving governance and accountability;  
 Establishing clear priorities for improvement and using resources more effectively; 
 Putting communities at the heart of community planning and public service reform; 
 Supporting CPPs to improve their skills and performance” (Audit Scotland, 2013a: 19). 
 
Although the five areas of reform could be interpreted as ‘guidance only’ (soft steer) the 
reform agenda itself has been heavily influenced by the Christie Commission; which was 
in turn influenced by the Independent Budget Review (Scottish Government, 2011c). The 
Christie Commission can be viewed as a major policy lever in terms of community 
planning and community safety in that it has influenced the Scottish Government’s 
direction on how to tackle the public sector reform process; including situating reform 
within a long term preventative agenda (Scottish Government, 2011c). Short term 
preventative measures have been criticised in the past as outcomes linked to measurable 
performance, which in terms of so called ‘wicked issues’ such as crime and social 
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exclusion could be viewed as putting a sticking plaster on a haemorrhage. For example, 
Deacon (2011) in her ‘Early Years’ report states that if the energy and investment applied 
to ‘youth justice, antisocial behaviour and criminal justice’, had been applied as early 
intervention, then it would have been transformational (Deacon, 2011 cited in Scottish 
Government, 2011c: 55).  The Christie Commission will be discussed briefly below. 
 
 4.2.1 The Influence of the Christie Commission  
 
Taking on board the recommendations of the Budget Review the Scottish Government 
commissioned Christie to provide “recommendations about how public services must 
change to meet the medium and long-term financial challenges and the expectations of 
the people of Scotland” (SPICe Briefing, 2011: 3), which basically translates as how to 
achieve more with less. In brief the Christie Commission’s remit involved; sustaining 
public services whilst at the same time improving the outcomes and quality of those 
services. Services were to be democratically accountable to local people and communities 
in Scotland – engagement was the order of the day – and partnership working 
(incorporating communities, elected representatives and the third sector) was to be 
redesigned around the needs of those citizens; whilst crucially tackling the “underlying 
causes of those needs as well as the symptoms” (Scottish Government, 2011c: 81).  
To tackle ‘underlying causes’ means that the public sector must adopt preventative 
approaches aimed at addressing social problems, such as, the increased cost to the 
economy of addressing violence, and chronic health problems in the community 
principally from obesity, smoking and substance misuse (Scottish Government, 2011c: 
55). Within austerity politics prevention has once again become a buzz word within 
central government, and in Scotland it is reinforcing a ‘radical’ collaborative culture 
underpinning the current reform agenda (Cairney and St. Denny, 2015: 36). Consequently, 
it has become a vague, but nevertheless widely supported solution to: sustainability in 
terms of service delivery; a way to address inequality by tackling the root causes of 
societies social problems; and finally as a way to address a governance crisis in terms of 
the failure of top down centralist driven managerialism in favour of a more holistic 
approach built around common aims (Cairney and St. Denny, 2015: 37). 
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In response to Christie’s recommendations the Scottish Government and COSLA 
advocated that the ‘building blocks’ for that approach currently existed under the 
“framework of Community Planning Partnerships and Single Outcome Agreements” 
(Scottish Government, 2012e: 1). Nonetheless, the Government decided to review 
community planning structures, and in March 2012 published a shared ‘Statement of 
Ambition’, which reiterated how community planning together with the SOA would 
underpin effective partnership working, within which a wider set of reform initiatives 
would be put in place, including the reform of the Police and Fire Service, and the 
integration of Health and Adult Social Care (Scottish Government, 2012b). As a condition 
for success all public services must improve outcomes, and play a full and active role in 
community planning, with Councils taking a lead role8 (Scottish Government, 2012b).   
 
Within the framework of community safety it could be argued that the Christie 
Commission and other policy levers such as the SOA are steering local partnerships 
towards behaving in a certain way – a way that is commensurate with Scottish 
Government priorities.  For example, CPP managers were sent a letter in May 20129, 
which identified three core proposals comprising of three key elements for implementing 
the Statement of Ambition (Scottish Government, 2012a), which included strengthening 
duties on individual partners, placing formal requirements on CPPs, and creating a joint 
group at national level – to provide guidance and strengthen the capacity of local CPPs 
(ibid).  
 
The National Community Planning Group was established to provide strategic leadership 
to drive the change set out in the Statement of Ambition, and  it states it will endeavour 
to find an “appropriate balance between local and national priorities” (Scottish 
Government, 2012c); this brings into question whether the appropriate balance will be 
decided locally or nationally? For example, CPPs will not be ‘formally accountable’ to the 
new National Group, but the Group will nonetheless place a focus on improved outcomes 
in relation to central government priorities; and one of the initial outputs of the Group 
was to produce ‘guidance’ for CPPs on the new SOAs (Scottish Government, 2012c).  
                                                          
8 See Statement of Ambition in full at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Government/local-
government/CP/soa    
9 See CP Review Update 10th May 2012:  http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Government/local-
government/CP/cpreview  
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The guidance states that it expects a more enhanced form of partnership working within 
and across different organisational cultures, and a more methodical and concerted 
approach to improving performance (Scottish Government, 2012f). Each new SOA must 
be able to demonstrate an ‘evidence-based understanding of place’, in other words CPPs 
must show that they have engaged with local communities, businesses and the third 
sector, using evidence from data bases such as strategic assessments or needs analysis, in 
order to outline local priorities (Scottish Government, 2012f: 3).   
 
Christie’s community engagement ethos built around communities of place (street, 
neighbourhood, estate etc.,), and communities of interest (people who come together 
because of a shared need or interest) (SPICe Briefing, 2011: 30), identified four key 
objectives to shape a programme of reform: 
 
 “public services are built around people and communities, their needs, aspirations, 
capacities and skills, and work to build up their autonomy and resilience; 
 public service organisations work together effectively to achieve outcomes; 
 public service organisations prioritise prevention, reducing inequalities and promoting 
equality; and  
 all public services constantly seek to improve performance and reduce costs, and are 
open, transparent and accountable” (Scottish Government, 2011c: 23). 
  
  4.3 Community Safety Partnerships – Steering/Rowing or De-prioritisation? 
 
The previous section discussed the complex governance arena within which community 
safety is situated, with a focus on policy levers such as; the NPF, SOA, Statement of 
Ambition and the Christie Commission, and how these have changed or sharpened the 
focus of community planning in terms of long term prevention, community engagement 
and accountability in the shape of best value. They have in turn impacted on how 
community safety is viewed by others within the current community planning/community 
safety partnership structure. This next section will examine some of the unintended 
consequences related to public sector reform within the community planning/community 
safety process, such as: growing tensions related to public sector reform; leadership; 
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austerity measures; loss of locality; and a possible de-prioritisation of community safety 
within the case study areas. 
 
It has been previously highlighted how top down central government policies have often 
undermined localism in terms of transforming and limiting the capacity of Local 
Authorities through institutional reform (Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 2004b; Wilson and Game, 
2011). Local Authorities in turn have then had to find a balance between implementing 
central government reforms, while being accountable to local communities in terms of 
prioritising local goals or objectives. In Scotland this is to be achieved through obligatory 
partnership working within Community Planning Partnership’s (CPP’s) as laid out under 
the Local Government in Scotland Act 2003. Community safety or Community Safety 
Partnerships sit within this overarching structure, which will be discussed next, in order to 
outline the policy frameworks that shape each case study area. 
 
 4.4 Community Planning Partnerships in Avonside, Burnside and Cartside 
 
The Community Planning Partnership (CPP) provides an overarching framework under 
which community safety sits. The policy documents on CPP’s state they are Partnership’s 
led by each Local Authority in Scotland bringing together key representatives from the 
public, private, voluntary and community sector; for the purpose of a joined up approach 
in the delivery of public services (Audit Scotland, 2013a: 3). The first CPP was established 
in 1998, and in 2004 the Scottish Executive set out statutory guidance for CPPs in the 
Local Government in Scotland Act 2003. This made clear the two main aims of community 
planning as: 
 
 “Making sure people and communities are genuinely engaged in the decisions made 
on public services which affect them; allied to 
 A commitment from organisations to work together, not apart, in providing better 
public services” (Scottish Executive, 2004: 1). 
 
This was to be achieved within the context of securing best value in local government 
service provision, and the ‘power to advance wellbeing’ in terms of allowing Local 
Authorities to work in a more creative fashion in response to the needs of their 
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communities. Section 15 of the Act facilitates partnership working with other relevant 
public bodies, and also establishes the leadership role of Local Authorities within 
community planning (Scottish Executive, 2004: 3); while Section 16 of the Act confers a 
duty on a number of public sector agencies to participate in the community planning 
process (Scottish Executive, 2004: 5). Although the Council is identified as the lead agency 
the Act does recognise that some strategies and themes within a CPP should be a joint 
task, therefore the leadership role may be taken up by the appropriate agency; for 
example, in policing the Chief Constable may take the lead on Community Safety 
Partnerships (CSP) with the support of the relevant key agencies (Scottish Executive, 
2004: 12).  
 
For the most part participants within the three case study areas viewed both the Council 
and the Police as lead agencies within the governance of community safety; especially 
within CSPs. However, as in line with the legislation the Council was viewed as the partner 
with overall responsibility for the partnership process;  
 
 “CSP process? My understanding is that it reports to the Community Planning 
Partnership, so ultimately the guardians of that would be Cartside Council” (C007) – 
Addiction Support – Cartside. 
 
 “Council’s the lead.  Not as in the most important, but we’re the ones with the 
statutory responsibility” (A001 - 2nd) – Community Safety Co-ordinator – Avonside.   
 
 “I think all partners are responsible to be honest, although the Chair does have a 
particular responsibility, but it is a partnership,  so really in any partnership it’s an 
equal relationship and you've got to take equal responsibility” (B011) – Councillor – 
Chair of NWCPP – Burnside. 
 
Clearly local government are thought to lead on partnerships within community planning, 
but, there is also a clear message that each agency has an equal responsibility to deliver 
services, not only through partnership, but for their own agency as well; as noted by the 
participant from Burnside. However, within the community planning/community safety 
framework the Police were also thought of as the lead agency on some thematic 
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partnerships, for example, those that dealt with antisocial behaviour (Antisocial 
Behaviour Partnerships/Community Safety Forums). On these partnerships Housing 
(Council, private and the third sector) also played a key role, as did Health and Social 
Services (Child Protection) and the Fire Service on Alcohol and Drug Partnerships. 
 4.4.1 Structural change within Community Planning/Community Safety Partnerships 
All of these agencies/organisations operate within a complex Community Planning 
structure subject to change during the public sector reform process.  For example, 
Community Safety Partnerships are themed/critical partnerships within the framework of 
Community Planning and each structure not only differed within the case study areas, but 
in the case of Burnside effectively ceased to exist as a result of the reform process. 
Community safety in Burnside was still ostensibly to be discussed within the wider 
Community Planning structure; however, exactly where it was to be discussed was often a 
confusing and contentious issue, which will be discussed later. See Table 5 below for the 
community planning structures within each case study area during the interview period.  
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Table 5: Case study CPP structures 2013 
Avonside Community Planning Partnership Structure  
5 Area Community 
Safety 
Partnerships/Forums* 
Strategic 
Community 
Safety 
Partnership** 
4 Area Community 
Planning Groups 
Chief officers Group 
(Accountability) 
Management Committee 
(Performance Management) 
Strategic CPP 
Burnside Community Planning Partnership Structure  
21 Area Partnerships 3 Sector 
Community 
Planning 
Partnerships – 
North East; 
North West 
and South 
Safe Burnside 
Group – 
citywide group 
set up to 
scrutinise the 
new 
arrangements 
for Police Fire 
and Rescue 
Services 
Executive 
Group of 
Senior Officers 
Strategic 
Community 
Planning 
Partnership 
Supported by 
3 Senior 
Officer Groups 
-  
Cartside Community Planning Partnership Structure  
Monthly Multi-agency 
tasking and co-
ordination group 
(MATAC) – Part of the 
CSP 
Strategic 
Community 
Safety 
Partnership – 
to meet 
quarterly 
Community Planning 
Regeneration Committee 
Partnership 
Group - 
forum for all 
statutory 
Community 
Planning 
Partners to 
engage 
Leadership 
Group - 
Carries out 
the functions 
of the 
Community 
Planning 
Partnership 
Board *** 
Public  Safety Committee 
– Scrutiny of Police 
Scotland ward plans  
* To be restructured 
** May be dissolved  
*** Replaced the Executive Delivery Group 
 
 
When participants in all three case study areas were first interviewed in 2013 the above 
institutional structures were in place, however, each area was in a state of flux in terms of 
adhering to and coping with the public sector reform agenda, and what this meant for the 
strategic direction of community safety. However, it became evident during the reform 
process that there was a growing tension within partnerships within the case study areas 
around issues linked to leadership, austerity measures, and local accountability.  
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 In terms of leadership in Avon Isle/Avonside the Chair of the CSP had always remained 
with the Council (perhaps because it is an Island community), but in Burnside (prior to 
reform) and in Cartside in particular the Chair of the CSP had historically been held by a 
Police representative;   
 
“[...] the Police always Chair Community Safety Partnerships - that's the sort of 
historical way they work in Cartside” (C006) - Community Planning Partnership 
Manager – Cartside. 
 
It was intimated that the CSP had to cope with the number of changes made by the Police 
with respect to representation on the CSP, which was possibly viewed as problematic by 
others;  
 
“[...] I think particularly there's a feeling in terms of Community Safety Partnership 
there seems to be quite a fluid movement within the Police as an organisation, so 
you'll just get used to dealing with one person and then they move on, you know, and I 
think that's the case with the partnership, I think this is the third or fourth Chair” 
(C010) - Youth Services – Cartside.   
Routinely changing key personnel (especially if that person is the Chair) could impact on 
one of the key features associated with effective partnership working – trust. Trust within 
partnerships is built up over time, and is a unifying theme built on commitment and the 
delivery of shared objectives (McCall and Rummery, 2017: 63). One participant (a former 
Police officer in England) who was now based within Cartside as a community safety 
project manager volunteered a reason as to why the Police were always the Chair; 
 
 “I think my understanding is a little bit of background for you, the reason the Police 
have always been in the Chair is that that was the way for the Police to engage in the 
partnership. […] I think partnership working for the Police was kind of at that point a 
fairly new way of working for them [...] it was just embedding the line of the Police 
can't solve all the crime prevention, crime reduction - we need to engage more broadly 
with partners; so that was the kind of context and conversations I sensed that were 
happening” (C008) - Community Safety Projects Manager – Cartside. 
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However, a senior Council officer added; 
 
“[...] There is also nothing to say that the Police have to Chair it, and both of these 
things are really up to the CPP to decide - the Police would just have to like it or lump it 
basically” (C001 - 1st) -  Community Planning Partnership Manager – Cartside. 
   
 4.4.2 Growing Tensions – leadership/direction 
 
Within Cartside there seemed to be an undercurrent of tension within agencies due to 
the reform process in general; in terms of a loss of personnel and services. But, there was 
also an underlying tension between some agencies (most notably public sector agencies) 
and the Police on the CSP; possibly in part response to a perception that the Police were 
becoming more dominant on the CSP with the reinforcement of a Police Scotland led 
performance management regime. This was most notable with regard to the new Multi-
agency Tasking and Co-ordination (MATAC) operational group which had been instigated 
by the new Police Chair of the CSP. This Police led proposal was discussed at a Cartside 
CSP meeting (2/9/2013) with respect to a questionnaire that had been circulated amongst 
the partnership seeking views on a new vision for the CSP; a view which would see it split 
into two; a strategic group and an operational group. The Police Chair reported that there 
was ‘support to explore this way of working’ (Cartside CSP meeting, 2/9/13).  
The Police in this instance arguably have more power to implement changes in that 
despite austerity they are still heavily relied upon in terms of being able to deploy 
resources quickly (Skinner, 2010; Crawford, 1997). Tensions may emerge around this 
Police led initiative as the ‘co-ordination’ and ‘tasking’ model is arguably more in line with 
a day to day crisis response management of offenders and vulnerable people associated 
with policing, rather than a proactive multi-agency response associated with Christie’s 
vision of long term prevention. One participant was not particularly happy about the  
changes on the grounds that the MATAC as part of a Police Scotland initiative would drive 
national objectives rather than what was needed locally;  
“ [...] The Chair  was quite clear that this was more or less a dictate from Mr House; is 
to how Cartside came into line with what they had in Camber (name changed) and the 
rest of it” (C012) – Cartside Licensing Forum – Cartside.  
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This was supported by a comment made by a former Police analyst seconded to 
Community Safety Burnside, which seemed to suggest that MATAC’s may become the 
norm within the domain of community safety, however, it was argued that MATAC’s were 
there to enhance not lower local accountability following Police reform;  
“It's the Chief says, I mean I think he's been, you know, of all the big concerns, the big 
questions have been - you know, you're just going to be a big force, you're going to be 
- less accountability locally, he recognises that, and I think one of the ways of 
overcoming that is to say - well I've got Multi-Agency Tasking arrangements in place in 
all these Local Authorities, and we're delivering community policing jointly through 
these multi-agency tasking forums” (B014) - Senior Performance and Information 
Manager CSB – Burnside. 
When interviewed a few weeks later the Chair of CSP Cartside had more or less intimated 
that the new changes were a fait accompli; 
“Essentially I'm going to split the Community Safety Partnership in two - on a kind of 
vertical chain of command, so the Community Safety Partnership will be more of a 
strategic group to ensure that the work that all the relevant people on the group […] 
will work more towards the strategy that's in place or the objectives or the priorities 
that have been set for these particular groups.  There will be a monthly Multiagency 
Tasking and Co-ordinating group (MATAC) which I intend the representation to be 
those individuals from that list that I read out there who are more kind of tactical 
members on the ground” (C011) - Area Commander Police – Cartside.  
The list in question was a list of agencies that had been sent the questionnaire from the 
Police about the reform proposals, which would suggest that the Police had a distinct role 
in determining what agency sat on either the Strategic CSP or the MATAC. The reform 
process effectively divides the CSP into two organisations – a steering committee and an 
operational committee (to meet monthly comprising of those agencies/individuals 
directly involved with operational matters). It is also clear from this participant that 
structural reform was viewed as necessary in order to align central objectives with local 
ones via the SOA in particular, which again despite the rhetoric of localism within the 
national reform agenda, did appear to bend more towards hard steering - central 
strategic direction - rather than soft steering – guidance (Martin and Guarneros-Meza, 
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2013). Featherstone et al., (2012: 178) argue that within ‘austerity localism’ it is usually 
the default actors “those with the resources, expertise and social capital” (ibid) who 
become involved in the provision of facilities and services (ibid). In the case of the Police 
localism may revolve around the analysis of Police data, which is arguably different to a 
co-production of solutions that come with working and engaging with communities. 
However, within Police organisational culture rigorous performance management 
systems are a key function of policing (Mackenzie and Hamilton-Smith, 2011; Hamilton-
Smith et al., 2013) and it was clear that the MATAC was created as part of a Police 
Scotland drive towards performance management via strategic assessments – whose 
purpose is to ensure everyone is rowing in the right direction (Osborne and Gaebler, 
1992). For example, the MATAC was discussed by the Chair as being necessary because 
the original CSP had become backward facing, rather than forward facing; 
“[...] it was very much updates from each of the membership about what they 
individually have done as an organisation, rather than collectively as a partnership, and 
that's based on the fact that there hasn’t been a strategic assessment done for 
Cartside Council area; so we should be working towards a strategic assessment and the 
SOA, we’re only working towards the SOA at the moment” (C011) - Area Commander 
Police – Cartside. 
When asked what they hoped to achieve from this approach i.e. implementing a strategic 
assessment it was stated that a ‘tangible document’ (C011) would identify not only where 
they were now, but, also identify vulnerable people and locations in terms of who the 
main offenders were and this was essentially what the partnership should be looking 
towards (C011). This approach perhaps reinforces concerns amongst some non-Police 
agencies that community safety will be situated within a problem oriented policing  
approach whereby prevention is linked to specific short term targeted problems (Dinsmor 
and Goldsmith, 2010) via a Police intelligence/analysis model (Sorg et al., 2013) rather 
than through long term prevention as envisioned by Christie. It was made clear by the 
Chair that the objective was to link up analytical products in order to put in place future 
preventative projects (C011). The language was one of efficiency and managerialism 
which perhaps helps to decipher a subtle difference between multi-agency and inter-
agency partnership working, a point highlighted by Coliandris and Rogers (2008: 119) 
insofar as the former refers to agencies coming together to discuss common problems 
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while still retaining their organisational work practices, whereas the latter 
‘interpenetrates’ and thus alters the work practices of those involved. This was addressed 
by the Chair when he discussed how his role was viewed by the other agencies on the 
partnership; 
“They probably see us in more of an enforcement role rather than a prevention role, 
but that's not true, we do look at... Police Scotland has brought a process for tackling 
problem areas, for instance, (Names Street in Cartside) just now is a problematic 
antisocial behaviour area; our analysts tell us that based on the number of calls, 
frequency of call. So, we now have a Community Action Plan which has a suite of 
options for prevention, a suite of options for enforcement, a suite of options for 
information and intelligence gathering, and then more tasks about the communication 
of what we collectively are doing to address the problem itself.  So the partners may 
see the Police as being enforcement only, but we do consider the whole prevention 
and intervention agenda” (C011) - Area Commander Police – Cartside.  
Having a suite of options, or considering an agenda however, does not necessarily mean 
you will implement that agenda; especially in times of fiscal restraint. This was made clear 
by the Area Commander of Police Scotland in Burnside when asked about prevention with 
respect to community safety initiatives being given a timescale to work; 
 
“[…] if I'm going to commit to an initiative -  then right at the very beginning I want a 
good business case and I want an interim evaluation probably within three to six 
months depending on how long it is [...] If something is ongoing it’s because it’s proven 
itself to work, it won't just be ongoing because it sounds like a good idea, we’ll actually 
need hard evidence, empirical evidence to prove that it’s working” (B005) - Area Police 
Commander – Burnside.  
Putting in place long term preventative options often appears to be problematic within 
Police organisational culture, insofar as their rigorous performance management regimes 
(linked to Police data) often focus on quantifiable measures, rather than on long term 
qualitative outcomes that are often more difficult to quantify (Henry, 2009; Hamilton-
Smith et al., 2013). The Area Commander from Burnside commented that although they 
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made efforts to do qualitative work around quality of service it was a bit more difficult, 
but, they did however make an effort to do so, nonetheless it was also stated; 
 
“Yeah sometimes... sometimes we’re a bit too reliant on simply number crunching and 
actually that quantitative performance measurement is sometimes easy or easier, so 
measuring the level of crime, measuring detection rates and things like that is a lot 
easier” (B005) – Area  Police Commander - Burnside .   
Therefore it remains to be seen whether or not the MATAC group will take precedence 
over the strategic CSP with regard to long term community safety outcomes. The strategic 
group may well discuss community safety as an overarching concept, with regard to the 
environment, local business, the night time economy or any other matters that arise. But, 
for the most part decisions will be operationalised within the MATAC, which may be 
steered towards particular outcomes, which in turn will be directed through a Police 
tasking co-ordinated problem oriented approach, whereby target setting and intelligence 
gathering are the key focus. It was recognised by the Chair that the dissemination of 
intelligence (a key requirement within the MATAC) could be problematic for non-Police 
agencies;  
“Some of the organisations, particularly the ones that deal with vulnerable women are 
a bit reticent to go into great level of detail or identify the individuals that they're 
talking about which is probably okay for a Strategic Partnership, but the monthly 
MATAC that I'm going to introduce, I would want individuals to share those names and 
the concerns that they have round about them so that we can see what the 
partnership can collectively do to address those.  There’ll be a confidentiality 
statement read out at the start of the monthly meeting to indicate to all round the 
table that what's discussed in the room essentially stays in the room unless there's 
grey boundaries for disclosure of that information out-with” (C011) – Area 
Commander Police – Cartside.  
A common complaint voiced by Police officers is that partnership meetings can be 
nothing more than ‘talking shops’, wherein specific tasking and accountability 
mechanisms to ensure partners meet their obligations are absent (McCarthy and O’Neill, 
2014: 248). Although this restructure was discussed as a necessary measure to improve 
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partnership working, it also has the potential to create division and increase tension 
amongst those agencies more suited to a social welfare response to social problems. It is 
also potentially problematic in that particular agencies may be reluctant to provide 
information about their clients or service users despite assurances around confidentiality; 
as has traditionally been the case between Heath and Social Care agencies and the Police 
(Crawford, 1997; Hope, 2005; Perri 6 et al., 2006). However, the opposite could be true 
and providing confidentiality statements or information sharing protocols may help to 
break down those barriers that have traditionally existed between these agencies. 
Nonetheless, tensions were emerging in Cartside concerning this new approach, which 
appeared to have the power to change the membership of the partnership in line with a 
more proactive Police led direction; 
“The membership’s going to change to include more individuals on a monthly basis 
who can  actually make a difference to that whole keeping people safe agenda” (C011) 
– Area Police Commander – Cartside.  
 
The participant from the Licensing Forum (who was not regarded as instrumental to the 
MATAC) expressed some concerns about the new partnership structure in response to a 
conversation they had with two other public sector representatives after a meeting they 
attended on (2/9/2013) had finished; 
 
“It's become a very - I mean (names person A) and (names person B) walked out that 
meeting (the one you were at) with me, and I said 'well what do you think' and (names 
person B) said 'It's getting too Policey for me' they said 'I'm going to go to a couple of 
the meetings and decide who is going to go in my place' (laughs) - wasn't happy” 
(C012) – Cartside Licensing Forum – Cartside. 
Although this was a second hand conversation or hearsay, it did help to reinforce an 
opinion formed through non-participant observation by the researcher at the aforesaid 
meeting, that there was some unresolved tensions between some actors and the Chair; 
based on their body language when the new structure was being discussed. Some 
criticism levelled at partnerships with the Police is that they are too dominant; or too 
‘Police-led’. However, a counter-argument to this is that the Police are often the biggest 
98 
 
partner agency involved, with the greater resources at their disposal; and more 
importantly with the clearest mandate to tackle crime and disorder (McCarthy and 
O’Neill, 2014: 249). 
 4.4.3 Growing Tensions – loss of localism 
During the interview period the CSP structure in Avonside was as listed (in Table 5), but 
the Community Safety Co-ordinator for Avonside pointed out that it also was in the 
process of change; 
“So the link has always been Area Partnerships (local CSPs) feeding into the Strategic 
(Community Safety) Partnership and then the Strategic Partnership would feed into 
the Community Planning Partnership, but that bit in the middle may change when we 
have a different body or a different arrangement” (A001 - 2nd) - Community Safety Co-
ordinator – Avonside. 
 
Subsequent policy documents have highlighted the restructure of community safety in 
Avonside from the five Area CSPs, and one strategic CSP to one Community Safety 
Partnership Tasking and Coordination Group overseen by a Avonside SOA Outcome 610 
Lead Officers Group, whose aim is to provide strategic leadership for the CSP Tasking 
Group, and also to combine community safety partnership working with other groups and 
‘strategic partnerships who share SOA Outcome 6 responsibilities’ (Avonside, 2015: 4.8). 
(see Figure 5); 
 
Figure 5: Restructure of Community Safety on Avonside 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore it appears that CSPs within Avonside have (like Cartside), split into a strategic 
steering group (in the guise of the Outcome 6 Lead officers Group) and an operational – 
tasking and co-ordinating CSP or MATAC (ibid); but Avonside has also lost local strategic 
                                                          
10 Outcome 6 for Avonside SOA is ‘People live in safer and stronger communities’ 
5 Area CSP/Forums 
One Strategic CSP 
SOA Outcome 6 Lead Officers Group 
One CSP Tasking and Coordination Group 
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decision making.  The five areas will still retain their local Antisocial Behaviour Group; 
which target specific problems related to low level incivility, crime and disorder rather 
than more holistic notions of community safety in general.  
 
As these changes were not in place (although discussed as a possibility likely to happen) 
during the interview process there is no direct discussion relating to how local actors and 
communities involved within the former local Avon Isle CSP perceived this change in 
terms of a loss of localism.  Stoker (2004a: 117) viewed localism as the devolving of power 
and resources away from the centre towards front-line managers, local structures and 
local communities, which would be in keeping with one of Christie’s key objectives insofar 
as public services are built around people and communities (Scottish Government, 2011c: 
23). Nonetheless, it was later noted by the Management Committee of the Strategic CPP 
that concerns were raised by local members within the former five local CSP areas that 
“local context and focus on local priorities could be lost if the Area Forums are replaced” 
(Avonside, 2015: 4.6). Therefore clearly there are concerns that local issues will be 
subsumed within an overarching Avonside SOA and the Scottish Government Statement 
of Ambition; designed to bring together local and national objectives, outcomes and 
priorities.   
 
On the other hand CPP managers (as mentioned in the previous section) have been given 
formal requirements to ensure adherence to the SOA when delivering local outcomes, 
and if the structure was not in place to ensure compliance then perhaps a re-structure 
was necessary. For example, the former local CSP’s had been in place since 2000, a point 
highlighted by the Management Committee of the Strategic CPP, when it noted that there 
now existed weaknesses linked to a fragmented service delivery, a lack of oversight, 
insufficient meeting schedule’s to drive community safety work streams, and non-
attendance, which impacts on effective partnership working (Avonside, 2013: 4.2). 
 
The solution for Avonside was to integrate the five local and one strategic CSP into one 
Community Safety Partnership Tasking and Coordination Group (in line with a Police 
Scotland narrative) within the new overarching CPP framework.  Perhaps directing 
community safety initiatives through one group rather than six was considered a more 
suitable way to monitor performance and accountability; especially within a tasking and 
100 
 
coordinating framework. This centralised focus could on the other hand be problematic in 
an area as diverse as Avonside; geographically it covers vast rural areas including twenty 
three island communities; of which Avon Isle is one. The average population density is 
just 13 people per square kilometre which may ultimately prove resistant to a one size fits 
all governance philosophy (Avonside, 2014: 4).  
 4.5 Changes in the purpose of the Partnership 
It could be argued that there appears to be a de-prioritisation of community safety within 
Avonside Council in the sense that local accountability is arguably depleted with the loss 
of community voice on local CSPs. While they may still retain local Antisocial Behaviour 
Partnerships, these tend to be Police led, reactive, and restricted to specific agencies and 
issues. In Cartside the focus within the new MATAC seems to be heading towards a 
problem oriented policing model, which may in essence de-prioritise some community 
safety initiatives that are less quantifiable. This may also resonate with Avonside and 
Burnside who also appeared to have adopted a multi-agency tasking and coordination 
Police model. Cartside Council have also cut back on the Noise Team despite noise being 
high up on the agenda in terms of complaints from local communities, as one participant 
noted when discussing austerity measures;  
“[...] you know, for example they're cutting back on the Noise Team and that's not well 
documented because probably that will cause a bit of a problem” (C013) - Housing 
Manager for Crawley Housing Association – Cartside. 
 
Previously there had been a Noise Team that responded to and documented late night 
noise complaints (for evidentiary purposes), but that service is no longer there and noise 
complaints were now to be covered by environmental services and community wardens; 
which is fine if it occurs during their working hours and not after 10pm, which is 
ostensibly when most noise complaints occur; 
“[...] We get a lot of complaints about noise issues, even last night at our Community 
Council meeting of the Burnwood City Community Council, they seem to get the brunt 
of all the problems because you have a lot of people coming out of pubs and clubs all 
hours of the night causing a lot of noise” (B015) - Councillor – Burnpark Area 
Partnership – Burnside.  
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It could be argued that there is an apparent gradual de-prioritisation of community safety 
as a concept within both Avonside and Cartside in respect of the withdrawal of key 
services, and an apparent shifting of priorities within the new structural arrangements 
that are more in keeping with a Police led centrally driven agenda, which could ultimately 
raise questions around the core purpose of CSPs in general. However, it may be even 
more so, within Burnside, for example, whereas Avonside and Cartside have at least 
retained a CSP structure of sorts, this is not the case for Burnside. They have reformed 
their whole community planning structure including removing the Strategic CSP and five 
local Community Planning Safe Themed Groups (See Figure 6). 
Figure 6: Restructure of Burnside CPP  
 
 
 
 
 
A former analyst to the CSP briefly discussed the previous structure and how he provided 
intelligence for them; 
 “So the remit was obviously community safety, so, for example, at this company 
(Community Safety Burnside) for a lot of the additionality - for community safety 
diversionary activities, and we'd be going to these Safe Theme Groups trying to bid for 
monies and they would be using the community safety assessment that I provide as a 
sort of evidence base to focus resources on communities” (B014) - Senior Performance 
and Information Manager CSB – Burnside.  
Community safety post reform in Burnside appeared to be subsumed within the new 
structure. However, when the interviews were first conducted the re-structure was at a 
very early stage and there seemed to be some confusion around where community safety 
sat within the overarching community planning process. One early interviewee (a 
principal officer within ‘Partnership and Development’ who acted as a gatekeeper re 
Prior to Reform April 2013: 
 
Overarching strategic CPP 
Executive Group of Senior Officers 
10 Local CPP’s 
21 Area Committees 
Strategic CSP 
5 Community Planning Safe themed 
Groups 
 
Post Reform April 2013: 
 
Strategic CPP 
Executive Group of Senior Officers 
Safe Burnside Group 
3 Sector CPPs 
3 Senior Officer Groups 
21 Area Partnerships 
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access, who was also on the new Burnside Safe Group), when asked if community safety 
was now discussed at a strategic level and then fed down to the new 21 local Area 
Partnerships (AP’s) was at first unsure, but then intimated that it may be a bit of both - 
depending on what was being discussed as they had yet to develop a work plan, which 
could include things you could describe as community safety in nature. They mentioned 
there had been a Neighbourhood Management Survey led by Housing;  
 “[…] they focused on things like I suppose a crime and grime type agenda. It's not 
purely from the purpose of community safety; it's not from a perspective of developing 
community safety. [...] it could be anything like dog fouling to fly-tipping to you know 
areas where there might be a lot of derelict land that's causing further fly-tipping or 
you know, making people feel unsafe in the neighbourhood. But it's not necessarily 
saying we are the community safety structure by any means at all” (B002) - Principal 
Officer – Safe Group – Burnside.  
When pushed further with regard to localism, community safety and the role of the new 
Area Partnerships it was made clear that discussing community safety in this context was 
difficult; 
“The Area Partnerships are not necessarily a replacement for the CSP's - they will have 
a wider brief, they wouldn't necessarily just deal with that, but it has been agreed that 
they will have a neighbourhood management focus, which I suppose in some way is a 
community safety focus, but it's not 100% the same, it's not like a - there isn't really a 
straightforward - this is the team where community safety gets delivered, it's probably 
more mainstream within the community planning structures, so there's been a big 
shift - a change in community planning structures” (B002) - Principal Officer – Safe 
Group – Burnside.  
When asked if community safety would now be discussed at the strategic CPP in the 
absence of a thematic CSP, or if there was someone on this committee who could discuss 
it, it was made clear (with some exasperation it must be said), that there was at that point 
no set plan for community safety as a concept within community planning, in fact it was 
stated;  
103 
 
“That's what I'm saying to you they don't talk about community safety in Burnside 
anymore” (B002) - Principal Officer – Safe Group – Burnside. 
Interviewer: “Is it to be one of their outcomes”? 
“No - well I mean to me community safety means a really broad brush, it means a 
whole load of things - it’s not one of the key things that are getting taken forward in 
either the SOA or within One Burnside which is another themed planning process. So, 
for example, the three key themes that are getting taken forward from the SOA for 
Burnside are: alcohol, vulnerable people, and youth employability. So where does 
community safety fit within that? It's not a specific theme on its own, but obviously the 
community safety issues around the use of alcohol in the community, you know 
excessive alcohol consumption causes problems in any case. Community safety isn't a 
theme anymore it's mainstreamed [...]” (B002) - Principal Officer – Safe Group – 
Burnside. 
Mainstreamed apparently meant that most operational work would be taken up by 
Community Safety Burnside (CSB), which is an Arm’s Length Organisation with a unique 
status in the UK in that it is a charity with two members – Burnside City Council and The 
Scottish Police Authority (Community Safety Burnside, 2015). As well as supporting 
victims of gender based violence, it also provides services to reduce offending and 
antisocial behaviour, environmental incivility, and a commercial service promoting 
community safety (ibid). One Burnside (a themed process within community planning) 
dealing with reoffending and prevention is also situated within CSB (ibid). However, 
overall it could be argued that community safety as a strategic outcome has become de-
prioritised within Burnside City Council, in the sense that it has no specific 
committees/groups or boards where it would be discussed as an outcome on its own. 
There was initially some confusion with regards to the role of the Burnside Safe Group 
(scrutiny structure for the Police/Fire Service within the new CPP) as its name suggests 
safety is a key issue, therefore it was originally thought that this may be where 
community safety was discussed. However, some interviewees at the start of the 
research process were quite definite as to its role;  
“The thing about the Safe Burnside Group - the title is misleading, because Safe 
Burnside does not mean that we are the replacement for a Safety Partnership or 
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actually at the moment have a broader remit than the local scrutiny and engagement 
of Police and Fire” (B002) - Principal Officer – Safe Group – Burnside. 
However, the Chair of the Safe Burnside Group when interviewed months later seemed to 
anticipate a wider agenda for the group, which perhaps highlighted awareness at that 
point that community safety was becoming a somewhat fragmented service delivery, 
insofar as there was no apparent oversight or direction via a strategic board; such as the 
former CSP. The strategic direction of community safety was also brought up at a later 
Safe Burnside Partnership meeting in August 2013. This was interesting insofar as one of 
the Council officers interviewed months earlier; adamant that the Safe Group’s remit was 
for scrutiny only, now raised the question that as they no longer had a CSP they ‘needed 
to look at their role and wider into the Safer Communities work – that they as a 
partnership had broader responsibilities’ (taken from notes from the Safe Burnside 
Partnership meeting 22/8/13). Perhaps it had become apparent that issues relating to 
community safety had become somewhat fragmented of late and lacking direction, and 
therefore needed more central steering through a strategic group. Interestingly, the 
actual minutes of the meeting do not mention the full conversation; merely that they will 
look beyond the role of scrutiny and ‘cover the wider Community Safety agenda’ 
(Burnside, 2013b: 106).  
 4.6 Conclusion 
Community Safety Partnership’s (CSP’s) set within the governance of community safety in 
Scotland have developed over time to incorporate new guidelines/legislation. In England 
and Wales their statutory role was set within the Crime and Disorder Act 1998; a role that 
arguably focused more on crime reduction rather than community safety (Hughes, 2002; 
Henry, 2009; 2012). In Scotland, CSPs emerged from a slightly different route. In 1999 the 
report Safer Communities in Scotland provided guidance for the establishment of CSPs; 
whose subsequent aims were to establish partnerships with a range of organisations 
drawn from the public and third sector; emphasising that sustainability could only be 
achieved if a variety of agencies and approaches were employed to tackle crime and 
disorder in local communities (Scottish Community Safety Network (SCSN), 2012a: 9). The 
report gave guidance to Local Authorities and the Police on how to set up partnership 
structures; including guidance on conducting audits, and how to monitor and evaluate 
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initiatives – in fact not to dissimilar to guidance issued to Crime and Disorder Reduction 
Partnerships in England and Wales (Henry, 2009: 97). Nonetheless, it has been argued 
that despite a possible ‘detartinisation’ of Scottish social policy (McAra, 2011; Croall et al., 
2010) during the New Labour era - which arguably put a brake on innovative policy 
making (Croall et al., 2010), Scotland for the most part retained  its distinctive civic culture 
with a continued emphasis on penal welfare values.  
However, CSPs in Scotland have since the 2003 Local Government in Scotland Act, been 
inextricably linked with Community Planning and the concept of best value, which means 
their role is set within the somewhat conflicting aims of centralisation and localisation 
(McAra, 2007). Community safety as a concept is therefore situated within complex 
government structures, whereby multi-levels or layers of partnership working interface 
with an intricate set of rules and regulations designed to increase public accountability 
(Cairney, 2015a). However, the more crowded the policy arena happens to be the more 
blurred the boundaries of accountability can become (ibid); and the more likely tensions 
will emerge between a rhetoric of long term prevention and engagement (espoused by 
Christie) and the drive to meet performance targets through policy levers such as the NPF 
and SOA within the Community Planning process – unless of course they overlap (Hughes 
and Rowe, 2007). Add to this the strain of a reform process promoting an ethos of 
achieving ‘more with less’ (Scottish Government, 2010: 2) and some unintended 
consequences may begin to emerge within the case study areas, which may ultimately 
impact on the role of CSPs within the governance of community safety in Scotland. For 
example, as austerity measures take hold some organisations – as has been suggested by 
some participants – may retrench back to what they perceive to be their ‘core stuff’ 
(C002), which may mean that the direction of community safety may by default  be 
decided by more powerful partners (those with the most resources and expertise) such as 
the Police.  
By utilising aspects of the Bespoke framework (see chapter 3), based on Hudson and 
Hardy’s (2002) ‘partnership assessment tool’, questions were addressed to participants in 
order to try and address some of the research questions. For example, with respect to 
‘partnership origins’ and power/structure and control, which allowed the researcher to 
gain an insight on participants perceptions around strategic decision making practices, for 
example, the vertical influence (if any) on horizontal strategic decisions. Or, the impact of 
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austerity measures on local structures, and how lead agencies that may possess different 
levels of power are perceived. This highlighted increased tensions within the case study 
areas around top-down decision making practices - especially in relation to policing, and 
how the reform/re--structure of CSP’s (particularly in Cartside) may lead to a change in 
focus within community safety partnership working. 
In terms of perception (amongst participants) throughout the case study areas - the 
Council are generally considered the lead agency in terms of partnership working within 
the CPP structure and within the CSP structure (where it exists), and have in the main 
been regarded as having overall responsibility for community safety. However, in light of 
the reform process, both structurally and with an added emphasis on performance it 
appears that tensions have begun to emerge within the domain of community safety 
partnership working. In Cartside this was made evident by reactions to the changes to the 
CSP structure as some agencies believe that the Police (whose representatives have 
always been the Chair) are becoming too dominant insofar as decisions may be taken 
using an intelligence led policing model that may (despite Christie) focus on short term 
quantifiable initiatives in line with rigorous performance management regimes favoured 
by the Police (Mackenzie and Hamilton-Smith, 2011; Hamilton-Smith et al., 2013). This 
issue was also highlighted in research on partnership working by the Scottish Community 
Safety Network; insofar as a number of CSPs in discussion around Police and Fire reform 
voiced concerns that Police Scotland had shifted their focus from ‘prevention and 
partnership working to enforcement-driven and performance output-led’ (SCSN, 2013: 6).  
This has possibly been the case in both Avonside and Cartside; where arguably the 
Council have relinquished the desire for a more holistic partnership approach to 
community safety (whereby a multi-agency solution is sought incorporating the 
public/private and third sector) in place of a more one dimensional inter-agency policing 
model, which has the possibility to interpenetrate and change the work practices of those 
involved (Coliandris and Rogers, 2008: 119).   For example, with the creation of Police 
oriented Multi-Agency Tasking and Co-ordination groups (MATAC’s); whose membership 
was ultimately selected by the Police. Within ‘austerity localism’ (Featherstone, et al., 
2012) the most obvious reason for this may be linked to the reduction in Council 
services/personnel; thereby necessitating a need to delegate community safety issues 
into the hands of the one agency with the most capital (human and social) to take the 
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lead. It may also be linked to the removal of ring fenced funding for CSPs. No funding, 
may result in Councils (and individual Agencies) returning to a sort of silo mentality with a 
focus on their own aims and objectives. This is possibly more evident in Burnside with the 
removal of the CSP structure and the ‘mainstreaming’ of community safety throughout 
the community planning process – to the point where “they don't talk about community 
safety in Burnside anymore” (B002). In fact, from 2007 to 2010 in the Burnside Household 
Survey, community safety is a main topic area (antisocial behaviour, community safety 
patrols, safety at night etc.), however, from 2011 to 2014 the priorities change to 
incorporate topics linked to welfare reform, fuel poverty, community cohesion etc., 
(Burnside, 2015a), thereby signalling a possible de-prioritisation of community safety as a 
concept. However, it may also be linked to a perception that people feel safer within their 
communities (Burnside, 2015a; Scottish Government, 2012g: 29). 
It is clear that austerity and the reform process in general is having an impact on strategic 
decision making within the domain of community safety. Not only has there been a 
marked reduction in personnel/services within the case study areas, but, structural 
reform has witnessed a more enhanced focus on performance in line with policy levers 
such as the NPF, the SOA and Christie. Add to this the emergence of Police MATAC groups 
as the operational arm of CSPs, and welfare focused agencies may struggle to commit to 
this type of partnership; as witnessed by the Agency who declared that they had become 
“too Policey” (C012). Although CSPs are interlinked with CPPs and Best Value they were 
nonetheless established to deliver efficient integrated local services to meet the needs of 
specific communities across Scotland (SCSN, 2012a). However, if there is a perception 
that core issues within the domain of community safety (in relation to long term 
prevention) are now somehow being diluted or obscured by enhanced performance 
management regimes; or community safety as a concept is somehow being de-prioritised 
(loss of local forums – community voice; services; initiatives) then it may raise questions 
around changes to the role of CSPs within the governance of community safety; as either 
a multi-agency forum discussing joint problems, or as inter-agency partnership working, 
whereby a dominant partner alters the work practices of those involved (Coliandris and 
Rogers, 2008: 119). Therefore, partnership working will be discussed next.  
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Chapter 5: Working in Partnership within the domain of Community Safety 
 
 5.1 Is Partnership Working necessary?  
 
Since the 1980s, as previously highlighted in the literature review, a prevailing opinion 
within UK public services is that partnership working is essential to crime prevention and 
community safety. This was reinforced by New Labour through the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998 (Gilling, 2007), and by the Scottish Executive in the Local Government in 
Scotland Act 2003 (HMSO, 2003). Partnership working has been deemed necessary within 
most public policy areas, and is ultimately viewed as ‘a good thing’ – a virtuous concept 
(Clark and Glendinning, 2002); wherein the ideal partnership involves co-operation 
between actors working towards common goals (Mackintosh, 2007).  
  
Working in partnership has become increasingly important within public policy over the 
last forty years, and has been invariably viewed not only as the obvious option, but also as 
the key implementation tool used to tackle ‘wicked issues’ such as crime and poverty by 
local agencies (Glendinning, 2002: 115; Martin and Guarneros-Meza, 2013). Nonetheless, 
working in partnership can also be problematic, for example, a frequent theme cited 
within partnership working is the interaction between hierarchy and networks (Martin 
and Guarneros-Meza, 2013: 585); and the role of external or top down rational 
bureaucratic forms represented by clear lines of accountability (McGarvey and Cairney, 
2008); and how this affects partnership working in general. Practitioners of community 
safety therefore (much like any other public partnerships), have to not only negotiate a 
path that takes in potentially contentious relationships between local, regional and 
national policy objectives, but also between inter-organisational cultures with opposing 
interpretations of community safety/crime prevention discourse; and between conflicting 
images of community representation (inclusive/exclusive) (Hughes and Rowe, 2007: 323).  
Therefore, a key question often asked by academics and practitioners within the social 
policy arena may be - is partnership working necessary, and if so, why?  Some academics 
have asked questions around the benefits of partnership working (Broussine and Miller, 
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2005; Mackintosh, 2007); in other words will the benefits of partnership working 
outweigh the costs (Riggs et al., 2013). 
 
In an attempt to identify if participants within the case study areas viewed partnership 
working as beneficial or essential; and not just as a ‘buzzword to sprinkle liberally over 
funding applications’ (McQuade, 2009: 3), questions were asked around the relevance of 
partnership working – in other words was it essential to the core business practices of 
their agency. Practically every participant answered quite emphatically in the affirmative 
(usually with a one word answer – ‘yes’, ‘absolutely’, ‘100%’, ‘definitely’, however, some 
others expanded on why it was so;   
 
“We can't do anything without partnership working” (A014) - Child Protection – Avon 
Isle – Avonside.  
“Yes, you know, it can’t be any other way, and by the fact that the third sector is an 
amalgamation of 2,500 different organisations, if we don’t find ways of working 
together we’re stuffed” (B010) - Chair of Third Sector Forum/SCPP – Burnside. 
“[...] I think partnership working is key and in terms of community safety nobody has 
got the answer, you know, everybody needs to bring something to the table” (B019) – 
VAW Co-ordinator – CSB – Burnside.  
However, one participant in Cartside acknowledged some limitations of partnership 
working within the Fire Service;  
 
“It should be but we aren't there yet. We are working to educate our staff on the 
advantages and benefits of partnership working. [...] and we still need to work to make 
sure everybody from the bottom up is aware of what the moral and legal obligations is 
in partnership working. So, I'd say we're still not mature as a partner at all levels of our 
agency” (C004) - Group Manager Fire Service – Cartside. 
Most participants were quite emphatic in their responses in relation to how working in 
partnership was a necessary and core part of their operational practices. This has been 
supported by other studies which have found that inter-agency partnerships have 
become a key component towards combating crime and disorder, and promoting 
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community safety (Shepherdson et al., 2014). However, as the participant from the Fire 
Service pointed out – you need to ensure that everyone from the ‘bottom up’ 
understands their obligations about working in partnership with others and what it entails 
in terms of commitment. In other words individuals in organisations need to understand 
and agree about the necessity of partnership working, and that it is an inescapable 
feature of present-day social policy (Weston, 2014: 10). 
Understanding other agencies core practices was also cited by two participants as a good 
way to offset potential conflict in respect of highlighting problematic situations that 
agencies have to deal with – especially between the Police and other agencies within the 
public sector; 
 “I think one time or another in terms of the community safety there was an initiative 
that was about work shadowing that a couple of our guys took part in, for example, 
there used to be the Antisocial Behaviour Team that went out on a Friday and Saturday 
night and a couple of our staff went out with them just to experience that from a 
Policing point of view [...] I can sit here and talk about the Police all day long but, I 
don't fully understand their role and the pressures and the different kind of context, so 
it’s good to challenge yourself and go out and learn, and it’s probably something that 
doesn't happen so much and I think that's probably a sign of the times in terms of 
pressures” (C010) - Youth Services – Cartside. 
 
Possibly alluding to how austerity measures (in terms of a reduction of resources across 
the public sector) could impact on effective partnership work in terms of actually having 
the resources to shadow or observe inter-organisationally. If this practice and others are 
stalled due to a lack of resources then it could lead to increased frustration across 
agencies owing to a lack of understanding about the problems each agency face; 
 
“I think it is always good to have an understanding about what other agencies do. […] 
We have an issue in Burnside with people claiming it’s on ‘Standby’ all the time, 
because they don't answer calls on time, and they don't” (B018) - Child Protection – 
Burnside.  
 
‘Standby’ was in reference to an out of hours service for Social Work (Child Protection) 
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and the Police in particular complained they had difficulty with the staff not answering 
the phone on time, or not responding in the way they wanted them to. In an effort to fix 
things they organised a meeting between those on ‘Standby’ and the Police; 
 
“The Police were shocked to know that there was only actually - I think it was only 
three or four members of staff on Standby and they thought there was a whole big 
team. So in that, an understanding of what the service actually did allowed the Police 
to stop getting so upset about it […]” (B018) - Child Protection – Burnside.   
  
In this case conflict was avoided in the Child Protection Committee by arranging a 
separate meeting between Social Work and the Police in an effort to come to an 
understanding. Conflict avoidance methods have been a key tool used in the past to 
offset tensions that may surface in partnership meetings between key agencies -
particularly between the Police and other partners. This is usually achieved by key 
agencies meeting outside of formal partnership structures and agreeing informally on 
future strategies (Crawford and Jones, 1995). While this may have been done to avoid 
future conflict, it could also have the effect of promoting exclusivity;  insofar as not all 
agencies would be involved in the decision making process (McCarty and O’Neill, 2014).  
 
5.2 Power and Decision Making 
 
Partnership on the whole as a concept is viewed as a positive quality associated with 
equality and reciprocity, however, partnerships are not necessarily viewed as equal in 
practice and can become unequal as time goes by wherein powerful partners too often 
determine the agenda and set the time frames (Mayo and Taylor, 2001). Partnership 
working often benefits powerful partners (Rummery, 2002: McCall and Rummery, 2017: 
59), for example, those partners who it is often argued have more economic social capital 
compared to others; in this sense social capital would signify certain resource availability 
to an actor (Coleman, 1988); including material and human capital – skills and knowledge 
embodied in labour (Nahapiet, 2011). Individuals or groups of individuals may also 
possess more social capital derived from their network of relationships of mutual 
‘acquaintance and recognition’ (Bourdieu, 1986). Putnam (2000) defines social capital 
further with reference to Bonding (exclusive) and Bridging (inclusive) social capital. In 
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terms of partnerships therefore it is arguable that the partner with the most social capital 
defined by; economic capital, human capital, and bridging social capital - links to a 
broader network of external assets (Putnam, 2000), has the most power. Power in this 
sense may manifest itself through the decision making process, insofar as powerful actors 
will have more leverage (social capital) to set the agenda or determine the goals and 
direction of the partnership.  
 
Lowndes and Sullivan (2004: 64-65) in discussion around decision making, partnerships 
and public participation argue that in real life partnerships are far from the ideal type; 
insofar as different actors from different organisations find it difficult to behave outside 
of organisational norms, and interaction is often characterised by clashes of competing 
principles rather than notions of reciprocity and interdependence. It could be argued that 
there are competing principles within community safety networks between; the public 
and the third sector, or between different public sector agencies, or even between local, 
regional and central government. However, a key point highlighted in the literature 
review was that Government (typified by hierarchical bureaucracies) no longer functioned 
through the same type of command and control from the centre, but neither was it 
incapacitated as power was still retained through resource allocation, regulation and 
legislation (Holliday, 2000: 175; Marinetto, 2003); and it is perhaps through powerful 
regulatory frameworks that tensions may emerge as a result of competing principles 
within the decision making process (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004).  
 5.2.1 The Concept of Power 
Policy levers within community planning structures, such as the SOA have the power to 
steer partners towards taking cognizance of national outcomes; while (in line with 
Christie) still pay attention to one of the main aims of community planning - engaging 
people and communities in the decision making process (Scottish Executive, 2004: 1). 
Haugaard (2002: 1-2) argues that it is impossible to define power as a single concept; he 
prefers to equate power to Wittgenstein’s ‘family resemblance’ concept insofar as while 
there exist similarities there is no one set of characteristics in common. There is ‘horse 
power’ and ‘political power’ both have the power to intrinsically make something happen 
or move forward, but they are not the same. Power is being discussed here in the latter 
political sense (however briefly) in order to identify some of the different layers and 
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ideology at play, for example, ‘power over’ (conflictual) and ‘power to’ (consensual) 
(Haugaard, 2002). For instance, within Dahl’s philosophy A has the power over B to make 
B do something they may not otherwise have done; it is in essence about ‘prevailing in 
decision making’ (Dahl, 2002: 6), and not necessarily about power over resources. 
Bachrach and Baratz (2002:26) while accepting most of Dahl’s perspective nonetheless 
criticise Dahl for not taking into account ‘institutional bias’- in that while A may exercise 
power over B in the decision making process, he/she may also do so by limiting the extent 
of the political process to public deliberation of those issues that are relatively innocuous 
to B (Bachrach and Baratz, 2002: 30). In essence there are two faces of power – the 
power to make decisions and the power of non-decision making (or agenda setting). 
Lukes (1974; 2005) characterises both Dahl’s and Bachrach and Baratz’s theorisations of 
power as dimensions of power. Dahl’s theorisation of power – those who prevail in 
decision making – he refers to as just ‘power’ or one dimensional power (Lukes, 2005: 
111), and Bachrach and Baratz’s two faces of power (agenda) as two dimensional power - 
the power to decide what is decided; by deciding what initiatives will be supported, 
resourced and in what timeframe (Mayo and Taylor, 2001). Furthermore, he argues that 
whereas these conceptions of power presuppose that actual conflict is essential to power, 
it is to ignore - as he states “that the most effective and insidious use of power is to 
prevent such conflict from arising in the first place” (Lukes, 2005: 27), by securing 
compliance to domination through the shaping of ‘perceptions, cognitions and 
preferences’ (Lukes, 1974: 24) into accepting the existing order of things, via institutions 
such as education, religion, government and the media (Lukes, 1974: 24), this he refers to 
as his third dimensional view of power.   
Power in Foucault’s view is also mutually constitutive (Foucault, 2002) insofar as far from 
being a conflictual force, it can also produce pleasure, discourse and forms of knowledge 
(Foucault, 1980: 119). Foucault asks that if power were only ever conceived as a negative, 
repressive force that only said no, then would people readily obey it? In other words 
whereas power could be conceived as rules and regulations that are prohibitive, it can 
also be viewed as a productive network that runs through the whole social body 
(Foucault, 1980). Mayo and Taylor (2001: 40) argue that the most visible aspect of power 
in partnerships is the ability to shape outcomes. This perhaps emphasises Lukes (1974; 
2005) first two dimensions of power – the power to (first dimension) and the power to 
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determine or set the agenda/objectives. Within community planning this is evident 
through the power of the Local Authority to change or create governance structures, 
establish partnerships, or to align partnerships to Single Outcome Agreements (SOA). 
Therefore participants were asked a series of questions designed to elicit how power in 
decision making (in respect of community safety) is viewed within the partnerships, for 
example, were decisions taken from a top down (vertical/command and control) 
perspective via the SOA, or from a horizontal perspective – with each organisations input 
taken into account.  
 5.2.2 Partnership working, power and decision making 
On the whole participants within all three case study areas had mixed views on whether 
there was a vertical/top down chain of command with respect to the governance of 
community safety. It was accepted by most participants that there is a hierarchical 
structure with regards to community planning wherein the Local Authority leads 
(influenced in part by key central government policy documents). Community safety as a 
themed partnership (in Avonside and Cartside) sits within that structure. However, in the 
Avon Isle CSP the command structure was viewed as more localised; flowing more 
through the Chair. The Chair was an elected local Councillor, therefore power is still 
flowing through the Council, but  perhaps (because of its geographical isolation) it was 
thought of in a more contained sense in that local issues were decided by the partnership 
through the Chair; 
“I suppose, our legal services department would ultimately be the organisational body, 
but control is sort of within the hands of the committee of what they're trying to 
achieve.  Nobody actually hands us an agenda with things to do. We decide what are 
the priorities for our community and try and work towards these” (A008) – Councillor - 
Avon Isle – Avonside. 
 
However, this interview had taken place before the structure was reorganised in Avonside 
in line with the new SOA, which means that with the demise of the local CSP this will no 
longer be the case. Nonetheless, the Community Safety Co-ordinator for Avonside in 
general emphasised that decisions would be taken with a ‘bottom up’ approach; 
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“Yeah, well the SOA and the community plan I’d argue is bottom up because services 
themselves will identify from their own priorities and their own service intelligence 
what are the significant issues for Avonside; and it’s those issues that are then fed into 
the community plan, the formation of the community plan” (A001 - 2nd) – Community 
Safety Co-ordinator - Avonside. 
 
Interestingly in Cartside opinion was slightly divided, for example, some participants 
(mainly from the third sector) thought there was a hierarchical structure within the CSP 
and it came through the Police;  
 
“Aye, definitely hierarchical, and its Police basically […] when one goes or moves on 
another one takes his place, that's been my experience anyway” (C005) – Rape Crisis – 
Cartside. 
  
“It’s always been a senior police officer that's led it, so because of the culture of the 
Police there is quite a clear structure as to who’s got the lead in convening the 
meetings and taking stuff forward” (C007) – Addiction Support – Cartside. 
 
For others (mainly public sector agencies) it was thought to be more jointly led; 
 
“In terms of the CSP - I mean there is a Chair and a Vice Chair but, I think it’s more 
people working together collaboratively rather than because they’ve been told to or 
they're following orders” (C003) – Child Protection – Cartside. 
 
Basically it's not so much a linear - it is a horizontal chain, where partners come in - 
obviously we have our own core issues that we deal with ourselves and it's only the 
multi-agency aspects that we will go into partners where other partners can insist - so I 
wouldn't say it is vertical, I would say it is more horizontal chain of command” (C004) – 
Group Manager Fire Service – Cartside. 
 
Although the comment above suggests that decision making is based on collaboration, 
they do however, add that it is only during the multi-agency aspects where other actors 
‘can insist’…the sentence was not finished, but, it could suggest that there are more 
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dominant actors/agencies within the CSP in relation to multi-agency decision making. 
Perhaps in Cartside this is in reference to the Police who have initiated the new MATAC 
structure (previously discussed), wherein ‘competing principles’ (Lowndes and Sullivan, 
2004) have highlighted some tensions surrounding the new structure; 
 
“I think like anything else there's certain organisations represented that'll have a 
bigger influence in terms of some of the kind of outcomes in the work that we’re 
doing.  It’s trying to be relaxed about that as well and, you know, again it changes in 
terms of some of the personalities involved as well, you know, there's been Chairs of 
the CSP where it’s felt quite a kind of... top down approach and it’s not sat well with a 
lot of the partners […] but some of their personnel have... it felt as though you were 
part of the Police and that was the way in which meetings were conducted and it was 
quite an unusual situation for some of us as partners who don't operate in that kind of 
environment” (C010) – Youth Services – Cartside.  
 
However, they did add that the new Chair “seems quite an approachable guy, quite 
focused, you know, easy to deal with” (C010). Nonetheless, it was also pointed out that it 
would be interesting to see in what direction the CSP is heading in light of some other key 
structural changes. For example, the Community Planning Partnership Manager role (role 
involved engaging with the wider partnership) was being deleted, which could have a 
significant impact in terms of engagement with the wider partnership, as opposed to 
engagement being limited to key players. As one participant put it; 
“[...] there have been periods perhaps where, because the Police are in the Chair, it 
can sometimes, if their priorities aren’t the ones that are driven, then perhaps 
sometimes make it difficult to deliver in the true context of partnership” (C008) - 
Community Safety Projects Manager – Cartside.  
Burnside was different in that under the new community planning structure 
accountability for community safety now sat somewhere between the local Area 
Partnerships and the Safe Burnside Group, which in the end was accountable to the 
Strategic Community Planning Partnership (SCPP); in other words information was fed up 
the way and citywide decisions were taken within the SCPP. Within this new structure 
there did appear to be prima facie evidence that the structure had been changed with 
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Christie in mind insofar as ‘services were to be democratically accountable to local people 
and communities in Scotland’ (Scottish Government, 2011c: 81); for example, community 
representatives on the new Area Partnerships and sectoral CPPs acquiring more power 
within the decision making process, and more crucially the right to vote;  
 
“I've experienced at the meeting... depends who the Chair is, but I've found that there 
is a degree of a vertical chain of command, but it’s quite clear that the process is 
consensus so far.  So it might be vertical, but it’s not dictatorial which I'm pleased at” 
(B013) – Community Councillor Burnwood CC – Burnside.  
“I think that the Council is genuinely grappling through this, but the Council... because 
it has a statutory responsibility for the leading or coordination of community planning, 
tends to work with other partners in a way that they’re working with them to their 
agenda. But I think that they are working very hard at how you develop a more 
collaborative approach operating; rather than a vertical chain of command” (B010) –  
Chair of Third Sector Forum/SCPP – Burnside. 
Although the previous comments have conceivably emphasised a more collaborative 
form of decision making within partnership working, they have also highlighted the 
differential power dynamics within community planning (between the Council and 
community partners); with respect to Bachrach and Baratz (2002: 30) ‘institutional bias’; 
or Lukes (1974; 2005) two dimensional concept of power – the power to decide what is 
decided. While it was accepted throughout the case study areas that there was a strategic 
hierarchical structure in place, there was also an acknowledgement that the SOA 
established decision making as a bottom up process; insofar as agencies within the 
partnership informed the SOA. Nonetheless, it was also pointed out that the SOA - 
although ostensibly consultative – was still a policy lever linking national priorities to local 
ones;   
 
 “[...] Within the SOA there's a section on community safety and a number of the key 
partners got together to work on that to identify shared priorities and also in terms of 
the National Outcomes because you've got to pay cognisance to those as well, to 
identify what each service would contribute towards achievement of the National 
Outcomes” (A001 - 2nd) – Community Safety Co-ordinator – Avonside. 
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“[...] In terms of the SOA, the One Burnside Agenda, they're all huge drivers and 
influences, so we have to fit in with those structures, you know, it’s a no choice not to 
because, you wouldn’t probably get much movement” (B019) – VAW Co-ordinator – 
CSB – Burnside. 
 
The general consensus amongst participants in this regard is that individual agencies have 
a definite role in the decision making process, and local areas have to an extent room to 
manoeuvre in deciding their own priorities; though arguably indirectly steered from the 
centre - albeit of the soft persuasion – through guidance and suggestion (Martin and 
Guarneros-Meza, 2013). Nonetheless, direct steering may also occur with respect to 
particular strategies; 
 
“[...] I think it depends on what the issues are.  If it’s something that affects City wide 
then there may be a steer that comes down that chain, if you want to call it that, from 
the CPP board level or the sectoral level […]” (B015) -  Councillor – Burnpark Area 
Partnership – Burnside. 
 
Having a clear role/identity within partnerships is often crucial to its success, thus how 
individuals judge their relationships to other actors/agencies within partnerships can be 
important (Hudson and Hardy, 2002; Broussine and Miller, 2005: 381). Therefore 
participants throughout the case study areas were asked how they thought their 
roles/identity were viewed within Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) (or within the 
different partnership structures in Burnside CPP) in order to obtain a reflexive viewpoint 
on how they thought they were perceived inter-organisationally, and if this may impact 
on how they work together as a partnership.  
 
 5.3 Partnership identity 
 
For the most part the Council throughout all the case study areas - were thought of as the 
key leads responsible for the governance of community safety, or as strategic facilitators 
(making sure partners bought into the SOA) to ensure proper governance, or to use a 
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nautical terminology in line with Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) concepts – at the helm in 
order to steer partnerships in one direction;  
 
 “[...] There’s obviously ensuring proper governance of the partnership, to a degree 
obviously getting some of the funding round the table, pulling levers by making sure 
that the right partners are round the table [...])” (B015) – Councillor – Burnpark Area 
Partnership – Burnside. 
“I suppose the Council is seen as the organisation that makes the whole community 
tick in some way...” (A009) – Street Scene Warden Avon Isle – Avonside. 
 “I think the Council’s role […] the centre of the organisation where I sit, its role is to 
provide primarily strategic policy direction and the clerking support, that's what the 
centre does” (C001 - 2nd) – - Community Planning Partnership Manager – Cartside.  
While there were clear perceptions as to the role of the Council within the realm of 
community safety, this was arguably also the case for those agencies principally involved 
in preventative activities - most notably the Police and to some extent the Fire Service;  
 
 “I don't know there's a definition what the Police should do, certainly we attend 
meetings on a multi-agency approach, basically to solving any issues that are in the 
community that affect community safety” (A004) - Senior Police Officer – Avon Isle – 
Avonside. 
“As a Fire and Rescue Service we have a legal requirement to get involved in the CSP or 
community planning process, in addition to that the new National Fire Service have 
basically a policy that they will fully engage with partners […]” (C004) - Group Manager 
Fire Service – Cartside. 
Housing Associations (Registered Social Landlords) – as issue specific partners in the third 
sector - were also (to some extent) viewed in a preventative role; 
 
“Our role would be defined in that we work with other agencies to reduce antisocial 
behaviour within the community and address antisocial behaviour issues” (A007) - 
Housing Officer – Avon Isle – R&S Homes – Avonside. 
120 
 
 
“[…] Our Community Improvement Partnership (CIP) is a partnership with; BHA 
(Burnside Housing Association), SFRS, Scottish Police force, and that works in trying to 
improve community safety […] but a lot of that's about the intelligence the three of us 
gather as well and using that” (B007) - Leader of Neighbourhood Services – BHA – 
Burnside. 
These comments will be explored later (in accountability section) with respect to the 
growing influence of Housing within the concept of Third Party Policing. Those 
participants representing community organisations (although it should be noted that 
there were no formal community representatives on the Cartside CSP); or the third 
sector, were slightly less definite about how their roles were viewed or defined within the 
community safety/community planning structure;   
 
 “[…] prior to the change (the restructure of the CPP) we were just there to make up 
the numbers.  We were there because ‘we better ask them, you know, they better 
come along’ […] they heard and were supportive of us. But when it came to a decision 
Community Councillors never had a vote.  So although we were listened to genuinely 
and sincerely (said with a wry grin) - and the Chair has made it abundantly clear that, 
you know, over the years ‘we do listen’ and they do, we never had any real teeth in it” 
(B013) – - Community Councillor Burnwood CC – Burnside.  
 “I've no idea how it is defined (laughs) we're just there” (C005) - Rape Crisis – Cartside. 
“I think it's a role - I think we have quite an important role in local CSP forums, because 
we provide, I believe, essential services throughout Avonside, our input is valuable […] 
I think we're viewed as quite valuable partners” (A002) - Rape Crisis – Avonside. 
“In many ways others are better to answer that than I am. I think what I would hope 
would be that the third sector is viewed as a hugely significant partner after the 
Council and the Health Board; it’s the organisation that has collaboratively the biggest 
budget” (B010) - Chair of Third Sector Forum/SCPP – Burnside. 
How you perceive your identity as an individual or how your agency is perceived is 
arguably different with respect to perceptions on status, which will be discussed next. 
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 5.4 Partnership Working and Status  
 
Much has been written about partnership working in the past in relation to the power 
differentials between agencies; with respect to central and local relations within 
networks of power - those who determined strategy (steered) had more power than 
those who merely rowed in the direction pointed out for them (Osborne and Gaebler, 
1992); or power could be determined through resource allocation (Holliday, 2000; 
Marinetto, 2003). Mayo and Taylor (2001: 41) ascribe the use of resources as a controlling 
lever by powerful partners (such as Government departments, or the Police) in that they 
may only be made available for ‘specific types of initiative’. This fits in with Lukes (1974; 
2005) second dimensional view of power in terms of powerful partners being able to 
determine what is up for consideration, via agenda setting, or non-decision making – 
determining what is not up for consideration. Similarly, there are powerful Government 
levers at work through regulation (Holliday, 2000). If this is the case then it could be 
argued that when a power imbalance such as this occurs – especially if there is a 
prominence/status accorded to some agencies over others within a network (with 
regards to agenda setting and availability of resources) – then how your status/power or 
social capital is viewed by others may impact on decisions made within a partnership. 
Somers and Bradford (2006: 76) for example, argue that power could simply reside in the 
ability of some agencies to ‘get the ducks lined up’ insofar as being able to link together a 
network’s constitutive partners with the goals of social policy. However, another possible 
inhibitor to partnership working is a perception that some agencies/individuals on 
partnerships are favoured more than others (Broussine and Miller, 2005: 382).  
In an effort to understand if there is a view held by participants of an asymmetry in power 
within community safety/community planning networks (which may ultimately impact on 
partnership goals); participants were asked a series of questions in an effort to try and 
determine how they viewed their status within partnership working. There was a mixed 
response from participants across the case study areas when asked if their agency had an 
equal status within partnership working. For the most part there was a consensus around 
statements on equality ‘partners being equal’ etc., which was more evident from Council 
agencies across all case study areas. Nevertheless, a dichotomy of sorts was also pointed 
out by some participants with reference to the key stakeholder status of other partners;  
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“Yeah the Council is probably the lead agency in the Area Partnership [...] the other 
partner agencies, it’s difficult for me to answer on their behalf, but I would like to hope 
that they do feel part and inclusive into this whole process, because ultimately it’s for 
them, and when I say them - that's probably more targeted towards the Community 
Reps.  But everyone in my opinion should feel part of the process” (B015) - Councillor – 
Burnpark Area Partnership - Burnside.  
 
“I'm not convinced... as Youth Services I don't believe that we do, but that's not... I 
think it’s a strange one because I don't think that we do, I don't know if others would 
consider us key players, but we make a big contribution and a lot of that contribution’s 
recognised by the other partners. We do get good feedback, but I don't know 
necessarily if we’re seen as, you know, a key player” (C010) - Youth Services – Cartside. 
 
The Police are naturally viewed as key stakeholders within CSP’s in both Avonside and 
Cartside, (and within the reformed CPP structure in Burnside) based on their knowledge 
of crime prevention, and consequently they also viewed themselves as equal partners – 
or in some cases as the main partners; 
 
 “Yeah, the Police are one of the main players obviously, one of the main agencies 
involved in it” (A004) – Senior Police Officer - Avon Isle – Avonside. 
“I think we’re all contributors, whether that makes it equal amongst... I suppose at the 
moment with the structure being as it is and with everybody kind of working in silos 
then you probably will have people that don't contribute as much as others because 
they don't have a collective goal to work towards at the moment” (C011) - Area 
Commander Police – Cartside.  
The above comment perhaps illustrates a sort of latent frustration on behalf of this Police 
participant in Cartside; partnership status or equality in this sense is arguably linked to 
active contribution (the sharing of intelligence/information); which perhaps has not been 
as forthcoming within the new MATAC structure due to differences in organisational 
ethos. Therefore working towards ‘collective goals’ is possibly being hampered by a lack 
of trust and a growing resistance by some agencies (both Council and the third sector) to 
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engage in the more task oriented practice commonly associated with Police work 
(McCarthy and O’Neill, 2014).  
 
The Fire Service (apart from Burnside) in Avonside and Cartside also exhibited signs of 
frustration with regard to perceptions of their status within the partnership. Partly, 
because relatively speaking they felt they had to prove their worth as partners, or make 
others appreciate their importance within the structure; 
 
“ […] being one of the smaller partners there's very little overlap, so where we have an 
issue it's not one of their major problems; it's one of their minor problems. What we 
have as a key issue very rarely makes it to a CPP meeting. Purely and simply because of 
the size of the problems and the dimensions of the problems - Social Work, Police, 
Health and what other partners can bring to the table. What we bring is a smaller 
issue.” (C004) Group Manager Fire Service – Cartside.     
 
“I think a lot of people still don't recognise that we can have a big part in certain things 
and they still think  - you go to fires, you mobilise when the bell goes - but you don't 
really have a part and it's just trying to convince everybody of that, but yeah I think 
people are seeing that now and the fact that we are committed to community 
planning, I think they see that you are an equal member yeah” (A003) – Group 
Commander – Fire Service – Avonside. 
 
Power according to some analysts, is not static, it is fluid as a concept (Mayo and Taylor, 
2001: 43) and within networks it can in a Foucauldian sense shift (Clegg, 1997) as each 
actor learns and internalises the rules to the game. Therefore the Fire Service’s status 
may change  over time as they increase their bridging social capital by developing their 
knowledge of how to engage, or how to be seen to engage in the decision making 
process; especially if they have material and human capital that can be adapted to further 
partnership goals. This was evident within Cartside when one third sector Participant 
described how they thought the Fire Service’s role had grown in importance; 
 
 “[...] Another major partner in the partnership whose role I think has become more 
important is the Fire and Rescue Service.  In the years I've been there I've certainly 
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seen probably a more coherent representation than there was before [...] I know for 
example the Fire and Rescue Service will provide free smoke alarms to people’s 
houses, what I didn't know is that they were also giving advice to vulnerable people 
either because they're vulnerable because of disability or mobility problems in terms 
of fire prevention which was good” (C007) - Addiction Support – Cartside. 
The third sector overall had quite a pragmatic response to the question of equal status; in 
terms of how they viewed themselves within the partnership. It could also belie the 
notion of equality within community planning insofar as it is thought that not all agencies 
can (or should) be treated as equal in status; 
 
“I don't think that there's any partner round the table that is trying to diminish us or 
don't think that we’re unimportant, but in terms of what we’re contributing - it’s not 
an awful lot therefore if we were to, hypothetically speaking, if we were to leave the 
partnership, I don't think that would seriously compromise the work of the 
partnership” (C007) – Addiction Support – Cartside. 
 
Status in this sense is naturally afforded to those organisations that have the power to set 
the agenda based on available resources, which for the most part will be provided by key 
stakeholders such as the Council and the Police. Although it can also depend on the type 
of partnership, for example, issue specific partnerships such as anti-poverty alliances, 
which bring together a multitude of voluntary and charitable organisations, or Violence 
Against Women Partnerships (VAW), where power differentials are not so easily defined. 
For instance, the VAW Partnership relies on the specialist knowledge (knowledge is 
power) of the third sector, but also the resources of the Council and Criminal Justice 
Agencies, which can lead to a complex governance arena. In Burnside for example, VAW 
is situated within Community Safety Burnside (CSB) (an Arm’s Length External 
Organisation (ALEO) created by the Council and the Police); 
“I mean, it’s a partnership organisation in terms of its ownership is with the City 
Council, Police Scotland, I think and BHA and Health, they're all stakeholders within 
Community Safety Burnside [...]” (B019) – VAW Co-ordinator –CSB – Burnside.  
125 
 
Therefore, although CSB may exist at arm’s length incorporating agencies from all sectors, 
there exists a potential conflict between top down strategic direction and bottom up 
operational decision making, and who provides the overall leadership – individual 
agencies within CSB or the CSB Board. The participant from VAW acknowledged the role 
of CSB;  
 “I’d say probably Community Safety Burnside has a role in terms of providing 
leadership for the partnership and I think it does it very well” (B019) - VAW Co-
ordinator – CSB – Burnside.  
 5.4.1 Are agencies naturally equal? 
Conversely, if an agency specialised in one area then their contribution was somewhat 
limited to their area of expertise, for example, Housing has a prominent role within 
Antisocial Behaviour Partnerships, but less so on strategic CSPs, which covered a much 
wider range of community safety issues, thus some Housing participants did not think 
they had an equal status on partnerships; 
 
“I don't think it can, because it’s become quite a large field and we’re mainly Housing” 
(A010) – Housing Manager – Avon Homes – Avon Isle/Avonside.  
 
“I wouldn’t have expected it to be honest.  So the answer’s no” (C013) – Housing 
Manager for Crawley Housing Association – Cartside. 
 
In Burnside where the community planning structure had significantly changed there was 
a slightly different attitude towards how it is (status), and how it should be, for instance 
the participant from the Third Sector Forum when asked if they had equal status at first 
said ‘not yet’ (B010), but then elaborated on his response, which is worth quoting in full 
as it touches on Lukes (1974; 2005) third dimension of power, which highlights how 
ideology and hegemony have in the past shaped the framework of debate about ‘what is 
and what is not thinkable’ (Mayo and Taylor, 2001: 41); 
 
“But I think that when I say not yet, I don’t want the blame for that to rest solely with 
other partners.  I think that part of it actually requires a cultural and organisational 
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change for the third sector as well. So, for example, one of the things that people 
would often have talked about is, how are we going to engage with the CPP or with the 
partners?  And one of the things that I would just say again and again is in actual fact 
we’re not going to engage with the CPP - we are one of the partners, and when we talk 
about community planning we are part of it, and in a way that requires from us a bit of 
a culture change as well as a culture change from some of the other partners to treat 
us as an equal. In a way we only really have the pushback to be treated as an equal if in 
actual fact we present as an equal” (B010) – Chair of Third Sector Forum - Burnside. 
 
‘Presenting as an equal’ is perhaps more difficult for some organisations compared to 
others, this was most evident from community organisations. For example, in Avon Isle 
where they had a place at the table (but not a vote) status (or social capital) was 
perceived as being heard; 
 
“Well you get your voice, you know and topics are discussed openly and pretty well, if 
you ask a question you get an answer” (A012) – Community Councillor – Avon Isle 
Community Council.  
In light of the structural changes to Burnside (wherein local communities now have a vote 
on Area Partnerships) opinion varied somewhat;  
“I would hope so, I would hope so. Do I need to tell the truth (laughs)...The Community 
Council - our wee bit, is just part of another whole really, but I think that eh, more 
thingmy (sic) – is paid to the Health board, or Police Scotland or the Fire service, and 
rightly so, rightly so. But, my wee bit is about Burnpark, we're just part of the big 
machine - but if you take it out it will break” (B017) - Community Councillor – Burnpark 
CC – Burnside. 
However, the Burnwood Community representative was more positive in his response; 
“It has because we've got a vote.  I have to be fair to that and say yes, the politicians 
are pretty good at that” (B013) Community Councillor Burnwood CC – Burnside.   
Partnerships are normally created to tackle complex problems, which mean allowing for 
diversity within its structures, which in turn could create tensions with respect to 
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perceptions on status and ultimate decision making. On the other hand, it could lead to 
an appreciation of the range of skills utilised to tackle complex community issues. It could 
also lead to inter-agency conflict resulting in poorer outcomes for local communities. For 
example, problems may be addressed through a consensual viewpoint based on 
perceptions of equality and status, wherein decisions around the long term goals of 
community safety are discussed and decided as a partnership. But, if this is absent, and 
decisions are made by those agencies with the most power, then conflict and less 
commitment to partnership working could be the result (Collins and McCray, 2012: 138).   
 5.5 Partnership and commitment 
There are some documented reasons why some agencies may acquire more status than 
others on partnerships, for example, commitment to partnership working, or 
commitment by key personnel who have the ability to drive forward initiatives (Riggs et 
al., 2013; O’Neill and McCarthy, 2014); or, because they have access to more resources 
(McQuade, 2009).  If some individuals/agencies are thought to be more committed to 
working in partnership than others then this may affect how representatives are 
perceived over time. For example, non-attendance by agency representatives may signal 
to others a lack of commitment to partnership goals – whether this be the case or not. 
Conversely, those agencies who regularly attend – especially key agencies (Council and 
the Police) may be deferred to, leading to an asymmetry in power with regards to policy 
direction. In an effort to understand how commitment may impact on, not only, decision 
making, and status, but perceptions of the necessity of partnership work in general, 
participants were asked - if the level of commitment to the partnership was the same 
from all partners?  There was a wide variety of responses across the case study areas 
ranging from a straightforward yes and no, to some less sure;  
 
“I think all partners have probably found that it’s very beneficial, so I think there's a 
willingness there” (A007) – Housing Officer – Avon Isle – R&S Homes – Avonside. 
 “That's a hard one, but it's hard to say that it is equal from all parties - I would say 
looking at it, that some of us give more time that others and some have more time 
than others to give” (A011) – Community Representative Avon Isle Forum for Older 
Voices. 
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Some participants highlighted the commitment of key agencies and alluded to their 
overall authority, while also commenting on the absence of notable others;  
 
“I'm not sure who all the partners are... certainly the main agencies that go, regularly 
attend, you know, but again I'm not in a position to say who should attend and who 
shouldn’t attend, but certainly if there is a meeting the Police certainly attend” (A004) 
– Police Inspector – Avon Isle. 
 
 “With the honourable exception of Health - and actually interestingly certain Council 
Services, we were  having this discussion recently that Social Work don't actually 
attend and Education don't, and these are some of the key players I think, and I think 
the membership needs to be revisited and also attendance needs to be. Because I 
suspect there are nominal members that don't actually attend. So, it tends to be the 
same people, who come” (C003) – Child Protection – Cartside. 
 
A possible explanation (linked to austerity) was given by participants as to why some 
agencies were more committed than others; 
 
 “I think, (pause) with staff changes - I've got to be careful how I'm saying this, with 
staff changes some of our partners, haven't picked up the piece of work yet. You'll 
know Burnside, we've had loads of people leaving the Council, you know lots of staff 
changes, lots of people leaving [...] and that impacts on - we are continually looking for 
a rep from the Health just now - we used to have - you know we need somebody and 
we need the right person, and that's down to staffing” (B018) – Child Protection – 
Burnside. 
 
“[...] My view is that I think it’s getting harder for Cartside Council to participate to the 
same level and spread of people that they did, because there's fewer people around” 
(C007) – Addiction Support – Cartside. 
 
Senior (2014) in a discussion around Integrated Offender Management has argued that 
unless there is effective governance in place to allow for a commitment to work together 
from both the strategic and operational levels then effective partnership working was 
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likely to fail.   This was also commented on by one participant in Avonside who suggested 
there was a disconnect somewhere between the Strategic and operational levels; 
 
“If you go to the Strategic - yeah, there's definitely a commitment from strategic 
leaders to actually sit down and discuss things at the table. But, then I think the 
enthusiasm wanes as you go down, because everybody’s got a job to do, and then 
when you get back to operational I think it starts to get strong again” (A015) – 
Licensing Standards Officer – Avonside. 
This comment possibly highlights a frustration amongst agencies who find that 
partnership working is time consuming, and time taken to attend meetings, translates as 
less time spent on the ground actually dealing with problems – especially during times of 
fiscal constraint. For the most part those participants involved in thematic partnerships 
such as, Antisocial Behaviour Partnerships or Alcohol and Drug Partnerships, who worked 
with core agencies such as Housing, the Police, the Council, or the Fire Service generally 
thought there was commitment from these agencies. However, a lack of resources or 
funding may affect other agencies commitment to partnership working if there is no 
obvious benefit for them to do so;  
 “[...] When initially the money wasn’t ring-fenced I think there was a little bit 
historically of some partners coming to the table with annual projects they wanted a 
bit of money for […] and then I think the partnership said well actually no there's no 
more money for you, we did see a little bit of ebb and flow of people” (C008) – 
Community Safety Projects Manager – Cartside. 
Many participants commented on a lack of commitment from Health in particular; 
although not on partnerships which were specific to Health such as Community Health 
Partnerships, or those involved in social care, or alcohol and drugs;  
 
“[...]It's more to do with the links between community safety that Health doesn’t sit at 
the table” (C003) - Child Protection – Cartside.  
There was a very real sense that this was a historical lack of commitment, and not 
necessarily linked to austerity. It was put forward that a possible explanation may be that 
as Health had their own budget, there was perhaps not the same urgency to work in 
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partnership compared to others;  
 
“[…] I don't know whether... and it pains me to say it, but speaking as a Councillor that 
perhaps because the Health budget’s been protected to an extent, there's not as much 
of an urgency to work together with other people.  I think others have been forced 
together, but as I said before, they’re made to realise that they need to work together 
to share information, share resources” (B011) – Councillor – Chair of NWCPP – 
Burnside. 
 
This last comment in particular ‘being forced to work together’ or ‘being made to realise 
that you need to work together’ in order to share information and resources (although 
made within the overall context of Community Planning) is particularly poignant as it 
demonstrates a growing awareness of a necessity of partnership working during times of 
severe fiscal constraint. However, that recognition and commitment needs to be evident 
throughout the whole community planning/community safety process.  Senior (2014) 
argues that it is no good having commitment at the top if it is not conveyed to those at 
the operational end of partnerships. O’Neill and McCarthy (2014) commenting on Police 
culture and partnership working state that positive characteristics shared by agents relate 
to being part of the group by regularly attending meetings and signing up to the groups 
goals. Another positive aspect is being able to share resources in the furtherance of a 
common goal (Armistead and Pettigrew, 2004).  However, if commitment to partnership 
working is affected by a shortage of resources (human capital) in terms of staff time and 
attendance, then it may be that policy decisions affecting the direction of community 
safety may be enacted by those key agencies who attend on a regular basis. This could 
lead to a snowball effect insofar as what is invariably discussed determines the next 
agenda which could in turn determine attendance;  
“I think when you look at the agenda and you look at what's going on you think ‘there's 
no real value for us to go along to this one’.  You've also got to look at your staff 
commitments [...]” (C013) – Housing Manager Crawley Housing Association – Cartside. 
 
Hudson and Hardy’s (2002: 53) ‘Partnership Assessment Tool’ recognised partnership 
commitment as one of the key principle areas necessary for partnership working, 
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however, commitment is not just about attendance, it is also about actively taking part in 
discussions around local community issues, or having the capital to provide resources 
(either in kind – time etc., skill – human capital) or actual resources (equipment, facilities,  
etc.,) or through economic capital (funding) towards initiatives. Since ring-fenced funding 
was withdrawn in 2008 (Scottish Community Safety Network, 2012a), the availability of 
resources was variable amongst participants, ranging from practical material resources to 
what has been described as specialised knowledge. One third sector participant from 
Cartside summed it up in respect of the overall community planning structure throughout 
the case study areas;  
 
“[...] In practice there is no bespoke funding that goes into any of the critical 
partnerships and so each organisation contributes the time of the staff that are 
involved in the partnership and is expected to modify the use of overall organisational 
resources to try and take forward the agenda” (C002) – Third Sector Representative – 
Cartside. 
 
This is arguably the overall purpose of partnership working, nonetheless, there were 
some variances, which may in part be influenced by ‘the agenda’, in other words, if the 
policy aims of the partnership does not intrinsically alter or impact on an individual 
agencies core goals, or meets their organisational ethos then resources for initiatives – 
whether they be in kind, material, or economic may not be forthcoming;  
 
“[...] There's been one or two initiatives where, through the partnership, there was an 
attempt to try and fast track people with alcohol and drug problems into our services 
quicker, which I thought was a useful initiative.  It was an initiative done by the Police 
who identified through profiling a small cohort of repeat offenders, many of whom had 
substance misuse problems, so through the partnership there was an attempt to try 
and get these people into services quicker than you would normally have to wait.  My 
agency was certainly up for that but, I don't think other agencies went along with it, so 
that idea floundered sadly” (C007) – Addiction Support – Cartside. 
 
The Council as a key partner and facilitator throughout the case study areas provided a 
number of resources ranging from accommodation for meetings to general secretarial 
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and clerking support; 
 
“The meetings are arranged and held in Council buildings and the secretarial work is 
done by the Council” (A008) – Councillor – Avonside. 
 
Local Authorities (much like other partners in the case studies) referred to providing 
resources in kind, for example, through attendance, or in terms of disseminating 
information/intelligence both organisationally or as the voice of the community 
(Community Councils, third sector etc.);  
 “Knowledge I'd say, and really just information sharing, there's no financial implication 
for us at all, there couldn't be (laughs) they'd ask us for money, (laughs) no chance” 
(C005) – Rape Crisis – Cartside.  
 
“Our resources that we bring to the partnership would be that we have two members 
of staff, myself and another Housing Officer that regularly attend the meeting and 
both of our backgrounds is as Housing Officers, so I suppose we’re kind of bringing that 
skill to it” (A007) – Housing Officer – R&S Homes – Avonside. 
 
 “Engagement with the local community, feelings and feedback from the local 
community [...] So the biggest thing you can give them is actual on site intelligence [...] 
we're very good at identifying crime and criminality and we've got a very good 
reporting system going back into that and to the Police as part of that [...]” (B013) 
Community Councillor Burnwood – Burnside. 
 
Practical material resources were mostly on offer from the Police or the Fire Service, or in 
some cases Housing Associations such as Burnside who provided a number of resources 
for the Community Improvement Partnership; including office space; 
 
“We use our premises for the CIP as well. The premises were in offices that we had a 
lease for, they were lying empty, so again that's partly what we brought to the table” 
(B007) – Burnside Housing Association – Burnside.  
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It is clear that commitment to partnership working has been exacerbated due to financial 
constraint. This may impact on how community safety initiatives are implemented to the 
extent that they were in the past; which may in turn dilute the overall purpose of the 
partnership. It may be the case that resources for more innovative initiatives may be 
sacrificed in place of those initiatives that match up to policy goals in support of both 
local SOA’s and national objectives; especially initiatives that are quantifiable as opposed 
to long term preventative community safety initiatives in line with the ethos of the 
Christie Commission. Therefore participants were asked about the types of community 
safety initiatives available in each locality. 
 
 5.6 Partnership and Community Safety Initiatives 
 
Across all three case study areas there have been a number of key initiatives in place over 
the years with regards to community safety. However, in keeping with the climate of 
austerity some of them have ceased, while others have continued. It has become a case 
of devoting resources to initiatives which are conceivably more quantifiable, which in turn 
may satisfy organisational performance management regimes. Fyfe (2014: 11) 
commenting on the first year of Police reform in Scotland, has stated that despite the 
rhetoric on long term prevention there has been a renewed focus on enforcement; linked 
to the introduction of a national performance management system. O’Neill and McCarthy 
(2014: 157) commenting on partnership work within Neighbourhood Policing in England 
and Wales have also stated that pressures on resources may cause the Police to revert 
back to addressing more pressing matters;  rather than dealing with projects and 
initiatives that require longer-term interventions. This is not unique to Scotland and the 
UK, Shepherdson et al., (2014) commenting on their study of CSPs in New South Wales in 
Australia stated that there was frustration towards local government insofar as there was 
a perceived withdrawal from some crime prevention initiatives in favour of others less 
complex, such as graffiti removal etc., (Shepherdson et al., 2014: 112).  Strong 
performance management regimes often make it difficult for innovative 
schemes/initiatives to be put into action, not just within the Police service, but also within 
other public sector agencies, which could ultimately impact on the overall purpose of the 
partnership, which is to put in place long term preventative measures.  
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In an effort to try and understand the effect of austerity on community safety within the 
case study areas, participants were asked a series of questions designed to elicit 
information around the types of initiatives favoured, with regards to timescale, what was 
prioritised, and more importantly, what was being de-prioritised.  
One area of priority across two of the case study areas was with regards to the night-time 
economy. Burnside in particular as the largest urban area has a night-time economy 
(defined as activity from 6pm to 6am) that is worth around £2.16 billion per annum; it 
also supports 16,200 full time jobs (Moffat Centre for Travel and Tourism, 2016). It stands 
to reason therefore that a lot of attention will be directed towards this area, especially as 
it arguably covers all three main themes within Burnsides SOA; alcohol, vulnerable 
people, and youth employability. Cartside, although considerably smaller also generates 
in excess of £68 million on the food and drink industry in 2014; and overall the total 
economic impact from tourism for 2014 was £463 million (Invest in Cartside, 2015).  
Austerity politics have arguably driven the actions of Local Authorities in recent years 
(Hastings et al., 2015), therefore a number of participants in both Burnside and Cartside 
talked about initiatives associated with the night-time economy, for example, both areas 
had ‘safe zones’ in operation during the weekend. In Burnside it operated every Friday 
and Saturday night between 11pm and 4am; 
 
“[...] We have the Nite Zones which is the designated taxi ranks and they are where the 
Home Safe Marshalls are, so they operate every weekend” (B020) -   Chair of City 
Centre Alcohol Action Group – Burnside.  
A similar initiative operates in Cartside called Safe Base, however, it usually only runs for 
five weeks during the festive period, but due to economic uncertainty that initiative was 
under scrutiny; 
 
“[...] Safe Base is one of these things that's developed year on year in terms of that 
kind of cycle of continuous improvement, you know, but we had a meeting a couple of 
weeks ago about Safe Base and again, you know, budgets are reducing so there needs 
to be hard decisions made over the next few months about whether we've got the 
resources to run like we did last year or if we've not, what can we run with what we've 
got” (C010) – Youth Services – Cartside. 
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Burnside also operates what is called an SOS Bus or ‘Cool it Off’ Bus as some participants 
have referred to it; 
 
“[...] it’s nothing more complicated than a bus with medical provision there for people 
who drink a little bit too much on a Friday and Saturday night [...] it’s had a significant 
impact on people getting arrested for low level disorder offences, people getting quick 
access to medical attention and over the last few years it’s no doubt been one of the 
contributing factors to reduction in violent crime and disorder in Burnside City Centre 
[...]” (B005) – Local Police Commander – Burnside. 
 
Best Bar None is a national award scheme promoting responsible management within the 
Licensing trade, and it was developed by Greater Manchester Police as part of a City 
Centre Safe Project in 2003 (Best Bar None, Scotland, 2016). Its remit is to tackle alcohol 
related crime and disorder and both Burnside and Cartside promoted this scheme. There 
were also a number of initiatives targeting specific problems for short periods of time, 
and these were mostly associated with diversionary activities aimed at young people in 
particular, which according to some critics further reinforces social exclusion (Hughes, 
2002; Gilling, 2007; Pamment, 2010).  
 5.6.1 Youth Initiatives 
The terminology associated with some of these initiatives is mostly set within a 
constructive framework insofar as the titles suggest they are designed to help young 
people rather than to hinder them; 
“’Positive Changes’ looks at first time offending or individuals that we perceive may be 
in the periphery of offending and we bring them into that whole environment, there's 
obviously a structure behind it and there's analytical support, but there's various 
activities either funded or voluntarily that are provided for those youths to try and 
change their path so to speak” (C011) – Area Commander Police – Cartside. 
 
The fire Service in Burnside also had a programme called ‘Fire Reach One’, which worked 
alongside Community Safety Burnside identifying “Youths on the cusp of becoming 
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involved in some sort of minor criminality […]” (B009) – Senior Fire Officer – Burnside. 
There were other more generic activities designed to keep young people out of trouble, 
such as; ‘Create’ in Cartside; 
 
“[...] Basically multi-agency shows for children during the summer holidays [...] every 
agency, such as ourselves and the Police, the Local Authority set up a single individual 
stall or activity and then the children rotate round it […]” (C004) – Group Manager Fire 
– Cartside. 
 
However, one Councillor in Burnside was fairly critical about community safety initiatives 
targeting young people; 
 
“A lot of these have been in diversionary programmes which I've never been entirely 
happy about, I see that as an old person’s agenda - gets young people off the streets” 
(B011) – Councillor/Chair of NWCPP – Burnside. 
 
Since the late 1990s the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 in England and Wales and 
successive Antisocial Behaviour legislation throughout the UK (Hodgkinson and Tilley, 
2011; Bannister and Kearns, 2012; Kelly, 2012; Neary et al., 2013) has presented a broad 
interpretation of what constitutes antisocial behaviour, which can include anything from 
littering to dog fouling, and allows the public to subjectively identify and label problem 
behaviour such as ‘teenagers hanging about’ (Hodgkinson and Tilley, 2011; Bannister and 
Kearns, 2012). This perception has quite often been reinforced by the mainstream media 
who advocate for a toughening up of the Criminal Justice System (Hough, 2013); 
especially in relation to ‘troublesome youth’ (Hodgkinson and Tilley, 2011: 290), which 
further plays its part in the public stereotyping of already vulnerable young people in 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Bannister and Kearns, 2012).  
This association of youth with crime and incivility has led to an increased emphasis being 
placed on the management of risk as opposed to crime prevention per se (Goddard, 2012: 
351). Farrington (2000: 1) refers to this neo-liberal agenda as the ‘Risk Factor Prevention 
Paradigm (RFPP); basic premise is to identify key risk factors associated with offending 
and implement methods to counteract them. Barry (2013: 348) asserts that RFPP is 
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thought to be the basis of the youth justice system in the UK; despite the fact that early 
intervention is not only difficult to justify, but potentially ‘stigmatising and exclusionary’, 
nonetheless, many diversionary programmes have been put in place throughout the UK – 
particularly within the governance of community safety. Kelly (2012: 102) conducted a 
study on a diversionary project in England and Wales called ‘Positive Futures’ (project 
aims to contribute to both ‘crime reduction’ and ‘social inclusion’) and found that in times 
of financial constraint initiatives often have to compete for short term funding sources, 
which can often mean that there is an added pressure on project managers to 
‘emphasise’ the risk associated with their target groups, thereby contributing to a 
negative representation of young people. ‘Positive Futures’ is similar to the initiative 
mentioned above in Cartside  - ‘Positive Changes’. 
In Burnside most of the initiatives directed towards young people were also diversionary 
in nature, or designed to keep children off the streets and ‘out of trouble’, and again this 
was mostly associated with young people from deprived neighbourhoods, which perhaps 
further reinforces negative stereotypes - as one Councillor said in reference to securing 
some funds for a summer play scheme in Burnship (deprived neighbourhood in Burnside); 
 
“It's not huge sums of money we give them, but it can help, because otherwise kids are 
kicking around in the street and they do get into bother” (B004) - Councillor – Safe 
Group/CSB Chair – Burnside.  
This form of social crime prevention (Darke, 2011) was also prevalent in Cartside as youth 
workers engaged in ‘Outreach Projects’ with young people out on the streets in an effort 
to reduce antisocial behaviour. However, the concern around antisocial behaviour and 
young people varied within the case study areas; for example, in Avon isle it was 
identified but not prioritised within CSPs. There had previously been initiatives for young 
people in Avon Isle (Disco’s etc.) but, as resources dwindled, priorities changed, and 
community safety initiatives have mostly been directed towards identifying risks for the 
elderly; 
 
“[...] We have run safety events which are open to the public; especially we were very 
concerned about elderly people and their safety at home” (A008) – Councillor Avon 
Isle – Avonside. 
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“Yeah, we've always had things like, you know, Discos, young person’s alcohol free 
Discos.  I have to be honest; I think as resources get tight these are the areas that have 
suffered” (A001 - 2nd) – Community Safety Co-ordinator - Avonside. 
 
Funding youth initiatives or activities has always been problematic in terms of the 
availability of resources; a point made worse by austerity measures imposed on Council 
services throughout the UK (Hastings et al., 2015). As resources diminish a welcome 
source of income was enabled through the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Since 2008 the 
‘CashBack’ for Communities Programme has invested money into community 
programmes and facilities; mostly but not exclusively directed towards young people 
(Scottish Government, 2015b). In Cartside there were growing concerns that it was 
becoming increasingly difficult to access this funding stream, a point echoed in Avonside;  
 
“[...] ‘CashBack’ is cutting back as well, but we've managed to retain most of the 
‘CashBack’ activity cause it’s benefiting our young people” (C001 - 2nd) – Community 
Planning Partnership Manager - Cartside.  
 
“[...] ‘CashBack’ has helped a little bit and then you've got organisations that are 
funded from the Council and various other sources of money providing Youth Services 
in Avonside. But, I think it’s unquestionable that certainly diversionary activities and 
community safety led initiatives have lost out because of the funding situation” (A001 - 
2nd) Community Safety Co-ordinator – Avonside. 
 
Burnside, will also have access to ‘CashBack’ funding, but, most of the operational 
initiatives are driven by Community Safety Burnside (the ALEO part funded by the Council 
and the Police). For example, Initiatives such as: ‘One Burnside’ (which looks at early 
intervention/prevention); CCTV (mobile CCTV units to monitor crime and antisocial 
behaviour); Community Enforcement Officers (Fixed Penalty Notices for littering, dog 
fouling etc.); Graffiti Removal etc., which may on the face of it target more quantifiable 
short term initiatives, as opposed to the long term preventative measures advocated by 
Christie. However, one Burnside Councillor (who is also the Chair of CSB) insisted that 
initiatives directed towards young people were not all about enforcement; 
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“[...] It isn't just about saying stop it, but it's about actually having positive things in 
place. The Police get involved in some of these things as well, and CSB do positive work 
as well as having the Enforcement Officers. Because a lot of the time young people get 
into bother because they've got nothing to do, so it's about ensuring there is things to 
do” (B004) – Councillor/Chair of CSB – Burnside. 
There is no doubt that austerity measures have had a marked effect on public services, 
and this next section will look at how participants viewed its effect on partnership 
working.  
 5.7 Partnership Working and the impact of Austerity 
Partnership working as previously discussed has a long history within the UK public sector 
(Lamie and Ball, 2010: 109), and inter-agency partnership working or multi-agency 
collaboration is considered necessary to tackle the multitude of issues linked to crime, 
community safety, and crime prevention (Shepherdson et al., 2014). However, effective 
partnership working may be affected by the impact of austerity on organisations in 
general. A recent report by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation titled ‘The Cost of the Cuts: 
The Impact on local Government and Poorer Communities’ (Hastings et al., 2015) 
identified a number of areas of concern related to ongoing austerity measures. This 
included much greater retrenchment in terms of Local Authorities withdrawing services 
from areas they have traditionally been involved with, and staff being overwhelmed by 
the scale and nature of the problems they face, which ultimately means that deprived 
communities suffer disproportionately as they are more reliant on public services - 
leading to greater inequality (Hastings et al., 2015: 118). Therefore participants in the 
case study areas were asked if austerity measures had affected partnership working 
and/or services; 
“I think the cut backs and the financial climate have had a major effect on every 
partner that sits round that table [...] I know that they have a couple of events every 
year that involve elderly or could involve young people in schools, you know safety 
events, and they're actually struggling to fund these events. So, there is a knock on 
effect” (A002) – Rape Crisis – Avonside. 
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“[...] I think austerity is impacting both in terms of we have less money to do what we 
used to do and so we need to do more, because there is less money out there” (C003) 
– Child Protection – Cartside. 
 
Effective partnership working is routinely associated with sufficient staff levels, continuity 
of staff, and the availability of resources (Hudson and Hardy, 2002), conversely, the 
opposite could result in poor partnership working (Petch et al., 2013: 628); and a number 
of participants across all three case study areas commented on how it may impact on 
partnerships;  
 
“[...] I think we have all witnessed staff not being replaced.  When I first came into this 
job I was part of a team of five, now there's me […] whereas before, we had quite 
dedicated individuals, but as people have moved on they've not been replaced” (B019) 
- VAW Co-ordinator – CSB – Burnside. 
“Well I suppose in a way, because I can no longer attend and I have to send somebody 
that's subordinate, and even they can't always attend, because we're under such 
pressure due to organisational pressures, but the staffing issues aren’t really to do with 
austerity measures, they're just to do with people being ill and things like that, and 
therefore having gaps in our team.  And then you have to prioritise and unfortunately 
attending the Antisocial Behaviour Group is not top of the priority tree” (A014) - Child 
Protection - Avon Isle – Avonside. 
 
The above comment is quite interesting insofar as this participant relates staff shortages 
to illness rather than austerity measures. However, a report by UNISON Scotland on the 
impact of austerity on the public sector states that cuts to services has led to stress levels 
soaring amongst employees who now have to endure longer hours and unpaid overtime, 
which in turn has an impact on sickness levels leading to more pressure on the existing 
workforce, which in turn leads them to prioritise their workload (UNISON Scotland, 2014);  
 “[...] Some of the areas of the ADP for example the recovery work and the delivery of, 
say for example the Alcohol Brief Interventions, we were behind with some of those 
things because people just weren’t there to do it, so we've had to look at how they 
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would re-do that, and revisit, and what are the key priorities that we need to do” 
(B020) - Chair of City Centre Alcohol Action Group – Burnside. 
It is clear that austerity measures have impacted on funding and the availability of 
resources (material and human), but it can also impact on the efficacy of partnership 
working through the loss of key personnel. Some personnel can be pivotal in ensuring 
that effective intra-organisational communication remains open (Riggs et al., 2013: 787), 
and it is often key players that drive partnerships forward (Hudson and Hardy, 2002; 
O’Neill and McCarthy, 2014: 151); 
 
“Cartside Council have had to make very significant cuts in their budgets and that's 
reflected in the reduction of key personnel.  So one manager who I thought was very 
influential in the partnership, when he retired his post was not replaced and he 
commanded several teams which have since broken up [...]  So that is beginning to 
have an effect on the partnership in that there's less influential representatives from 
Cartside Council there, it’s got smaller” (C007) - Addiction Support – Cartside. 
“You can never underestimate the importance of people in all this.  You can have all 
the organisational charts in the world, but if you don't have the right people in place 
who are determined to make it work, the charts don't mean anything” (B008) - 
Burnside Health Board/Chair of CHP/SCPP – Burnside. 
Other participants particularly within the Police were slightly cautious about the effect of 
austerity on partnership working; 
“I don't think there's been a significant change, but then Police Scotland [...] have 
always had a seat at the partnership table and we've always taken it very seriously and 
always had a lot of commitment to it, so it certainly hasn’t changed our approach and I 
think it’s far too early to say if it’s going to have an impact, that's probably a question 
for... we’re only two and a bit months into Police Scotland, we’re week 11 as it is just 
now” (B005) - Area Police Commander – Burnside.  
Participants from the Fire Service also reiterated their commitment to partnership 
working, but also highlighted how difficult it had become to engage effectively; 
“ […] the move to a single Fire and Rescue Service means we've had to trim our staffing 
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levels, so we can't contribute as much as we'd been able to. However, because of the - 
I suppose austerity, we have got to be more focused to ensure we are achieving what 
we can with the limited resources, which is driving us down the pathway to 
partnership working [...]” (C004) - Group Manager Fire Service – Cartside. 
The last sentence in this comment is quite poignant as it highlights an opinion held by 
many that there could be some positive outcomes related to austerity and partnership 
working, for example, forcing partners to be more focused, leading to less duplication of 
effort, which in essence may bring more people to the partnership table;   
“there's less opportunity to duplicate things and people are having to have hard 
discussions with each other, and that's not necessarily a bad thing in terms of this is 
what we can do […]” (C010) – Youth Services – Cartside. 
“[...] So, it might positively influence partnership seeking, whether in the long run it 
will negatively affect what we are actually able to deliver - I think that's probably going 
to be the case, but it's certainly brought a lot more agencies together who realise we 
can't afford to do what we've done in the past […]” (B003) - Police Chief Inspector – 
Safe Group – Burnside.  
“I think in many respects, you know, it's been positive austerity, in the sense that it has 
focused the minds [...]” (C014) - Councillor – Community Planning and Regeneration 
Committee – Cartside. 
“I think a lot... well in one sense I think that austerity measures have actually helped to 
drive more effective partnership working, because I think we are now left with a clear 
realisation that we can’t operate on our own and work with others when it suits us, 
but in actual fact there needs to be a pooling of shared resources.” (B010) - Chair of 
Third Sector Forum/SCPP – Burnside. 
Fiscal austerity measures have provided a focus for some agencies towards more 
partnership working in general, therefore it would be interesting to find out what (if any) 
barriers existed that may prevent organisations working towards common community 
safety goals or objectives. The next section will examine issues related to possible barriers 
to effective partnership working within the case study areas. 
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 5.8 Barriers to effective Partnership working 
 
Multi-agency partnership working may be viewed as more necessary than ever during 
times of austerity within the governance of community safety, and McCarthy and O’Neill 
(2014: 248) argue that in order to achieve effective operational outcomes the pooling of 
information, intelligence and data is vital in order to do so (Senior, 2014). However, it can 
be a major task to establish a common language within local partnerships as various 
partners come to the table with different perceptions on how to tackle issues, find 
solutions to problems, and what if any information should be shared, which could 
ultimately lead to conflict (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2006: 65). It has been well documented 
that there has existed a number of barriers to effective partnership working in the past, 
mostly related to differing organisational cultures and work practices; especially between 
Health and Social Care, and the Police (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2006; Petch et al., 2013; 
McCarthy and O’Neill, 2014; Senior, 2014; Weston, 2014). Nonetheless, it has been 
pointed out by a number of participants that partnership working is now more necessary 
than before, which would suggest that some barriers to effective partnership working 
may be overcome. Therefore, participants were asked if there were any barriers to 
effective communication within partnerships. For the most part participants did not 
initially conceive of any barriers, but on reflection a number of themes began to emerge 
across the case study areas ranging from willingness to participate, jargon (Council Speak) 
(Sparrow, 2008), and how to secure I.T. systems; 
“I suppose the barrier is about people's participation and willingness to participate. I 
think that the people who are active members of the CSP communicate fairly well, so I 
suppose it's a bit about services and agencies that don't step up to the table” (C003) - 
Child Protection – Cartside. 
 “[...] We’re doing a whole load of work on the city centre - team are involved in stuff 
around street begging and the homelessness, drugs and alcohol issues, and there's 
some national campaign, the person who’s in the street along the road from us is 
speaking to folk nationally, but not speaking to us, and I'm worried for the city for that 
specific piece of work.  So I think there's different drivers that haven’t yet come 
together to make that joined up” (B020) - Chair of City Centre Alcohol Action Group – 
Burnside. 
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“[...] Well it's about allowing other folk to have a voice and sometimes I  think it's not a 
fair representation of people on the islands if we're going to spend forever talking 
about dog fouling […] so for me and I know for some others it can be at times quite 
frustrating” (A002) - Rape Crisis – Avonside. 
 “I think one of the big things to me is about people’s time, you know, just people 
seem really busy and the pressure on people’s time can always have an impact in 
terms of taking the time to either send out stuff or lift the phone or send an email or 
catch up, you know, people’s time’s precious” (C010) - Youth Services – Cartside.  
A lack of capacity amongst local communities/Community Councillors was also cited as a 
barrier; 
 “[…] they've got voting rights and they're now there in an enhanced role.  They may 
feel that they don't have the right to pick up the phone to the Police representative or 
the Fire service, and they may only feel that they're only there as a conduit between 
the information that is given here to the local Community Councils [...] if they're less 
confident of feeling that they have the right to make enquiries about certain things, 
that's maybe the only barrier I can foresee” (B015) - Councillor – Burnpark Area 
Partnership – Burnside. 
However, that may be related to having to decipher ‘partnership speak’ or Council jargon 
(Sparrow, 2008); 
 “[...] There are people sitting there saying what's this, what's all this outcomes. I mean 
in all honesty, the jargon that has come out of that bloody place” (C012) - Cartside 
Licensing Forum – Cartside. 
A number of other issues emerged related to data protection concerns; 
 “Where we have an issue just now is we do not have a secure email system, so the 
police have a pnn, or a gsi., or a gsx. […]” (C004) - Group Manager Fire Service – 
Cartside. 
“Occasionally personalities, but in my experience there sometimes is the occasion 
when people will say ‘I can't tell you that because of data protection’ or ‘freedom of 
information says that I don't need to tell you that’ and they hide behind it [...] it’s a 
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good barrier to hide behind, data protection” (B005) - Area Police Commander – 
Burnside.  
For the Police, those agencies ‘hiding behind data protection’ were more likely to be 
Social Work or Health in particular. One senior Police officer in Burnside pointed out how 
it was more problematic for Health who had not got their act together in terms of 
information sharing protocols, even in discussions around community safety, wherein, 
they (the Police) would ‘pretty much share everything’. However, he claimed to 
understand their reasoning; 
  
 “[...] because there's patient confidentiality sort of fits in there, so there is a kind of, 
you know, problem that Health haven’t quite worked out so much.  Social Work on the 
other hand, you know, between Police and Social Work has come an awful long way” 
(B012) - Police Superintendent – NWCPP/ADP/’One Burnside’ 
 
However, one third sector participant in Cartside summed up why they thought barriers 
still existed between organisations purportedly working in partnership; 
 “The reality is - it's a group of discrete organisations and inevitably those organisations 
become focused on their - are focused on their own organisations activities and that 
can sometimes mean that people forget to communicate with and involve everybody 
within the partnership because we all default back to our own institutional behaviours, 
so I think it’s (pauses) organisational structures can and organisational imperatives can 
always get in the way of a shared endeavour” (C002) -  Third Sector representative on 
EDG/CSP – Cartside. 
Despite a number of participants claiming that there were no barriers to partnership 
working that they were aware of, a number of themes began to emerge, however, the 
most cited barrier to partnership work was issues around data protection and the sharing 
of information.  
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5.9 Partnership working and Information sharing 
 
A number of participants indicated that the sharing of information is often a contentious 
issue amongst organisations involved within the domain of community safety, or indeed 
within partnerships in general. How information is shared has often proven to be 
problematic in the past and has long been cited as an inhibitor to effective partnership 
working (Perri 6 et al., 2006) as each organisation struggles to adhere to their individual 
aims and objectives, which can lead to a clash of priorities and a barrier to effective 
information sharing (Lennox et al., 2012: 132).  
 
There has been an increased pressure in recent years on the public sector within the UK 
to share information particularly within Health and Social Care, Child Protection, Crime 
Reduction and protecting the public from dangerous offenders (Perri 6 et al., 2007: 406). 
In Scotland reports such as: the Christie Commission; the McClelland report on IT 
infrastructure in Public Services in Scotland; and Scotland’s Digital Future Strategy have all 
identified many organisational/technical barriers that need to be broken down to allow 
for the efficient sharing of information in order to support collaboration across 
partnerships (Scottish Government, 2015a: 7).  
Third sector participants in particular perhaps struggle with the pressures to share 
information, while maintaining their structural integrity, and often have to find a balance 
between what is shared and meeting their organisational and partnership aims, and 
maintaining confidentiality and trust within communities.  This could be more 
problematic within small rural communities where identification may become an issue;  
“[...] Confidentiality is a huge issue when you're living in these wee small communities 
where we have to be able to do our level best to ensure the confidentiality of our 
service users, so, no we certainly wouldn't be sharing. Basic stats - yeah stats that are 
available at the end of the year [...]” (A002) – Rape Crisis – Avonside.  
This can also be the case for some public sector agencies dealing with alcohol and drug 
related problems;  
“[...] I have to be very careful, particularly in a place like Cartside where numbers 
aren’t always huge for specific issues, that we don't start to identify people within the 
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partnership, particularly sometimes if we have more lay members [...] So there's 
information that can be shared but, from a personal point of view, I do have to be 
cautious around particular stuff like overdose data and stuff like that” (C009) - Lead 
Officer for Cartside ADP.  
Cultural or organisational issues in relation to the sharing of information between 
particular agencies such as the Police and Health and Social Care have often been cited as 
problematic (Barton and Quinn, 2002; Hunt and Van der Arend, 2002; Irvine et al., 2002; 
Richardson and Asthana, 2006; Perri 6 et al., 2007;  Lennox et al., 2012). Within the case 
study areas there was some evidence of organisational tension within the domain of 
community safety. However, there was also evidence that certain relationships have 
developed between the Police and others in relation to particular issues, for example, 
child protection and dealing with low level crime and disorder, or antisocial behaviour, 
particularly in relation to drugs and alcohol, as long as the information shared is used 
appropriately; 
“Yeah, I mean, I would’ve thought that the two sets of organisations that might be 
most guarded would be myself - Social Work, and the Police and we've always been 
okay with sharing on the basis that the information is used within appropriate limits” 
(A014) – Child Protection - Avon Isle – Avonside.  
One way to ensure the co-operation of agencies within a partnership is via Information 
Sharing Protocols, and a number of participants commented on them; 
 “There's information sharing protocols in place, I mentioned the Antisocial Behaviour 
Subgroup, so if there's information that needs to be shared then there's protocols in 
place” (A004) - Senior Police Officer – Avon Isle – Avonside. 
 
“Well we get good information, when you're dealing with the cops, well you can 
imagine what it's like at times, but the Council's been fortunate that we've had the 
CSB, who share a lot of information and intelligence with the Police under specific 
protocols that they've now got in place. So they've been sharing information for years. 
It’s something that's really helped in Burnside to get the crime numbers down” (B006) 
- Councillor – Chair Safe Group/Chair VAW – Burnside.  
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Having information sharing protocols in place is not without its problems as one 
participant from Burnside pointed out regarding information they receive from the Police;  
“[...] We get a daily briefing every day which is electronic and it’s restricted, so that 
can't be printed or downloaded or... I can read it.  The effectiveness of that depends 
on me remembering what's in it; including images of people” (B020) - Chair of City 
Centre Alcohol Action Group – Burnside. 
This is problematic when the circle of trust only extends to those individuals who have 
direct access to information within a partnership, which could lead to a disconnect 
between the strategic and the operational; 
“I mean, I think if you've got somebody that's excluded from a park, there's no point 
showing me his picture cause I'm not in the park, you know, but the people that work 
in parks are in the park, and they can't get to see the pictures and know that this 
person’s... so there's complex issues there that I think have yet to be resolved to get 
the best out of partnership working [...]”(B020) - Chair of City Centre Alcohol Action 
Group – Burnside. 
Information protocols have been put in place within a number of thematic partnerships 
within the case study areas, but one organisation in particular was cited by a number of 
participants in Burnside and Cartside as still resistant to the sharing of information; 
“I mean, the player that's always a bit difficult is Health, we still don't have Health 
round the main Community Safety Partnership table.  They attend some of the sub 
groups, they attend the ADP - they're not great at sharing” (C001 - 2nd) - Community 
Planning Partnership Manager – Cartside.  
“Well it's like all big institutions, for instance the Health Board and people like that 
who as soon as you mention data sharing the barricades go up, but it's a matter of just 
trying to batter them down and explain that we've already done it with the cops, right 
so, why can't we do it with you!” (B006) - Councillor – Chair Safe Group/Chair VAW – 
Burnside.  
A study conducted by Lennox et al., (2012: 132) found that many Health professionals did 
not share information because they were often fearful that they would be in breach of 
professional codes of practice. Lennox et al., (2012: 132) assert that many of these 
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obstacles could be overcome if all organisations provided their staff with unambiguous 
information sharing policies and appropriate training. This was commented on by one 
participant in Avon Isle who thought people were reluctant to openly discuss some issues 
in the (ASB and CSP) Partnership, because in their opinion they were not fully conversant 
on legislation such as, the Data Protection Act;  
“I don't want to use the word ignorance, but I think in a lot of cases representatives of 
the partners aren’t very sure what they can and cannot say.  And sometimes it could 
be the Housing association saying to the Police at the meeting ‘you know who I'm 
talking about, remember, last week?’ and the Police will go ‘oh right okay’ but that's 
not - the rest of the meeting doesn't know what it is because they don't know, they're 
not very sure” (A009) - Street Scene Warden Avon Isle – Avonside.  
  
Co-locating services has been thought of by some as one way to break down 
organisational barriers – especially those related to data protection issues between 
Health, Social Care and the Police.  
 5.10 Partnership Working and Co-location 
Co-location refers to the physical placement of different services, agencies or 
organisations in the same location/same space (Grace and Coventry, 2010), either to 
work independently within a geographic location, or as a multi-disciplinary approach 
directed towards a specific goal such as the management of offenders (Senior, 2013).  Co-
locating agencies can also help tackle so called ‘wicked issues’ related to poverty and 
crime, domestic violence, or alcohol or drug misuse, which go beyond the capacity of a 
single agency (Stanley and Humphreys, 2014). Other benefits include the sharing of 
resources to reduce costs, or to avoid a duplicated service delivery (Plax et al., 2015). Co-
location can - according to Hoyle and Palmer (2014) - empower victims of domestic 
violence to make informed decisions about their future; this was in reference to the 
creation of a Family Justice Centre in Croydon in 2005, which brought thirty three 
agencies under one roof to allow for a consumer led service which responded to 
individual needs. McGuire et al., (2009) in their study on homeless veterans in the USA 
(with serious mental health or substance misuse issues) found that co-located services 
allowed them to deal more effectively with this hard to reach group. A similar study in the 
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USA by Plax et al., (2015) which targeted hard to reach high risk youths in relation to 
sexually transmitted infections (STI), found that co-located community health and social 
services proved instrumental in reducing the burden of STI’s in this population.  
Co-location or co-located service delivery is not a panacea to multi-agency partnership 
working, as it also can prove to be problematic in relation to issues around organisational 
culture or trust – especially in relation to data protection and the sharing of information 
(Chermak et al., 2013; Diemer et al., 2015; Hoyle and Palmer, 2014; Stanley and 
Humphreys, 2014). Co-location as a concept brought forth a variety of opinions from all 
three case study sites, most notably from Avon Isle and Cartside in relation to its 
necessity based on geographical location and size. For example, geography could be used 
to define a smaller island community almost as a co-located entity in and of itself; 
“[...] I think the locality thing, the size of Avon Isle makes the locality thing a given” 
(A014) – Child Protection - Avon Isle – Avonside.  
“Well on an island we do work from the one location really so it does, yeah and it does 
work, cause we not only just meet for the meetings, we know each other, albeit that 
some of the Council members have got to travel to us, but we all know each other and 
I think we genuinely are working towards the end that we hope we’ll be able to 
achieve”  (A008) - Local Councillor – Avon isle – Avonside.  
However, having to travel to meetings was also cited as an issue in support of co-location, 
by one participant who covered not only the island communities, but also the wider 
geographic area - on the grounds that the area was too vast; 
“It’s such a wide geographical area and there are offices here and there […]  I have 
staff that traipses up and down this road [laugh], whether it be to Social Work, Housing 
Benefit offices, Avon Homes offices, Homeless service; I think that would be really very 
useful”  (A007) - Housing Officer – Avon Isle – R&S Homes – Avonside. 
Cartside had similar issues and concerns to Avonside; however, they were perhaps slightly 
less reticent about giving their opinions on the issue of co-location; including advocating 
the use of technology instead; 
“I think with technology and all this sort of stuff I don't think it’s necessary, no” (C013) 
- Housing Manager for Crawley Housing Association – Cartside.  
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 “I mean Cartside City Council now has three different office areas, I mean it’s not a 
hindrance” (C012) - Cartside Licensing Forum – Cartside. 
“No. I don't think it's practically possible. It might do for some agencies […] When you 
think about a large complex organisation like a Council, it's not always clear that there 
is effective inter-departmental working between Council departments despite the fact 
that they're in the same building, so I don't think it necessarily makes a difference” 
(C002) - Third Sector representative on EDG/CSP – Cartside. 
The comment from the third sector representative from Cartside perhaps suggests there 
is some discord between Council Departments in Cartside, which would make co-location 
difficult. This contrasted with opinions in Burnside where more people (especially 
statutory agencies) were in favour of co-location – especially co-location within 
Community Safety Burnside (CSB);  
 “I've seen some fantastic examples of co-location having an impact and in fact one 
good example would be our approach to domestic abuse.  We work together with 
social work, with Women’s Aid, with a group called ASSIST (advocacy service), 
ourselves, the National Domestic Abuse Task Force;  some of those agencies have been 
co-located for a wee while […] it’s absolutely to the common good; so, there’s a great 
example of co-location having a big, big impact” (B005) - Area Police Commander – 
Burnside.  
However, not all Burnside participants were as enthusiastic about co-located service 
delivery, particularly the participant from the Third Sector Forum who was more critical 
about the aims of co-location in the sense that it factored in agency needs ahead of local 
needs; 
“I think the principle of hub working in local neighbourhoods would actually be of real 
value, but I think you need to co-locate around a common task or goal...But not 
necessarily around saying - what we need to do is, we need to get the Health Board 
and the Council and the Police and the third sector and Housing all in there, because I 
don’t know that that necessarily serves local communities particularly effectively, it 
just means that those institutions come together. I want to see co-location, but I want 
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to see co-location driven by local communities rather than institutions” (B010) - Chair 
of Third Sector Forum/SCPP – Burnside. 
 “I think that would be helpful if Social Work was based next to the Health Centre or 
whatever and such like, but city wide or sector wide, I don't think that's necessary, but 
certainly locally I think that would be a good idea” (B011) -  Councillor – Chair of 
NWCPP – Burnside. 
The above response from a city Councillor perhaps highlights a pervading fear amongst 
public sector workers about job security during a recession. In that co-location in some 
instances could be used as a cost saving exercise to reduce staffing levels, or it could be as 
a result of ongoing tensions between Health and Council Social Care services within 
Burnside. Three participants in Burnside also mentioned (as evidence of ‘best practice’) 
an award winning purpose built Hub in the East Coast of Scotland, that was created more 
out of structural necessity, rather than a desire for co-location;  
 “[…] So they pooled them all (resources), and they built a Court, a Police office, a Fire 
station, and Council office all in the one place - all co-located.  […]  I think it's the first 
one” (B003) - Police Chief Inspector – Safe Group – Burnside.  
However, one participant although enthusiastic about the co-located service mentioned 
above, also pointed out that post reform this could lead to difficulties within other 
localities;  
 
“Prior to reform the Police estate was owned by the Police Authority, which was co-
terminous with the Local Authority, so in essence if we wanted a new Police office, we 
go to the Police Authority who were funded by the Council […] Now it's the SPA, which 
is different from the Local Authority areas. So how we would be able to sit down with 
Burnside City Council for talking sake, the Fire service and NHS and say right let’s build 
one huge community office, I don't know if that would work now, but if there's a will 
there will be a way” (B003) - Police Chief Inspector – Safe Group – Burnside. 
  
This highlights a number of issues, which could lead to increased tension between what is 
perceived as local or central areas of responsibility. For example, as the previous 
comment makes clear – in the past elected local authorities together with the Police 
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authority for that area - could make decisions and allocate resources based on local need. 
Now, however, in terms of policing - any decisions on an expansion of the Police estate 
could potentially by-pass Local Authorities altogether, which brings into question Local 
Authority accountability in terms of policing. One participant in Avonside commented on 
some negative aspects of co-location in reference to a previous experience of co-located 
service delivery centred on child protection;  
“One of the experiences I had in that respect was - from a policing point of view - 
where the partnership became Child Protection, and it was Social Workers and Police 
Officers working in the same office. And to be honest the views I got back on that - it 
got kind of blurred as to who was doing what, and who was responsible for what, and 
at the same time who was the Social Worker and who was the Police” (A015) - 
Licensing Standards Officer – Avonside.  
 
The participant was of the opinion that there was good and bad points to co-location, 
however, it was all a matter of balance. This point was also reinforced by a senior 
performance and information manager/analyst within CSB who had a positive opinion on 
co-location, but added that agencies/individuals have to have “clear roles and 
responsibilities” (B014) - Senior Performance and Information Manager CSB – Burnside.  
The participant discussed the Persistent Offender Model project as a good example of co-
located service delivery; where police officers and addiction support staff work together. 
They work with around one hundred individuals who commit around 2400 crimes a year 
pre-engagement. Post engagement the figures were down to around 1700 crimes a year; 
which an economist worked out to be around £10 million in savings for the Criminal 
Justice System a year (B014).  These were clear benefits according to the participant - not 
only from a policing perspective, but also in terms of better care outcomes for offenders 
(stable methadone programmes, accommodation etc.). However, roles had to be clear in 
order to avoid blurred lines of responsibility, but it also had an impact on mainstream 
service delivery; 
“[...] Ultimately you're taking a Police Officer off the street, so they'll not respond to a 
radio or an Addiction Worker who's not working in Addiction Services and dealing with 
clients as they come in, but what we're doing is we're making significant - potentially 
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cashable savings - if it's non-cashable then it's efficiencies and it's harder to buy into, 
but if there's cashable benefits then I can't see why we wouldn't do more of that […], 
and there is lots of that goes on so, it's not just a case of putting partners into a room 
like this and just hoping the magic will happen - it has to be clear” (B014) - Senior 
Performance and Information Manager CSB – Burnside.  
 
This perhaps highlights the previous comment from the participant in Avonside in relation 
to Police Officers working within a co-located entity – that potentially accountability and 
responsibility becomes a blurred issue. Not only has there to be clear lines of 
responsibility within policing, but, it is important to acknowledge that the third sector or 
private sector may operate under different guidelines. This can be problematic insofar as 
retaining autonomy may become difficult for some organisations reliant on outside 
resources, which in turn may force charities or social enterprises to abandon oppositional 
forms of practice (Tyler et al., 2014); thereby limiting choice or advocacy on behalf of 
vulnerable individuals or communities. Another factor may also be added to the pros and 
cons equation insofar as the provision of services within an ALEO, such as CSB, may also 
take into account their obligations to the commercial aspect of their organisation. This 
point is highlighted by Garrow and Hassenfeld (2014) on their exploration of social 
enterprises, which they argue operate within two distinct organisational fields, which 
were perhaps touched on previously by the senior performance and information manager 
when he discussed the drive towards cashable and non-cashable savings.  
In Cartside some potential problems related to Police reform and co-location were also 
commented on. This was in reference to the daytime economy; more specifically within 
the ‘Cartside Partners Against Crime’; insofar as the building they were referring to 
housed third sector Partners ‘Retailers Against Crime’. It also housed a ‘One Stop Shop’ 
for Council services, and the new Safer Communities Team;  
“Yeah, I mean, we've tried very hard as a partnership to create some of this co-
location. The office you are in now, this is a third sector not for profit organisation. 
There are two desks in the bottom office which are linked to Police computers, so the 
Police can come in and work from there.  Now that was done prior to the reform of 
policing, so perhaps again that'll change their priorities, and I don't think the Police are 
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here as often as they might like” (C008) - Community Safety Projects Manager – 
Cartside. 
Trust is a key issue linked to effective partnership working (McCall and Rummery, 2017) 
and this can only be achieved incrementally through repeated encounters – especially if it 
leads to successful outcomes, which may fail to happen if key partner’s decrease their 
attendance (ibid). There is also the issue of cost, for example creating a co-located space, 
or housing compatible I.T. systems costs money, so who pays the bill? It may also be 
resisted by other organisations (particularly the third sector) if it is thought to contravene 
organisational commitments to service users – such as total confidentiality, as one 
participant in Avon Isle discussed with respect to co-location;   
“I don't think it would work, because I think the range of partners are way to diverse, 
so I don't think it would work at all, especially with - well voluntary and statutory 
organisations there is an element of confidentiality, and I don't think it would work. 
Certainly not for us, because our organisation - in certain parts of Avon Isle anyway is a 
bit cloak and dagger, and it has to be to maintain your service users confidentiality, 
because if they've been abused by their next door neighbour or a guy that lives two 
doors away, or somebody that still lives in that community...” (A002) – Rape Crisis – 
Avonside.  
Maintaining confidentiality is a major stumbling block to co-location for some 
organisations, and it is probably more significant within small rural or in this case island 
communities, where agency representatives may work and live alongside victims and 
offenders. It also highlights a general reluctance from some agencies – especially those 
dealing with sensitive information – to co-locate their services based on data protection 
concerns. This could be linked to ignorance of data protection laws (as previously 
highlighted) about what you are allowed to share, or perhaps it is linked to issues of trust.  
 
 5.11 Trust and Partnership Working  
 
Trust or lack of trust has been described as a key issue in relation to the success of inter-
organisational work practices. Bunger (2012: 1167) in reference to their USA study on - 
inter-organisational co-operation, competition and trust - amongst the non-profit 
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children’s behavioural health sector - found that ‘trustworthiness directly and positively 
impacts administrative co-ordination’. In other words the more organisations perceive 
each other as trustworthy then the more likely they are to co-ordinate their services. The 
development of trust is also linked to an organisations commitment to collaboration; 
especially if they share similar goals and values (Kyle et al., 2012). Rekers and Hansen 
(2015) refer to a ‘two community problem’ or ‘two community gap’; whereupon 
organisations have to overcome cultural or language differences – most commonly found 
between the natural sciences and humanities. This they argue can be achieved by mutual 
trust built on the knowledge that each organisation knows what they are doing. Treloar 
and Rance (2014) conducted a study on trust (using Halls Framework of trust) around 
clients and Health workers in a co-located setting in Australia; dealing with Hepatitis C 
and Opioid Substitution Treatment (methadone etc.). They argue that in order to develop 
trust - amongst workers and service users alike – then sources of mistrust must first be 
understood within existing Health services, therefore allowing for the appropriate policies 
and procedures to be put in place; chief amongst which are issues around confidentiality. 
Confidentiality problems were a key issue cited by third sector participants in Avonside 
and Cartside in particular. Trust issues could also be linked to the perception that other 
agencies such as the Police may use co-location and ‘information sharing’ as an 
intelligence gathering tool;   
 
“We’re ensconcing a police officer in the Municipal Buildings in Cartside to work with 
the Safer Communities Team.  So there’ll be a morning tasking meeting chaired by that 
officer who brings to the table all the antisocial behaviour calls, events, locations in the 
last 24 hours and discusses them.  They'll also have access to our top offenders in 
Cartside; they'll have access to our most vulnerable people in Cartside in terms of 
victims; they'll have information easily at hand in relation to our problematic locations 
based on analytical work. [...]  And then likewise, the Council, the Safer Communities 
Team, will bring their own data to the table, because some individuals/members of the 
public phone them direct, so we wouldn’t capture that information, [...] but, co-
location is going to completely streamline that flow of information” (C011) - Area 
Commander Police – Cartside.  
This policing viewpoint perhaps highlights a more reactionary form of problem solving 
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policing; that has more relevance to performance management, rather than a proactive 
long term holistic approach to community safety. Coleman (1988) argues that having 
social capital signifies certain resource availability to an actor, and if that resource is built 
around trustworthiness, then it perhaps highlights why some agencies may be reluctant 
to engage in co-located service delivery if it means that they will lose the trust of service 
users/clients who may distrust police motives. That’s not to say that every organisation 
will distrust Police motives, for example some partners within the Safer Communities 
Team (dealing with antisocial behaviour) may share similar goals and therefore trust 
increases as co-ordinated services increase (Bunger, 2012). However, if the generation of 
social capital/trust within partnerships is built on reciprocity (Hutchinson, 2004), as in 
paying off obligations, such as the sharing of data or intelligence, then social capital/trust 
may decrease between the Police and other agencies if information exchange is not 
reciprocated. In an effort to understand if or how trust facilitates co-operation within the 
case study areas, participants were asked how they built and sustained a level of trust 
within the partnership. A number of participants across all three case study areas 
believed trust was generated by building relationships and in essence people doing what 
they said they would do; 
 
“I think it's about relationships - I think it's about people doing what they say they will 
do, and it's about reciprocity there […].” (C003) - Child Protection – Cartside.  
“That's about personalities again and it’s about being open and transparent in 
everything you do.  And it’s about building relationships, it doesn't happen overnight. 
[...]  a lot of it's about building trust and confidence and it’s not easy won, it’s easy lost, 
but I don't have an issue with it” (B005) - Area Police Commander – Burnside.  
“Professionalism - people actually delivering what they've promised they'll do […]” 
(A005) - Council Area Housing Officer for Avon Isle – Avonside.  
 “I have never engaged with anybody on the partnership before February, so I've had 
to build that level of trust with them and I suppose communication and the 
information sharing process and action has led people to trust me.  […] if I say I'm 
going to deliver something then I do it”  (C011) - Area Commander Police – Cartside.  
Networking or attending meetings was thought to be another way to generate trust;  
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“You have meetings (laughs) I mean everybody says - 'Oh no, not another meeting', 
but until you look somebody across a table and get to know that person - I mean I can 
send all the emails and all the phone calls I want, but you don't really know a person 
from an email or a phone call [...]” (B003) – Police Chief Inspector – Safe Group – 
Burnside.  
“Well I think sometimes that’s about the work that you do outside of meetings rather 
than simply in meetings. So, it’s actually about the amount of time that you’re willing 
to spend with the different partners really working together, rather than just meeting 
up once every couple of months for a board meeting, and it’s also about being able to 
disagree  [...]” (B010) - Chair of Third Sector Forum/SCPP – Burnside. 
Commitment from senior managers was also thought to be important, as was being held 
accountable for your agencies actions; 
“[...] true trust can only be built by goodwill or working over a period of time, so we 
need to get the correct processes in place, and the correct people in place to take that 
forward” (C004) - Group Manager Fire Service – Cartside. 
Community organisations tended to view trust more through the lens of other 
organisations, for example, how they were viewed by others, or what was required of 
them; 
“By actually doing things for them - you know bringing them the information” (A011) - 
Community Representative - Avon Isle Forum for Older Voices.  
“Delivering targets and be impartial on all matters if you can.  And only, only represent 
the views of your Community Council when you go there” (B013) - Community 
Councillor Burnwood CC – Burnside.  
In Avonside being part of a small rural/island community like Avon Isle was thought to 
generate trust through familiarity and professionalism; 
 
 “[…] I think because you're all on an island you quickly know each other through 
normal day to day working and the benefit of that is you don't wait until, like, quarterly 
Community Safety Forum meetings, you know, I could phone any of the partners on 
any day of the week saying ‘look, we've got an issue here [...]” (A004) - Senior Police 
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Officer – Avon Isle – Avonside. 
 
However, generating familiarity with your fellow partners was not limited to island 
communities, for example, this was also thought to happen in smaller Local Authority 
areas, such as Cartside; 
 
“[...] People within the CSP primarily do work well together, they know each other well 
because we are a fairly small Local Authority area […],  you can only really build up 
trust if you're working with people can't you, and I think it’s through that that helps 
us” (C001 - 2nd) - Community Planning Partnership Manager – Cartside.  
Familiarity could also have its downside in small communities insofar as new faces may 
not achieve the same amount of access compared to faces that are known – it took time; 
 
 “[...] When I moved here in 1993 it was hard to get any information because I was told 
that I had to integrate myself into all these partnerships […] but it was like pulling teeth 
for about a year – not because people didn't know that they could tell me things, but 
they didn't really know me [...]” (A009) - Street Scene Warden Avon Isle – Avonside.  
Clearly trust in this sense is viewed – not only in terms of reciprocity – but, also through 
sustainability, commitment, and delivering on your promises. 
  5.12 Conclusion 
Using the Hudson and Hardy (2002) inspired partnership assessment framework - the 
concept of partnership working within the governance of community safety was explored 
in-depth with participants throughout the case study areas, with respect to co-ordination 
and steering, communication and commitment, and organisational culture. Although 
participants generally held a positive view on partnership working in line with public 
policy; key implementation tool in order to tackle ‘wicked issues’ (Glendinning, 2002: 115; 
Martin and Guarneros-Meza, 2013), nonetheless a number of themes germane to all the 
case study areas began to emerge in relation to: asymmetrical power relations; status; 
the impact of austerity; and barriers to effective partnership working. These themes could 
in turn help to answer some of the points raised by the research questions; with respect 
to the impact on CSP priorities or goals in terms of performance management and 
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organisational culture (particularly the Police). Other themes that emerged with respect 
to co-location and trust may help identify more positive aspects of partnership working. 
But, first we turn to possible negative aspects of partnership working (highlighted within 
the data) in relation to power and status. 
  5.12.1 Power and Status (social capital) 
Throughout the case study areas there was a general acceptance by most participants 
that there is a hierarchical structure with regards to community planning wherein the 
Local Authority leads. However, the Council are in turn influenced by key policy levers 
such as the single outcome agreement (SOA) between central and local government. This 
means that decision making revolves around a balance to make local priorities in line with 
national objectives. McCall and Rummery (2017: 59) argue that too often partnership 
working tends to benefit powerful partners, and within the realm of community 
planning/community safety the most powerful partners are arguably the Council 
(agencies) and the Police; influenced in part by national priorities. There were somewhat 
mixed viewpoints as to the extent of the influence of lead agencies (Council/Police) or 
central government on decision making processes. In Avon Isle decisions on local issues 
were thought to be taken through the Chair (Local Authority Councillor) of the local CSP; 
although, this has now changed with the removal of the local CSP, resulting in a regional 
(as opposed to local) strategic focus on community safety via the new SOA/Community 
Safety Partnership Tasking and Coordination Group (MATAC - Intelligence led policing 
model).    
In both Cartside and Burnside decision making on the whole was perceived to be more 
horizontal in nature. However, decisions were thought to be taken in line with the SOA 
(taking cognisance of National Outcomes) - emphasising perhaps an ‘institutional bias’ 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 2002:26) insofar as the power dynamics with respect to decisions 
around what is, or is not, regarded as a priority remains with powerful partners such as 
the Council/Police (who are in turn influenced by central government policy). 
Furthermore, a lack of dissent may coincide with Lukes (1974; 2005) third dimensional 
view of power – insofar as actors/agencies within the partnership process have been 
shaped into accepting the existing order of things. For some participants this meant that 
dominant agencies on the partnership are favoured over others, or there was an unequal 
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weighting of priorities. In Avon Isle it was thought to favour the Council, and in Burnside it 
was thought to favour both the Council and the Police, whereas in Cartside it was thought 
to favour the Police. In this instance the Council and the Police have clear roles to play 
within the governance of community safety – they have a clear identity/role within the 
partnership process; which is often crucial to its success (Hudson and Hardy, 2002; 
Broussine and Miller, 2005: 381). Thus how individuals judge their relationships to other 
actors/agencies (status/social capital) can be important in terms of how decisions are 
made with respect to the strategic direction/goals of the partnership. 
Status in this sense was arguably linked to perceptions of power in terms of what 
agencies actively contributed towards the partnership (governance, resources and 
symbolic social capital). The Council symbolised authority - they were above all viewed as 
facilitators (providing resources for meetings etc., and administrative staff); or as having 
the most salient voice; they could pull levers. In essence they have the electoral mandate 
to serve, and have the power to form links between the central and the local 
(Shepherdson et al., 2014). The Police were also viewed as a key agency – especially in 
relation to specific issues; they were the ‘go to partner’ for resources related to crime, 
disorder and security – keeping people safe as per their mandate (Bradford and Loader, 
2015). 
Within the domain of community planning/community safety these two agencies were 
naturally afforded higher status as key stakeholders, both by themselves and others. They 
in turn have generated not only bridging social capital via inter-organisational links to the 
wider community; especially in relation to information sharing (Coleman, 1988), but also 
a strong intra-organisational bonding social capital as seen through the lens of a 
dominant Police culture (Putnam, 2000). However, the Fire Service, although strongly 
identified/linked within the field of community safety in terms of prevention, was 
perhaps viewed as having less social capital than both the Council and the Police. For 
example, although they had developed bridging ties within the partnership, they were 
generally thought of as issue specific and linked to the Housing sector. They did have 
however, much like the Police, strong intra-organisational bonding social capital (Putnam, 
2000). Nonetheless, the Fire Service as an organisation was keen to expand its influence, 
and was actively trying to increase their bridging social capital (Putnam, 2000); by 
establishing wider links throughout the community. 
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The third sector and Community groups were the organisations who were the most 
unsure of how they were perceived as partners. For the most part community groups saw 
themselves as necessary to the process, but, were perhaps unsure of their importance. 
Within their own communities they had more bonding social capital through close ties to 
both friends and family (Putnam, 2000); more links to people like them (Briggs, 2004), but 
perhaps less bridging social capital to individuals and organisations outside of the 
partnership process (Putnam, 2000). In Avon Isle community groups had arguably more 
linking (Woolcock, 2004) than bridging social capital insofar as their links were more 
vertical to people in positions of authority (such as the local elected Councillor).  
However, in Burnside in particular, this view was changing. For instance, Community 
Councils on local Area Partnerships have arguably more power now compared to the past 
(more voice through the power of a vote), which means that their perceptions of their 
identity/role may change; as they gain more knowledge/capacity about how the new 
structures operate. Community Councillor Participants from both Burnpark and 
Burnwood sat on the Burnpark Area Partnership, which covered a geographically distinct 
area – it bordered the city centre/commercial district (which included Burnwood a 
recently developed upmarket area inhabited by mainly the professional/middle class); 
and Burnpark – bordering the city centre (denoted as an area of high deprivation). There 
was a distinct difference in attitude about status between both participants – the 
Burnpark participant perhaps lacked the capacity to fully engage with the partnership at 
the strategic level (which possibly explains his reticence in perceiving himself as an equal 
partner), whereas the Burnwood participant (a local businessman) was fully conversant in 
how the structures operated and represented the Area Partnership in the sectoral CPP. In 
essence both Community Council representatives had both bonding and bridging social 
capital; for Burnpark (area of high deprivation) bonding social capital was perhaps greater 
(more social integration within the local community) than their bridging social capital 
(less capacity to link/integrate into wider organisational groups). Whereas Burnwood was 
lower on bonding social capital (less social integration within the local community), but 
exhibited higher bridging social capital in both the local business area and within the 
wider community planning structure.  
The perceptions of the third sector on their role/status is possibly linked to future funding 
(insofar as services offered by the third sector are issue specific), therefore their role may 
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be viewed in terms of necessity. For example, Housing and their skill and capacity to deal 
with antisocial behaviour could possibly be thought of as more necessary in a partnership 
than other third sector organisations whose role and resource availability is not 
immediately linked to policy goals (Coleman, 1988); especially if the partnership is 
following the multi-agency tasking and co-ordination model (MATAC) favoured by the 
Police. However, as one participant argued – the third sector as an organisation “[…] has 
collaboratively the biggest budget” (B010) therefore, their social capital may increase as 
public sector resources decrease; in terms of being able to provide necessary services to 
local communities. Though for some third sector organisations the opposite may be true - 
especially if they have been resource dependent on the Council. For example, as 
competition increases for scarce Council resources (funding), those organisations with 
more capacity (in terms of bridging social capital) may succeed in securing funding at the 
expense of smaller organisations with similar (but different) programmes leading to 
organisational failure  (Bunger, 2012); which could ultimately impact on the type and 
quality of services available to local communities.  
Partnerships are normally created to tackle complex problems, which mean allowing for 
diversity within its structures, which in turn could lead to an appreciation of the range of 
skills utilised to tackle complex community issues. However, tensions could arise with 
respect to perceptions on status and the role of powerful partners to ultimately make 
strategic decisions. Participants on the whole alluded to aspects of horizontal decision 
making practices; nonetheless, it was also made clear by some participants that decision 
making was also heavily influenced by the dominant agenda of both the Council and the 
Police (influenced in turn by national priorities and a desire to meet key performance 
indicators). If partnership working within the domain of community safety is thought to 
benefit the goals of some agencies over others then this could ultimately impact on the 
effectiveness of the partnership. For example, problems may be addressed through a 
consensual viewpoint based on perceptions of equality and status, wherein decisions 
around the long term goals of community safety are discussed and decided as a 
partnership. But, if this is absent, and decisions are made by those agencies with the most 
power, based on short term quantifiable goals, then conflict and less commitment to 
partnership working could be the result (Collins and McCray, 2012: 138).  One other 
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problem may influence the efficacy of community safety partnership working – the 
impact of fiscal austerity measures. 
  5.12.2 The Impact of Austerity on Partnership Working 
Partnerships in general are thought to not only garner improved communication but, also 
to engender information sharing, reduce inefficiency, avoid duplication and identify how 
to effectively share resources (Broussine and Miller, 2005: 379). However, as some 
participants have pointed out partnership working is only effective if it is fully resourced, 
which is problematic during periods of significant public sector reform. For example: 
within community safety less money means less community safety events; a reduction in 
staffing levels means there is a an added pressure to produce more services with less 
resources; if key personnel are not replaced then partnership commitment can flounder 
(key point highlighted in Hudson and Hardy’s (2002: 53) ‘Partnership Assessment Tool’); 
and engagement may grind to a halt. This point was also highlighted by research carried 
out by the Scottish Community Safety Network (SCSN) on CSPs, which found that a 
number of events were cancelled as a direct response to the ‘withdrawal of key 
personnel, which was in turn directly linked to the reform process’ (SCSN, 2014: 11).  
 
Across all three case study areas funding has become a major issue in respect of, not only 
implementing, but in some cases continuing with some community safety initiatives. This 
opens up the question on what will be prioritised/or de-prioritised in terms of community 
safety. In Burnside there is a continuing focus on initiatives associated with the night-time 
economy; this is also the case in Cartside; but to a lesser degree. Youth diversionary 
initiatives are also still in place in both Burnside and Cartside, but, more in line with risk 
management, and early intervention in an effort to reduce offending in line with national 
objectives – or as Darke (2011) contends as a form of social crime prevention more akin 
to social control (Garland, 2001). In Avon Isle initiatives directed towards the elderly 
population have been prioritised ahead of others, including diversionary activities for 
young people. While there are some positive associations by young people towards 
diversionary activities; particularly those associated with sport (Coakley, 2011; Kelly, 
2012), there are also many criticisms associated with the public ‘intolerance of youth’ 
(Bannister and Kearns, 2012: 381) and the negative labelling (Becker, 1963) of young 
people ‘hanging about’ as antisocial behaviour (Bannister and Kearns, 2012; Neary et al., 
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2013). Nevertheless, it appears that quantifiable projects (focusing on risk 
management/youth offending) that match up to local and central government objectives 
continue to be prioritised ahead of more generic initiatives. Kelly (2012) argues that this 
has the potential to draw more young people into the Criminal Justice System through a 
net widening effect, rather than steering them away from it. 
It is clear that fiscal austerity measures have had a major impact on partnership working 
across all three case study areas, in terms of the reduction in personnel, which in turn has 
impacted on attendance at partnership meetings. This has the potential to generate a 
knock on effect insofar as commitment was not only linked to attendance, but also to the 
type of services that could be provided to a partnership. For example, resources for most 
agencies were viewed of as ‘in kind’ – attending meetings, and linking queries or sign-
posting problem individuals onto the relevant agencies. Other resources entailed 
providing specialist knowledge, information, or on-site intelligence, which is considered a 
crucial resource to be accessed - mostly by the Police and some key Council agencies 
dealing with antisocial behaviour, alcohol and drugs, or child protection issues.  
In the past there has existed a somewhat sceptical attitude towards partnership working 
from the Police (particularly during the 1990s and early 2000s).  Scepticism was 
somewhat focused on the belief that non-police agencies not only lacked a proficient 
command structure, but that they were intruding on traditional policing functions; 
compounded by an organisational ideology that viewed community policing as ‘soft 
policing’ (O’Neill and McCarthy, 2014: 144). However, recent research has highlighted a 
change in attitude towards partnership working from a policing perspective (O’Neill and 
McCarthy, 2014: 148). This has been supported by the evidence within the case study 
areas wherein partnership working, especially during times of austerity, is now viewed as 
a necessary tool within crime prevention and community safety (Apex Scotland, 2013). 
However, it has also been acknowledged that commitment to it has become more 
difficult to maintain, for example, a recent Audit Scotland (2016) report highlighted some  
major fiscal challenges affecting policing in Scotland including; “working more closely with 
other organisations, inside and outside the public sector to ensure community safety” 
(ibid: 9). 
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It has been suggested by the Home Office that pooling resources in the mixed economy of 
policing will always be an advantage to both the Police and the public sector (ibid). This 
has been recognised somewhat by participants within the case study areas who have 
acknowledged that severe cut backs may encourage agencies/organisations to pool their 
resources, and possibly force some recalcitrant agencies to return to the partnership 
table; such as Health, Education and Social Work. However, this also highlights a 
dichotomy of sorts, insofar as, while austerity may encourage partnership working 
‘anecdotally’ or ‘on paper’, evidence throughout the case study areas has also shown that 
it has the potential to force agencies to retrench back to their core activities – highlighting 
a possible barrier to partnership working. 
  5.12.3 Barriers to effective partnership working 
Despite a number of participants claiming that there were no barriers to partnership 
working that they were aware of, it has become clear from the data that there were a 
number of contentious issues that proved contrary to that opinion. For example, time 
pressures were cited by some, as was a lack of commitment or willingness to participate; 
also referred to by a Community Councillor as a general apathy amongst local 
communities to attend community meetings. A lack of capacity by community 
organisations was also cited as a barrier to partnership working; which may be 
exacerbated by non-Council organisations having to cope with deciphering Council 
‘jargon’ (Sparrow, 2008). But, the most enduring barrier to partnership working cited 
throughout all the case study areas was in relation to issues around data protection and 
the sharing of information.  
A number of participants commented on issues around ‘data protection’, which tended to 
hamper co-operation. In smaller geographical areas (Avon Isle; Cartside) this was thought 
to pose more of a problem insofar as agencies were reluctant to discuss individuals within 
an open forum; despite the use of ‘information protocols’. Irvine et al., (2002: 199) writes 
that some inter-professional relationships are typified by ‘conflict rather than co-
operation’. Conflicts may arise out of who has power and authority over a particular 
jurisdiction in terms of service delivery (Irvine et al., 2002) and information has long been 
cited as a source of power. This was possibly viewed as an issue between the Police and 
other social welfare based agencies (particularly in Avon Isle and Cartside). 
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Barton and Quinn (2002: 36-42) also contrast the role of confidentiality and consent to 
the growth of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management within the Criminal Justice System in the UK in 
respect of DTTO’s11. For example, there is a concern between the rights of the individual 
with respect to confidentiality and consent, and a Criminal Justice System that is more 
concerned about measuring, identifying and classifying offenders. Hunt and Van Der 
Arend (2002) have also written about the reluctance of Health workers to share 
information with the Police due to concerns around patient confidentiality, and possibly 
violating professional codes of practice. This was a point highlighted by some participants, 
with one Councillor from Burnside stating “[…] as soon as you mention data sharing the 
barricades go up […]” (B006). Richardson and Asthana (2006: 659) argue that numerous 
codes of practice, or practice frameworks in relation to information sharing, can lead to 
problems in terms of perceptions on what can and cannot be shared between agencies, a 
point highlighted by one participant in Avon Isle “representatives of the partners aren’t 
very sure what they can and cannot say[…]” (A009). Lennox et al., (2012: 136) argue that 
this can be tackled by ensuring that all personnel are given adequate training and clear 
information sharing policies.  
  5.12.4 Co-location 
It has been argued that one possible solution used to overcome barriers to effective 
partnership working may rest in agencies working on ‘shared and agreed goals’ (Grace 
and Coventry, 2010: 159); based in a single location (Stanley and Humphreys, 2014). 
However, evidence within the case study areas suggests that there exists some resistance 
to the concept of co-located service delivery. This could be based on geography (Avon 
Isle) wherein an island community was thought to be more or less a co-located entity; or 
the effect of institutional ‘silo mentalities’ that exhibit an unwillingness to share 
information or to give partnership working much support (Hunter and Perkins, 2012); or 
structural difficulties with respect to reform (accountability and cost awareness); or with 
respect to problems associated with access to computer data bases. However, there was 
some support in relation to operational Hubs within local areas; although these were 
usually associated with reactive services in relation to prevention most often associated 
with antisocial behaviour, drugs or alcohol abuse.  
                                                          
11 Drug Treatment and Testing Order’s 
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There are also issues in relation to blurred lines of responsibility/accountability. For 
example, Community Safety Burnside (CSB) is a co-located service, which houses a 
number of agencies (third and public sector), which has been cited as having a big impact 
on crime reduction in Burnside. CSB as an organisation is funded by both the Police and 
Burnside City Council; however, accountability issues may emerge in relation to different 
organisational work practices. Audit Scotland (2011) in their report Arm’s-length external 
organisations (ALEOs): are you getting it right? points out that while ALEO’s may take 
responsibility for service delivery, the Local Authority is responsible for ensuring that they 
are held to account on how they use public funds. CSB is also accountable to the Police. 
However, where policing was once aligned with Local Authorities, it is now bypassed and 
the Police estate is overseen by the Scottish Police Authority – a centralised structure. 
There is also accountability to the CSB Board (made up of representatives from the 
Council, the Scottish Police Authority, and independent Directors). The board ostensibly 
meet six times a year in order to scrutinise performance (Burnside, 2015b), but it is 
difficult to ascertain just how much time or diligence is allocated to this process by busy 
city Councillors or members of the Scottish Police Authority. 
Nonetheless, co-location may encourage trust (instrumental to building social capital) 
between agencies. Trust may also be achieved through other means in partnerships, for 
example, it may grow through time as actors come to know each other, or through a 
shared commitment to partnership goals. Fukuyama (1995: 26) asserts that trust arises 
within communities based on co-operative behaviour, and shared norms by members of 
that community; and social capital arises “from the prevalence of trust in a society or in 
certain parts of it” (Fukuyama, 1995: 26) - including networks. Tonkiss (2004: 20) asserts 
that to take an “instrumental view of trust as an element of social capital” requires actors 
to consider how “trust can be capitalised” (ibid: 20), in other words how it is used to 
access resources, economic capital, or indeed opportunities to work together in 
partnership – providing of course that it is to everyone’s mutual benefit. Co-location may 
improve trust amongst some agencies; however, enduring concerns regarding blurred 
boundaries and accountability persist, which will be discussed in the Accountability 
Chapter in relation to partnership working, Police reform, and perceptions on localism 
within the case study areas. 
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Chapter 6: Accountability 
A key aim of CPPs is to improve the delivery of public services in a way that is inclusive of 
the Single Outcome Agreement (SOA) - incorporating best value while achieving the 
Scottish Government’s national objectives (Fenwick et al., 2012). Signatories of the SOA 
will thereby be held accountable for the delivery of national outcomes. However, 
CPP/CSPs involve a number of agencies/actors, and not just the two key statutory 
organisations involved in the governance of community safety (Local Authority and the 
Police). This means that a number of actors/organisations must adhere to their own 
internal and external accountability mechanisms. Consequently, actors have a statutory 
responsibility to the SOA (in turn accountable to the Scottish Government); individual 
accountability for certain areas (for example, key performance indicators within policing); 
and accountability towards a successful partnership (ibid: 413). There is also, some may 
argue, the ultimate democratic accountability; being held accountable to local 
communities through engagement and service delivery.  
Accountability is therefore a complex issue within local government partnerships, which 
can lead to increased tensions with regard to the blurred lines of responsibility between 
the centre and the local, and between the public sector and third sector organisations. 
This next section will examine some contentious issues that have possibly arisen within 
the case study areas with regard to: Third Sector Organisations; Third Party Policing; 
Police Reform, and Community accountability. 
6.1 Third Sector Organisations 
The third sector is a term used to describe organisations that are generally independent 
from government – within governance they are according to Osborne and Gaebler’s 
(1992) analogy those organisations with expert knowledge who do the ‘rowing’ as 
opposed to ‘steering’ through monitoring; the function associated with Government 
(ibid). However, many problems have begun to emerge within partnership working, which 
may support the argument that Government is not only ‘steering’ but trying to ‘row’ (ibid) 
through the use of target setting, and funding which may force some organisations to 
adapt their core aims (Hastings et al., 2015). Third sector organisations are thought to be 
value driven in the sense that their broad remit is to improve social goals (environmental 
or health and wellbeing) and are commonly known as not-for-profit organisations 
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(National Audit Office, 2010). There are a number of third sector organisations 
throughout the UK who operate alongside the public sector either as support services for 
- Employment and Welfare, Health and Social Care, Housing, Education and Learning or as 
part of a wider framework for the Criminal Justice System/community support and 
community safety – (Home Office, 2005).  The third sector are ‘closely related to the 
public sector, at both national and supranational levels’ (Sgueo, 2015: 9), and this 
relationship has grown increasingly stronger in recent decades as more functions are 
delegated to the third and private sector (Sgueo, 2015: 9).  
 
According to the Scottish Government website the third sector in Scotland is wide and 
varied and includes; charities, social enterprises, community groups, voluntary 
organisations, co-operatives and individual volunteers, who each have an important role 
to play in the creation of a more successful country with equal opportunities for all 
(Scottish Government, 2015d). It states they not only have a substantial part to play in 
terms of Scotland’s economy, but also have a direct impact on its public services and on 
the wellbeing of its citizens, and are equally important at the local level in terms of the 
development of SOA’s within Community Planning Partnerships (Scottish Government, 
2015d).  
 
A number of Third Sector Organisations (TSO’s) operate as standalone agencies within the 
community safety domain across the three case study sites, although some of them are 
more involved with the public sector than others; in the sense that a TSO may be 
approached on an ad hoc basis depending on a particular initiative. However, two key 
themes identified by the Scottish Government as areas of concern are Violence Against 
Women12 and Alcohol and Drug Misuse13. Consequently these two central government 
areas of concern have also been prioritised within Local Authority areas via the 
community planning/community safety agenda.  
A number of agencies operate under the heading of Violence Against Women (VAW) 
within the case study areas, for example, Women’s Aid, Rape Crisis (TSOs), and Child 
                                                          
12 Scottish Government – Violence Against Women http://www.gov.scot/Topics/People/Equality/violence-
women  
13 Scottish Government – Reducing the damaging impact of drugs and alcohol 
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Justice/policies/drugs-alcohol  
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Protection (public sector). However, although these organisations may share similar aims, 
it became apparent that there exists an underlying tension in terms of differing 
organisational values, goals or culture between two of these agencies. One representative 
from Rape Crises thought that this was due to a politically gendered view on VAW in 
particular; which meant that some organisations fared better than others in terms of 
government funding.  
As multi-agency partnership working became the dominant discourse (especially under 
New Labour); Carmel and Harlock (2008) argue that there has been an attempt by central 
government (UK) to institute voluntary and charitable organisations as a ‘single 
governable terrain’ (ibid: 156); under the umbrella of the third sector. This has been 
achieved through ‘discourses, strategies, and administrative and policy changes’ (ibid: 
156) – through governance (regulation and performance management). The effect of 
which is to establish and enact an ‘institutional and normative order’ (ibid: 156) onto an 
otherwise distinctive terrain.  They further argue that in so doing the third sector is often 
then viewed as generic service providers rather than distinctive organisations with 
specific goals and ethos (ibid: 156).  
For example Rape Crisis tackle sexual violence towards any victim (or any survivor as they 
prefer to call victims of sexual violence), whereas Woman’s Aid focused mainly on 
violence against women within a domestic environment. Consequently, it was asserted 
they receive more funding from the Scottish Government in comparison to Rape Crises, 
which the TSO participant for Avon Isle/Avonside found to be short-sighted;  
“I think for Rape Crisis centres and there is thirteen centres throughout Scotland now, 
we have always been the very poor relation to Women's Aid who have masses of mega 
bucks thrown at them; because domestic abuse is the thing of the day. But I tend to 
think that a lot of people are horrendously short sighted because - have they actually 
considered what domestic abuse consists of? Sometimes it consists of the worst 
possible kinds of sexual abuse and violence. But, I think people are much more 
comfortable in thinking that domestic violence is about shouting or emotional abuse or 
the odd slap here or there, because that's what's in their comfort zone. But, when we 
take it to the next level, we're just not as comfortable, so we tend not to get money 
thrown at us the same way as Women's Aid do” (A002) – Rape Crisis – Avonside.  
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Since 2010 funding has become a key issue for both the public and the third sector 
(Hastings et al., 2015), but it has arguably affected smaller to medium sized organisations 
more than others. According to the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations (SCVO) 
cuts to small grants programmes are mainly affecting small (around 12,000+ organisations 
with annual budgets under £25k) and medium (around 5500 organisations between £25k 
and £1m annual budgets), for example, 83% or four in five small organisations receive no 
funding from statutory sources – in total 69% of TSO’s receive no statutory funding at all 
(SCVO, 2014). However, while the larger organisations (around 800 with a turnover over 
£1m) are also experiencing cuts they seem to benefit the most; in terms of 50% of this 
groups income is from the public sector (SCVO, 2014). 
 
Over the past decade TSOs have had to compete against each other for funding (Brandsen 
and van Hout, 2006), and post 2008 (in a climate of austerity); the prospect of having your 
budget cut may in some cases be used as a way to force change on some smaller TSOs 
(Hastings et al., 2015). The previous respondent discussed how they once had access to 
three different Scottish Government funding streams; including the Rape Crisis Specific 
fund – which is part of the VAW stream; each Rape Crisis organisation receives a core 
fund of £50,000 from the Scottish Government and in every centre it funds different 
things; 
 “We had the Violence Against Women fund, we had the Rape Crisis Specific fund and 
we had the Survivor Scotland fund. We only ever got £30,000 from the Violence 
Against Women fund and we lost that last year - that wasn't continued” (A002) – Rape 
Crisis – Avonside.  
Although funding streams are discontinued for a number of reasons, it was however 
intimated that the loss of the £30,000 in funding, may be linked more to a difference in 
organisational ethos (or arguably a refusal to change core values); 
“I think that it was something to do with us opening our doors up to men. We only 
ever got £30,000 from that funding stream, and last year we weren't successful. 
Woman’s Aid in Avonside were given £359,000 from that funding stream and we got 
nothing” (A002) – Rape Crisis – Avonside.  
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The potential loss of funding has become problematic for many TSOs; as highlighted by a 
study conducted by the Joseph Rowntree Organisation on the impact of cuts on local 
government and poorer areas (Hastings et al., 2015); insofar as there was an added 
pressure on TSOs to adapt bids and grant applications to specifications that did not fit 
their core purpose in order to secure or continue to secure funding, which ultimately has 
the potential to stifle creativity and innovation (Hastings et al., 2015). For example, more 
time may be spent chasing funding streams and ‘justifying’ yourself (Brandsen and van 
Hout, 2006: 542) than performing core functions. The participant from Rape Crisis in 
Avonside discussed how they often had to spend time chasing funding streams - which 
had a strict criteria attached to them - and often had to tailor their services in order to 
access them; although it was pointed out that they would not however apply for anything 
that was way out of their remit; 
“But, if I can look and say well actually there is a specific project that we could do that 
will meet our service users needs and theirs, then absolutely” (A002) – Rape Crisis – 
Avonside. 
A Burnside Local Authority Councillor acknowledged that TSOs would have to change 
their work practices in order to meet the prerequisites for funding; 
“[...] we conditioned grants on some of the voluntary sector organisations […] - You 
know it's all very well doing youth work with small children during the week, I mean it's 
good because its preventative, but we said they needed to be doing work on a Friday 
and a Saturday night when most of the issues are arising, to be out doing street work 
and so on, and that was a condition of the grant that they also have to do that in 
conjunction with ‘Burnside Life’ and talking to each other - you know the joined up 
approach between youth agencies […]” (B004) - Councillor – Safe Group/CSB Chair – 
Burnside.  
This could prove problematic for some organisations relying on volunteers for frontline 
services, for example, asking them to go out on Friday and Saturday nights in areas where 
violence may occur, may impact on their decision to volunteer. Relying on volunteers 
could also generate tensions between the public and third sector as each sector competes 
for limited funds. For example, ‘Burnside Life’ is the operating name of Culture and Sport 
Burnside; an ALEO - with Burnside Council being the sole member (Burnside, 2014a), and 
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its staff may feel resentment towards some voluntary organisations if it is thought they 
are replacing trained paid staff. This was the case in Hastings et al’s., (2015) study when 
public sector staff objected to unpaid volunteers taking over a service; in this instance a 
library service in England, and subsequently refused to support them. Although this was 
not mentioned directly within the case study areas, one participant who worked within 
the VAW Partnership discussed cut backs and the use of volunteers within frontline 
women’s organisations;    
 “I think what organisations are doing is relying heavily on volunteers now to coming in 
and help shore up elements of the business that they're in and the way of delivering to 
support them to do that” (B019) - VAW Co-ordinator – CSB – Burnside. 
Consequently the tensions that arise out of disparities in funding or service provision 
could lead to a division amongst services culminating in a fragmented service delivery 
(Hastings et al., 2015). Trying to retain your autonomy could also lead to increased 
tensions between TSO’s and between TSOs and statutory organisations, for example, with 
reference to the comments made above about TSO’s having to work with ‘Burnside Life’ – 
would this be as equal partners, or would ‘Burnside Life’ be the lead agency, thereby 
setting the agenda. Grix and Phillpots (2011: 12) discuss this in relation to their case study 
on 49 County Sport Partnerships in England; they argued that although outwardly it 
appeared as if the partnerships conformed to a governance narrative based on equality 
and consensus, in reality there was an asymmetrical power relationship between ‘Sport 
England’ (the political arm of the Government’s sport policy) and other partners.  For 
example, if a TSO wished to obtain funding for a local project, they must first sign up to 
the partnership’s mandatory Public Service Agreement (much like the SOA in Scotland), 
which works to ensure the “uniform delivery of Government-set policy and targets” (ibid: 
11); which is more about ‘enforced co-operation’ rather than autonomy within an equal 
partnership (ibid: 12).  
In essence this highlights the difficulties some TSOs may face in the future, with regards 
to remaining autonomous, while being reliant on public sector funding; especially funding 
with strings attached. In order to survive TSOs may have to adapt their services in line 
with the overarching aims of community planning, rather than focusing on their core 
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aims, which may ultimately impact on the types of services available to local 
communities.  
For smaller organisations there is the added problem associated with trying to keep pace 
with TSO’s who are better funded and subsequently have more resources. For instance, 
TSO’s, such as Rape Crisis, have to divert much needed resources (staff, time, funds), in 
order to access funding streams in the first place, and in order to do this they must first 
become known. One such way to do this and gain access was through presentations to 
partnerships to promote their organisational aims; which again requires utilising scarce 
resources. However, it was thought to be crucial by Rape Crisis in both Avonside and 
Cartside that their organisations became known within the domain of Community Safety 
Partnerships - despite the obvious financial hardships;  
 “[...] I think I invited myself onto the partnership and then eventually I gave a 
presentation about TESSA and we shared some of the workshops that we do with the 
partnership and as TESSA became better known and more established in Avonside 
then TESSA was kind of fed into the strategic plan” (A002) – Rape Crisis – Avonside.  
TESSA (To explore sexual exploitation and sexual abuse) was in reference to a youth 
prevention programme that was established in 2009. The programme was currently 
(2013) funded for three years by Comic Relief to deliver a prevention workshop in ten 
secondary schools in Avonside (covering quite a wide geographical area). In a discussion 
around status and equality within the CSP the participant returned to the topic of TESSA;  
 “I’ll just go back to what I said about TESSA and the youth prevention, it is very 
obvious to me that that's where the interest lies, and again it doesn't surprise me 
because prevention work is very proactive - it concerns young people, whereas our 
core work is not something everybody is comfortable with and they are least likely to 
want to know about that” (A002) – Rape Crisis – Avonside.  
Measuring performance has become a key factor in terms of partnership working 
throughout the UK - the majority of Local Authority funding comes from central 
government, therefore accountability to the centre is established through ‘performance 
and financial audits’ (Fenwick et al., 2012: 407). Therefore some initiatives – especially 
those directed towards youth prevention – are often favoured more than others within 
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the community safety agenda; especially when it meets both partnership and 
organisational outcomes.  For instance, the Police had decided to duplicate the youth 
initiative around internet safety in schools previously undertaken by Rape Crisis (TESSA);  
“I thought this is a bit strange - why are they doing that, because we are in every 
secondary school, but they were going into do it as well, but not nearly as good as we 
were I have to say. It was covered in much more detail by us, but because you know, it 
seems to be a good idea that that's what they should do” (A002) – Rape Crisis – 
Avonside.  
They were asked if this duplication of services was perhaps down to a lack of 
communication between themselves and the Police, or was it down to strategies being 
put in place; 
“I think they had a strategy and they were keeping to it. Because it wasn't a case of a 
lack of communication, because they knew precisely - because of me feeding back 
what we were doing, and I thought it was absolutely bizarre” (A002) – Rape Crisis – 
Avonside.  
In this sense genuine partnership working is perhaps superseded by the fact that other 
agencies are still accountable to their own organisations, to the point that they will 
duplicate activities in order to meet their own organisational aims and objectives within 
performance management regimes - like the one that exists within Police Scotland; 
“[...] Within Police Scotland there's a very, very rigorous performance regime which 
looks at everything from the way we’re performing round about crime, disorder, 
antisocial behaviour, road traffic etc. […]” (B005) - Area Police Commander – Burnside. 
In partnerships such as the CSP – generating trust is often associated with effective 
partnership working (McCall and Rummery, 2017). However, this could be eroded if it is 
thought that by providing information (around initiatives such as TESSA) it may lose an 
organisation its competitive advantage (Brandsen and van Hout, 2006); insofar as larger 
organisations (such as the Police and the Council) may duplicate their distinctive service 
provision, or in the case of Cartside try to take it over;  
“ [...] at one point, certain bods (sic) that were on the - and still are on the CSP wanted  
to do it in-house at Cartside Council, and needless to say they never bloody got it 
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(laughs). If they had wanted to do it, they could have done it at the same time that we 
did it, so we refused to allow them to have it” (C005) – Rape Crisis – Cartside. 
The conflict around the youth project was principally between the Council and Rape Crisis 
and was put down to the youth project being successful and to particular “petty 
personalities” (C005), and it was later claimed that when the youth project had first 
started they had been threatened over comments they had once made in an annual 
report which suggested that “bullies sometimes came in the guise of teacher’s” (C005). 
They were chastised for this by some Council representatives and more or less warned 
that they were thought to be operating out-with their remit and were effectively given a 
warning to stop;  
“[…] And then we were threatened - they wouldn't minute it - but we were 
threatened, it was a case of - well if you don't work in our way - we will close you 
down. I said 'I beg your pardon, could you make sure that that threat is minuted', but it 
wasn't. It was just a certain few that wanted it [...]” (C005) – Rape Crisis – Cartside. 
Although this incident had occurred in the past it perhaps highlights how smaller 
organisations reliant on Council funding (the TSO had originally been given a one off 
payment to fund their pilot), have constraints exerted on them by more powerful 
partners. Fenwick et al., (2012: 413) discuss this in relation to partnerships within local 
governance in England and Scotland in terms of while there may be internal 
accountability within local partnerships; ultimately there is accountability towards the 
centre. This may explain why statutory organisations such as the Police and Council 
agencies pay more cognizance to what is required of them as organisations internally or 
externally (accountability to the centre) rather than to what may be expected of them 
with regards to peer accountability within the partnership (ibid: 413).  
It also resonates with Lukes (2005) second dimensional view of power in the sense that 
the Council were trying to exercise their control over this agency through decision making 
– or non-decision making (setting the agenda on what is reported in the minutes) or as 
Luke would argue making sure that grievances “have not reached expression in the 
political arena” (ibid: 111). It also resonates with Lukes (1974: 24) third dimensional view 
of power – to prevent conflict through the shaping of perceptions; or in this case 
preventing future conflict through the shaping of reports and minutes.  
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The TSO’s in (Avonside and Cartside) commented on above perhaps emphasise an 
asymmetry in power within partnership working within the domain of community safety, 
insofar as they have arguably less status compared to other more dominant statutory 
agencies. However, in Burnside – how TSO’s are viewed – was thought to be changing 
insofar as the third sector are now represented at the strategic level of decision making 
within the Community Planning Partnership; 
“For a number of years it wasn’t represented, and when the Third Sector Forum came 
into being and I was elected as its Chair; that was the first time for a number of years 
that we had representation at city wide level […]” (B010) - Chair of Third Sector 
Forum/SCPP – Burnside.  
The participant went on to point out just what the third sector had to offer local 
communities;  
“We bring, I think, somewhere between 2,100 and 2,400 organisations that are part of 
the third sector in the city, which represents a billion pounds in terms of the city’s 
economy. Those organisations operate at different scales, so some are quite large third 
sector organisations dealing with multi million pound budgets and contracts, and 
others are very small, very location or issue specific, and that as an entity it seems to 
me, brings an opportunity for the partnership to deeply connect into the web and 
wharf of local community life” (B010) - Chair of Third Sector Forum/SCPP – Burnside. 
It is clear that there are a number of organisations operating within different spheres of 
public life, and most of them will have clear internal or external accountability 
frameworks in place. However, not all organisations that operate alongside public sector 
agencies are linked into those strategic frameworks, and therefore lack external scrutiny, 
which could also prove problematic in terms of accountability. One such organisation 
which has grown in number in the UK over the past few years is called the ‘Street 
Pastors’; a faith based TSO affiliated with The Ascension Trust, which was first pioneered 
in London in 2003 (Barton et al., 2011).  
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6.1.1 Third Sector Organisations/scrutiny 
In both Burnside and Cartside ‘Street Pastors’ are in operation, although they are perhaps 
more involved in Cartside. The Pastors were referred to many times in response to 
discussions around key Local Authority cross cutting priorities (SCSN, 2014: 12), such as 
the night-time economy and antisocial behaviour; and usually in a positive manner. 
Another TSO participant (from addiction services involved with the Community Safety 
Partnership), said the ‘Street Pastors’ go out every Friday and Saturday night and had 
done for about the last five years – looking after people; 
“Particularly people leaving clubs late at night or whatever who may be vulnerable 
because of alcohol misuse, or because they're stranded, or they can't get home or 
whatever, so that's been quite a useful initiative” (C007) - Addiction Support – 
Cartside.  
They were also associated with the control of antisocial behaviour insofar as certain 
agencies often co-ordinated their services;  
“[…] We work with the wardens and the ‘Street Pastors’ and we also do a lot of work 
with the Police on that, just kind of co-ordinating things and sharing information” 
(C010) - Youth Services – Cartside. 
It would appear that the ‘Street Pastors’ are an organisation that are growing in influence 
in terms of the night-time economy, and in other areas linked to the prevention of 
antisocial behaviour. This is not a new phenomenon, as religious organisations have a 
historical legacy in terms of delivering services to those in need (Green and Johns, 2011).  
However, as previously stated the ‘Street Pastors’ are not linked into a formal strategic 
accountability framework compared to other partners within the CPP/CSPs, and therefore 
lack external scrutiny or accountability with regard to their work practices compared to 
others (Green and John, 2011; Barton et al., 2011). For example, Green and Johns (2011) 
have commented on their continued lack of secular or non-Christian faith based group 
involvement within the ‘Street Pastor’ movement; despite this being one of its original 
stated aims. Other areas of concern include: the efficacy of their crime prevention role; or 
that they may be used as a substitute for policing; or anecdotal evidence that suggests 
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they preach more than they prevent (ibid).  One Community Council participant in 
Burnside had this to say about ‘Street Pastors’; 
 
“Yeah, they're becoming more and more prevalent, and I was very keen on the ‘Street 
Pastors’ until we done a wee bit more work on them and we decided that we had to 
watch our affiliations with different organisations, but again we have a role with them 
and we want to encourage them” (B013) - Community Councillor Burnwood CC – 
Burnside. 
 
The reticence he described could be centred on perceptions that the ‘Street Pastors’ 
(members of an evangelical faith based organisation) may have a censorial attitude 
towards some sections of society. For example, this Community Council represents an 
area that is inhabited and frequented by large sections of the LGBT (lesbian, gay, bi-
sexual, trans-gender) community. A similar reserve came from disabled respondents in a 
study conducted by Green and Johns (2011) which looked at levels of trust in ‘Street 
Pastors’; disabled respondents exhibited low levels of trust towards ‘Street Pastors’, 
however as the study was principally directed towards student attitudes, it did not 
explain why. If the ‘Street Pastors’ identity and vision is in contrast to secular viewpoints 
based on inclusivity and equality, then perhaps this organisation and others like it should 
be open to more scrutiny.  
A further criticism levelled at the ‘Street Pastors’ is their focus on ‘vulnerable young 
women’, suggesting censorious views on women and alcohol consumption within the 
night-time economy. The ‘Pastors’ assert that their prime focus is centred around 
antisocial behaviour and at risk groups within the night-time economy, although the label 
of vulnerability is mostly attributed to young women (Green and Johns, 2011). A focus on 
‘young women as vulnerable’ also became apparent in Cartside through discussions with 
two participants around a report that was presented to the Community Safety 
Partnership by the ‘Street Pastors’.   
However, there are some problems with the data, in that volunteers within the ‘Street 
Pastor’ movement will be making personal judgements on who is judged to be at risk or 
who they perceive is vulnerable. It could also be problematic insofar as the volunteers 
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decide on whom to help, and it may be considered safer to approach women as opposed 
to men late at night (Cartside Street Pastors, 2013). A European study analysing the 
financial accountability of community sector organisations (a term attributed to all 
voluntary sector organisations within Europe) states that a criticism levelled at these 
organisations is that they lack the ‘experience and capability in monitoring and evaluating 
their own activities’ (Sgueo, 2015: 15). 
In terms of the night-time economy in Cartside and Burnside it would also suggest that 
the ‘Street Pastors’ are insinuating themselves within areas of concern traditionally 
associated with policing and social services, despite the fact that they are not specifically 
trained to work in these areas, and are therefore less accountable to existing regulatory 
bodies. One other unintended consequence may concern net-widening (Mazerolle and 
Ransley, 2006), for example, contacting the Police to report people who are aggressive 
when approached - who may only have become aggressive because they were 
approached, may bring more young people into the Criminal Justice System who may 
otherwise have escaped police attention (Kelly, 2012); which may in turn further reinforce 
social exclusion (Crawford, 1997; Gilling, 2007). 
 
 6.2 Responsibilisation and Third Party Policing 
 
With the advent of neo-liberal policies from the 1970s onwards advocating major 
structural and financial reform within both the public and private sector (Gilling, 2007), 
there has existed to some extent a laissez-faire attitude from the government in Britain 
(most notably the Conservatives and New Labour) in terms of crime prevention, whereby 
the government takes a step back and promotes an individualistic notion of 
responsibilisation (Garland, 1996; 2001).  
In consequence there has arguably been a rise in ‘private prudentialism’ (Gilling, 2007: 3), 
whereupon local communities, individuals and groups together with the private and third 
sector have been persuaded to adopt practices to reduce crime and disorder 
(Neighbourhood Watch, alarms, CCTV, locks/grills etc.).  This situational approach to 
crime prevention eliminates causation by restoring liability onto a rational actor (victim or 
offender) and further adds to the crime debate by reassigning responsibility for crime 
control out of the domain of the Police and onto individuals and communities (Hughes et 
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al., 2002: 326; Tilley, 2002). According to Garland (1996: 453) this sends out a message 
that the ‘state alone is not, and cannot effectively be, responsible for preventing and 
controlling crime’. It also addresses the problem of an unwanted extension of policing 
measures due to cost (Garland, 1996), for example, there are fiscal limits to the amount 
of Police resources available not least regarding the amount of Police officers employed 
and deployed in problem areas (McLaughlin, 2007). 
For the Police much attention had been focussed on the notion of community policing 
characterised by high visibility in communities in an effort to promote public reassurance 
(Hamilton-Smith et al., 2013) through crime prevention. However, the reassurance, crime 
reduction agenda was only one half of the coin, the other half included adopting a holistic 
approach to crime prevention, which included the promotion of community safety 
through partnership working for the co-production of security (Gilling, 2007). One of the 
biggest developments in this field (not limited to, but especially in the UK and the USA) 
was the desire to combine the informal crime control practices of some non-state actors 
with the more formal activities of the Police themselves, particularly if it could be 
presented in the guise of community safety (Garland, 2007: 124).  
This responsibilisation agenda has been aligned to the development of the ‘third 
governmental sector’ (Garland, 2001: 170) comprising a range of crime 
prevention/community safety organisations/networks, such as multi-agency Community 
Safety Partnerships, which occupy an “intermediate, borderline position, poised between 
the state and civil society” (Garland, 2001: 170). This networked community of crime 
prevention connects criminal justice agencies to the activities of local communities and 
citizens (Garland, 2001: 170).  
This extension of the governance of crime control advocates that non-state 
actors/organisations take responsibility for the control of some forms of incivility by 
governing the conduct of others (Flint and Nixon, 2006: 940). The governance of conduct 
in this sense is arguably based on what Rose (2000) refers to as ‘ethopolitics’, whereby 
conduct is subject to wider political discourses around a type of moral and ethical 
behaviour expected from communities. Flint and Nixon argue that antisocial behaviour 
presents a clear challenge to the constructed norms and values of society, and therefore 
opens up a channel for a range of governance interventions, and wider debates 
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surrounding the ethics that underpin ‘citizenship, civility and government’ (Flint and 
Nixon (2006: 940).  
One key concept linked to the notion of responsibilisation is Third Party Policing. 
Mazerolle (2014: 342) describes it as a “a partnership between the Police (as the first 
party) and an external entity (the third party) where the legal powers of the third party 
are used to prevent or control a crime problem” (Mazerolle, 2014: 342). In this sense civil 
remedies beyond the control of the Police are used as an effective and additional tool to 
add to the policing arsenal (Mazerolle and Ransley, 2006). This may be through the use of 
co-operative partnerships in the sense that the third party is a voluntary partner. It can 
also be used as a coercive tool whereby non-offending third parties are forced to use 
their civil remedies ‘outside the scope of their normal routine activities’ (Buerger and 
Mazerolle, 1998: 301) to reduce or minimise disorder caused by others; usually by the 
threat of legal sanctions. For example, Mazzerolle and Ransley (2006: 104) refer to a 
number of legal levers utilised by the Police in the USA to force landlords to deal with 
antisocial tenants, such as; Health and Safety, Fire, Building, and Housing Codes. In 
Scotland similar legal levers exist under the Housing (Scotland) Acts and the Antisocial 
Behaviour etc. Scotland Act 200414, whereby landlords can be ‘persuaded’ through the 
threat of legal sanctions against themselves to take action against offending tenants. The 
Police in this sense return to a compliance model in policing (Mazzerolle and Ransley, 
2006). This approach by the Police is often used in conjunction with other policing 
strategies, such as problem oriented policing which analyses crime problems and then 
implements a solution tailored to reduce those problems (Sorg et al., 2013: 92). 
 6.2.1 The Role of Housing in the Third Party Policing of antisocial behaviour 
Problem oriented policing (POP) is an analytical tool used within the arsenal of 
community policing (in both the USA and the UK) as the Police move away from a more 
incident driven response to a crime prevention model (Cherney, 2008). Cherney argues 
that POP motivated Police agencies to re-think how they addressed those problems the 
public routinely expect them to deal with, and one such way is to harness the capacities 
of third parties in the ‘furtherance of crime control’ (ibid: 232).  Within the case study 
areas a number of references were made to the use of third parties, for example, using 
                                                          
14 http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2004/10/20146/45685#7 
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Licensing legislation. Participants from all three case studies discussed how Licensing laws 
were being utilised to tackle underage drinking/alcohol related disorder, or to object to 
new licensed premises. in Cartside one participant discussed advice that was given to the 
Alcohol and Drug Partnership (ADP) on how to frame their objections to the Licensing 
Authority with regards to a new pub being granted a licence in an area both the ADP and 
the Police considered to be oversubscribed, which in turn could add to existent problems 
related to alcohol fuelled antisocial behaviour; 
“because the ADP is now a statutory objector, they can object the same as the Health 
Boards can now, the Public Health can now object to licensing applications, and so too 
can the ADP” (C012) - Cartside Licensing Forum – Cartside. 
Licensing levers were routinely used to coerce third parties (landlords, licensed premises 
etc.,) to control their premises more effectively. However, other third parties such as 
Housing Associations did not appear to be coerced and readily worked with their Police 
partners in order to reduce antisocial behaviour within their communities. Within the 
three case study areas Housing Associations operate across diverse geographic and 
demographic areas. Crawley Housing Association in Cartside operates in a small 
urban/commuter area and has approximately 730 homes (CHA, 2015), while Avon Homes 
have approximately 5000 homes and cover a wide geographical area throughout 
Avonside (including island communities); covering both smaller urban and rural 
communities (AHA, 2015). Burnside Housing Association is the largest Housing 
Association in Burnside and one of the largest across the UK with over 43,000 tenants and 
operates mainly within dense urban areas (BHA, 2015). 
Throughout the UK Housing Associations have been described as independent not for 
profit organisations, governed by voluntary boards, to provide low-cost social housing for 
people in need (Mullins and Murie, 2006). In Scotland they are registered with the 
Scottish Housing Regulator under the Housing (Scotland) Act 200115, and regulated under 
the Scottish Charity Regulator, which operates independently, and furthermore is a Non-
                                                          
15 Scottish Housing Regulator 
http://www.esystems.scottishhousingregulator.gov.uk/register/reg_pub_dsp.home  
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Ministerial Department and part of the Scottish Administration via the Charities and 
Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 200516.  
In all three case study sites Housing Associations have become a key partner in crime 
prevention, mostly concerned with the policing of antisocial behaviour, however it was 
taken a step further in Burnside with the creation of a new ‘Community Improvement 
Partnership’, which will be discussed more fully below.   As a consequence of legislation 
such as the Local Government in Scotland Act 2003 there now exists a statutory 
requirement for the Local Authority, the Police and other relevant agencies to participate 
in community planning; part of which includes the Community Safety Partnership and 
subsequent thematic partnerships such as Antisocial Behaviour Partnerships – according 
to local need (Donnelly, 2008; Fyfe, 2010). One driver towards the policing of antisocial 
behaviour rests within the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003, which placed a new duty 
on the Police and Local authorities to produce and publish antisocial behaviour strategies 
(Fyfe, 2010: 193). The Police tend to be the lead agency in terms of tackling antisocial 
behaviour throughout the UK, however, other actors in the public and private/third 
sector also help to co-ordinate or devise strategies;  
 
“[...] If there's any issues of antisocial behaviour it’s tackled on a multi-agency 
approach, whereas before, maybe going back a few years, the Police would be the lead 
agency on that, and I suppose we're still the lead agency, however, we do it now in 
partnership” (A004) - Senior Police Officer – Avon Isle – Avonside. 
 
Noise pollution (noisy neighbours/loud music etc.,) has long been a source of complaint 
by tenants throughout the UK and a typical third party measure - targeting antisocial 
behaviour in social housing, for example - is eviction or the threat of eviction. Many 
Housing Associations in response to antisocial behaviour legislation have put in place 
measures to tackle disorder;   
 
“Yes, we worked closely with the ASBO group (Antisocial Behaviour Partnership) and 
we managed to... we were successful in evicting a tenant for prolonged antisocial 
behaviour.  We evicted another one for growing cannabis – the group all helped with 
                                                          
16 OSCR ‘About us’ http://www.oscr.org.uk/about/about-oscr  
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that, you know, were supportive, especially the Police” (A010) - Housing Manager – 
Avon Homes – Avon Isle/Avonside.  
Discussions around partnership working and antisocial behaviour within all three case 
study areas was mostly linked to Housing; however, this was more prominent in Burnside 
insofar as a unique partnership was established between the Housing, the Police and the 
Fire Service called the Community Improvement Partnership (CIP). 
 6.2.2 Community Improvement Partnership (CIP) 
In 2010 Burnside Housing Association (BHA) established what has become known as the 
Community Improvement Partnership (CIP) alongside the former Burnside Police and 
Burnside Fire Service (now known as Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue 
Service). The purpose of the partnership was to deal with antisocial behaviour and other 
safety related matters concerning not only the tenants of BHA, but also wider 
environmental issues affecting their properties such as fly-tipping, vandalism and graffiti;   
 “[...] at first when we set it up it was just BHA and the Police, and we also brought the 
Fire in through a different route, we were looking at asset management, and Fire 
Services were part of that. Then we realised to make a better partnership the three of 
us had to work together and so that's that partnership there -  it's a tri-partite 
partnership if you like” (B007) – Burnside Housing Association – Burnside.  
Currently the CIP has eighteen Police personnel seconded to it; twelve constables, two 
sergeants, an inspector and three intelligence officers including an analyst (B007). A 
senior Fire Officer from Burnside also discussed their involvement with CIP; 
“We second two officers into the CIP. We've got a Station Commander in there and a 
Watch Commander. Now we're paying for one, and BHA are paying for the other” 
(B009) - Senior Officer Fire Service – Burnside. 
 In terms of resources all three agencies ‘put different things into the pot’ (B007); and 
funding had been agreed between the partners up to January 2015. When asked who set 
the organisational strategy for the partnership it was stressed that Housing were at the 
forefront of the partnership – tasking meetings were held in each of BHA’s local offices, 
and they “are actually hosted and driven by Housing” (B007). One of the reasons given for 
this was; 
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“ [...] One of the statistics that we know is, when the Police asked people ‘who would 
you tell or report crime to’ and not just crime – ‘nuisance and things that were going 
on in your neighbourhood’,  and 60% said they would tell their Housing Officer and 
only 30% said they would tell the Police” (B007) - Burnside Housing Association – 
Burnside. 
 
The BHA participant indicated that the information passed onto Housing Officers from 
local communities was beneficial to the Police in the sense that it was intelligence they 
otherwise would not have had. They emphasised this by reporting on an ‘Away Day’ for 
staff - where they were joined by the Police. At one seminar Housing Officers and Police 
Officers were asked to write up where they believed their ‘hotspots’ (of crime, antisocial 
behaviour etc.) were to see if it was in the same areas. It turned out they did not match as 
both the Police and Housing were working on different sets of intelligence. The Police 
based their analysis on recorded crime, whereas Housing more likely reported on ‘dark 
crime’ – unreported crime (Hope, 2009). 
 
“So, Housing Officers were going with what tenants told them which was unreported, 
and they (the Police) were going with what was reported. So that was the interesting 
bit for us to say - right there is something here then” (B007) - Burnside Housing 
Association – Burnside. 
 
A Senior Fire Officer also praised intelligence sharing within the CIP. He said that Station 
Commanders go to tasking meetings either weekly or once a fortnight to the Housing 
Office in their area where they just discuss issues and share information (B009).  Some 
statistics were given to support the success of some of the preventative work of the CIP. 
For example, prior to the partnership BHA experienced approximately eight to ten fire 
deaths a year within their housing stock, which was tragic in itself, but also led to high 
costs economically;  
“Each fatality on average cost you about a million and a half pounds. Now the reason 
for that is because of - apart from somebody dying - the ferociousness of the fire for 
that to happen as well, will mean that you've got a lot of work needed done in your 
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property. It could be surrounding properties, taking in Housing officer’s time - 
everybody’s time that's what they say. The last fire that happened in BHA property was 
the 14th of July 2011. So, since the partnership has been established with the Fire 
Service, there has been no fatalities since that date, so that's twenty three months 
with no fatalities” (B007) - Burnside Housing Association – Burnside. 
The sharing of information between these organisations is arguably linked more to a neo-
liberal economic assessment of risk as opposed to a responsibilisation ethos (Carrabine et 
al., 2009), however, a number of crime statistics were listed on the BHA website (6671 
(stop and searches, drug seizures, warrants, ASBOs etc.), which could attest to it also 
being linked to social control strategies (Garland, 2001). Jonathon Simon refers to new 
strategies of control as the ‘actuarial regime’ (cited in Hudson, 2002: 367) – wherein 
those identified as ‘different or dangerous’ (ibid: 367) are excluded from Housing, streets 
or shopping malls.  
The website states that more than 450 home fire safety visits to vulnerable tenants had 
been carried out since July 2011 (BHA, 2015). Furthermore, it was suggested during a 
discussion on effective communication between agencies that staff should be trained to 
spot hazards or issues for other agencies; 
“So for instance, me as a Fire Officer going through the front door the first thing I 
would look at would be the front door - can it lock, is it safe, is it secure, is it fit for 
purpose. Then you would look at the general layout of the house, you would look to 
see if there was poverty issues, health issues and anything else right, then you could 
feed that back” (B009) - Senior Officer Fire Service – Burnside. 
Intelligence about local crime is also passed onto the Police by Housing Officers during 
the weekly tasking meetings; where decisions are made on how to tackle pertinent areas 
of concern. However, it was pointed out that once the intelligence was passed on to the 
Police - Housing effectively ceased to have any more to do with it. This type of 
information from Housing Associations has proven to be invaluable to the Police as 
evidenced by the crime statistics listed in the BHA website. It was also reinforced by an 
Article in Inside Housing - reporting on a CIH (Chartered Institute of Housing) conference 
in Manchester, whereby a former Police Scotland Chief Inspector (who had previously 
worked for the CIP) ‘called for stronger partnerships to be forged between Housing 
189 
 
Associations and local Police Forces’ (Douglas, 2014). He argued that Housing Associations 
held information that was of incredible value to Police Forces, and indicated that he 
wished he had forged a relationship with them at the beginning of his career (Douglas, 
2014). Stating that further assessment had to be made on the information Housing 
Associations held as “there might just be a little golden nugget that they don’t recognise 
the value of” (Douglas, 2014). 
 
Although there are obvious benefits to information sharing within the CIP, there could 
also be a downside; especially within the domain of Third Party Policing. Mazerolle and 
Ransley (2006) for instance assert that there are some social side effects to Third Party 
Policing which are often difficult to measure. For example, while sharing information may 
seem beneficial to some organisations or networks such as the CIP, for other actors this 
may produce some unintended consequences. For instance, Housing Officers passing on 
hearsay evidence on drug dealing, antisocial behaviour or low-level incivility may increase 
intelligence on neighbourhood crime, but it could also draw the attention of the 
authorities onto individuals who may otherwise have escaped attention (Kelly, 2012). This 
net-widening effect further disadvantages certain individuals/groups who are drawn into 
the criminal justice net simply because they live in a targeted area (Mazerolle and 
Ransley, 2006).  
This resonates with labelling theory (Becker, 1963) insofar as it could stigmatise and label 
certain sections of the community, and in the worst case scenario lead to eviction for the 
whole family; not just an offending parent or child (Mazerolle and Ransley, 2006). One 
evaluation on a new system of on the spot fines in England and Wales supported this 
assertion by finding that between half and three quarters of notices listed as ‘new 
business’, were given to people who would not have been otherwise cautioned or 
prosecuted (Halligan-Davis and Spicer, 2004). Other negative aspects include arguments 
that the Police are usurping resources and agendas away from their primary roles and 
purposes, for example by co-opting other agencies to deal with crime instead of focusing 
on their core roles (Mazerolle and Ransley, 2006). Other problems surround the 
disproportionate allocation of policing resources in some areas while ignoring others, 
which could lead to accusations around the legitimacy of the Police (ibid). This is possibly 
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pertinent to the policing of social housing under the remit of BHA in terms of having a 
dedicated policing team. 
There is also the problem that agencies intent on improving the safety of some citizens 
may inadvertently increase further victimisation. For example, in some cases some 
service providers are tasked with noticing other problems in households, such as social 
workers assessing risks associated with domestic or child abuse. This holds true for other 
service providers, such as the Fire Service who enter properties principally to assess fire 
risk, but may also look for other intelligence to ‘feed back’ as noted above (B009).  Not 
only has this the potential to net-widen, but it may also lead to retaliation from a violent 
offender who thinks his/her spouse/partner has reported them to the authorities. This 
leads to obvious ethical questions surrounding placing someone in harm’s way, or 
possible violations of the right to privacy; or questions around accountability in view of 
asking untrained actors to assess risk leading to net-widening (Mazerolle and Ransley, 
2006), which would also be the case in terms of passing on information or ‘intelligence’. 
 
While it was clear that the Police had ease of access to information, this may not be the 
case for the other agencies within CIP. For example, if BHA wanted to have access to 
certain Police intelligence (regarding their properties/tenants) then they would have to 
conform and change their work practices in line with the dominant policing model. This 
created some tension amongst staff within BHA, for instance, in order to comply with 
data protection laws and policing practice an intelligence hub had to be created on BHA 
property. This entailed creating a secure room to store data. While this was not 
structurally insurmountable, the next request has possible repercussions in terms of 
eroding trust within the Community Improvement Partnership; 
 
“The Police wanted to do vetting of the staff that worked for BHA, because they were 
in the partnership. Now we've come to an agreement through the partnership, that 
actually the way the office is laid out and everything we don't need to go through that. 
[...] it was something we had to think about - it was all about the data and how did we 
make sure that all the data was protected” (B007) - Burnside Housing Association – 
Burnside. 
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They were asked if this may have caused some conflict within BHA in terms of members 
of staff being reluctant to being vetted by the Police; 
  
“There was a wee bit of that. I think it was because of the partnership that we were 
able to come to a sort of solution, which did mean the way we are working just now is 
fine. […] What we'll do is we'll agree if anybody new comes into the partnership (CIP) 
to work in that particular location, before they come we will explain that they will need 
to be vetted” (B007) - Burnside Housing Association – Burnside. 
 
Working in close concert with the Police also arguably has the potential to change 
community perceptions around the role and identity of Housing Officers. Flint (2002: 634) 
commenting on a previous study (around the role of Social Housing Agencies in the 
governance of antisocial behaviour) found that concerns were expressed by some 
Housing Officers in relation to providing information to the Police. Especially if it led to 
direct interventions; insofar as, not only was there a need to protect sources, but also in 
relation to agency identities and legitimacy being maintained (ibid: 634).  
 
A key criticism directed towards Third Party Policing tactics concerns the notion of 
accountability. The Police have a legitimate monopoly over the use of force and are held 
accountable by various regulatory bodies both in policing and in government. The 
mechanisms for accountability for policing in Scotland has traditionally been based on a 
balance of power between central, local government and the Chief Constable, however, 
under the new Police Reform Act, this balance may change, which will be discussed next. 
 
  6.3 The Reform of the Police 
 
The Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012; established on the 1st of April 2013 (now 
referred to as the Reform Act) created the single Police Service of Scotland (PSS) – or 
Police Scotland as it is now known (Scott, 2013). Police Scotland takes overall 
responsibility for policing in Scotland and upon its creation was led by Chief Constable 
Stephen House; it is now led by Philip Gormley. Previously governance of the Police 
Service existed under the tripartite arrangement and responsibility was split between 
eight Police forces, the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency (SCDEA), and the 
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Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland, which are now abolished together with 
the Scottish Police Services Authority (SPSA) (Scottish Government, 2014a). The functions 
of the SCDEA and the SPSA will now be absorbed by Police Scotland (Oag, 2012a: 17). This 
previous structure allowed for a form of accountability based on an equilibrium of 
interests, between central, local government and the Chief Constable (Scott, 2013: 142), 
whereas now, governance and oversight of Police Scotland will exist under the new 
Scottish Police Authority (SPA).  
 
Some early evidence from a qualitative study (in progress) jointly conducted by the 
Scottish Institute for Policing Research (SIPR) and by ScotCen Social Research, as part of 
the highly regarded annual Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, has Indicated that reform has 
brought with it some significant changes in ‘style and approach’ especially for Local 
Authorities (Anderson et al., 2014:6). For example, as Local Authorities have now lost 
their statutory responsibilities for policing, the perception is that they are now in a 
weaker position in terms of influence. The study found that Local Authorities are still 
trying to develop their new roles in terms of local scrutiny and engagement, especially in 
“relation to the production of Local Police Plans” (Anderson et al., 2014:6). There are also 
issues emerging surrounding national policing priorities and local priorities. For example, 
the study highlights how in some areas national and local priorities appear to be closely 
aligned, while in some other areas a tension has arisen between what is perceived as a 
national agenda compared to a local one. For instance, a national agenda focused on 
crimes of violence as opposed to some local concerns about other types of criminality, 
such as property crime (Anderson et al., 2014:6). 
 
The Reform Act may have a significant impact on local government accountability with 
regards to local policing, which in turn may impact on local community accountability 
with regard to community engagement. Therefore those sections of the Reform Act that 
have an impact on local scrutiny and accountability will be briefly examined below.  
 6.3.1 The Reform Act – Policing Principles 
For the first time in Scottish policing history the new Police Service of Scotland (PSS) will 
have to abide by a set of guiding principles designed to recognise the significance of 
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partnership working as a key element of policing17 (Scott, 2012: 136; Apex Scotland, 2013: 
9). The principles will also underpin the importance of localism, and improve the safety 
and wellbeing of citizens within localities and communities (Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015: 531). 
Furthermore, the principles highlight that the PSS should be accessible to and engage 
with local communities, although how accessibility and engagement is to be determined 
is very much in the hands of the Chief Constable and Local Commanders. The PSS already 
consult with local communities through annual consultations and what they describe as 
Police and Communities Meetings (PACTS);  
 
“Yes, well it starts at the ground level with Police and communities meeting, where 
community Police officers - Constables will meet with members of the community on a 
daily basis and work out what their issues are. So that will either  - at a Police 
community officers surgery, or one of these things that we call PACTS and basically you 
can have one of these on a street corner if you want” (B003) – Police Chief Inspector – 
Safe Group – Burnside.    
 
In light of the speed of the reform process it could be argued that the new Police plans 
have been put together fairly quickly, which could raise issues around the consultation 
process. Newburn (2002: 111) commenting on Police consultations in England and 
Wales18 states that when they are conducted quickly ‘time pressures’ often make it 
difficult to consult with ‘hard to reach’ groups, which in turn raises questions regarding 
social inclusion and representation within communities (Phillips, 2002; Myhill, 2007; 
Harkin, 2015). Especially, representation from groups of young people that seem to be 
the target of stop and search initiatives, or for noise complaints related to antisocial 
behaviour, or indeed those on the fringes of society, such as the homeless, or people with 
a disability (Myhill, 2007). As one senior Police officer admitted; 
 
“It’s getting meaningful consultation, I think that's probably the issue, you know, do 
we consult enough” (B012) - Police Superintendent – NWCPP/ADP/One Burnside.  
However, another senior Police officer from Burnside seemed to suggest that 
consultations were representative;  
                                                          
17 Section 32: Policing Principles http://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2012/8/section/32/enacted  
18 In reference to Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships 
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“we don't just ‘willy nilly’ go along to all the groups that are the Police fans and ask 
them to give us - or ask people to tell us how good we are, that's not going to achieve 
anything” (B003) – Police Chief Inspector – Safe Group – Burnside.    
There has been much written surrounding the apparent lack of community involvement 
in local policy decisions which may have a direct impact on local communities. Many 
reasons have been cited ranging from public apathy to the difficulty of breaking down 
organisational/cultural barriers within multi-agency partnership working.  Head (2007: 
443), states that there has been an international trend towards a more society centred 
form of social democracy since the late 1980s. At the national level it is linked to a more 
participatory approach as governments recognise the need to share responsibility for a 
myriad of complex social issues, or so called ‘wicked issues’.  This has culminated in the 
belief that there are benefits associated with involving local citizens in identifying and 
tackling local problems, which in turn helps to build social capital (Head, 2007: 443).  
One Police participant in Burnside had mentioned that one obvious route for consultation 
was through Community Councils, or through elected representatives or surveys (B005), 
which may take place within local communities, or through the CPP process.  This could 
be problematic on two counts: firstly, in terms of Community Councils/PACTS opinions (as 
previously suggested) may be based on a small unrepresentative sample of local 
communities (Myhill, 2007; Harkin, 2015: 736); and secondly at more formalised 
procedures, such as CPP/CSP meetings, there are arguments around an inequality of 
power and knowledge that tends to favour the Police above citizens, insofar as 
community representatives may bow before the wisdom of the Police (Harkin, 2015: 
737). This comment about community consultation from a senior Police officer in Avon 
Isle, would suggest that the Police already have solid opinions on what the problems are 
within a given locality;  
  
“It’s literally Police officers with clipboards standing in prominent locations once a year 
asking the public questions; ‘what do you see as being the issues that affect your 
community’, basically they're asked what do they see... the Police know, well we think 
we know what we should be addressing, however, we ask the public to see - and 
they're generally - to be honest the same, they're very close” (A004) - Senior Police 
Officer – Avon Isle – Avonside.   
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It has been argued that consultations (either through surveys, focus groups, or through e-
participation etc.,) as a form of participatory democracy within complex governance 
structures, often amount to little more than tokenism (Pollock and Sharp, 2012). Ercan 
and Hendriks (2013: 427) argue that tokenism is embedded in a particular form of 
localism usually associated with local citizen committees constructed from ‘self-selected’ 
volunteers (Community Councils), which arguable are devoid of any real power, or are 
used to “rationalise established power through some degree of shared governance”.  The 
concept of tokenism is mostly associated with Arnstein’s (1969: 2) ‘Ladder of Citizen 
Participation’ in which rungs three, four, and five out of eight (informing, consultation, 
and placation) refer to citizens being allowed to hear and be heard but lack the power to 
ensure that their views will be taken into consideration by the powerful – rung eight 
being citizen control.  
This resonates with comments from Taylor (1998) when he wrote about the 1968 Town 
and Country Planning Act in the UK, whereby a special parliamentary group was set up to 
examine how to secure participation from the public. Taylor argued that the conclusion 
reached by the committee was that decisions must remain with trained officers 
(planners), which basically meant that participation translated as peripheral consultation 
rather than active decision making (cited in Astrom et al., 2011: 573). The same could 
arguably be true for Police consultations. Police consultations may genuinely try to 
engage with local communities, or they could be as suggested by some, a ‘tick the box’ 
exercise, based on the assumption that the Police have already decided what their 
priorities will be. Under the Reform Act the Police must follow a particular legislated path 
with regards to Strategic Priorities, and the Strategic and Annual Police Plans, which in 
turn will arguably have an impact on Local Authorities in terms of consultation and 
contribution.  
For example, Government Ministers set the strategic priorities for the SPA (taking into 
account the Policing Principles) and consulting with both the SPA, the  Chief Constable, 
and ‘such persons as appears to them to be representative of Local Authorities’; and ‘such 
other persons as they consider appropriate’. Ultimately, a copy of the strategic priorities, 
the Strategic Police Plan, and the Annual Police Plan must be laid before the Scottish 
Parliament (Legislation.gov.uk, 2012). This is a significant change in terms of Police 
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accountability, for instance, it means that unlike the previous tripartite arrangements, the 
Scottish Parliament has a statutory voice in terms of Police accountability. They can if 
they so wish, summon the Chief Constable and the SPA to be questioned on any relevant 
matters that may arise (Scott, 2013: 143). Furthermore, the Strategic Police Plan must 
also obtain the views of ‘persons whom it considers likely to have an interest in policing’ 
and involve the Chief Constable (Legislation.gov.uk, 2012). A draft copy is sent to each 
Local Authority, and persons it considers likely to have an interest in the plan, whereupon 
recipients are invited to comment within a reasonable period the SPA specifies. The plan 
is then given to Scottish Ministers for approval and a copy is laid before the Scottish 
Parliament. The Annual Police Plan (prepared by the Chief Constable) must take into 
account the Strategic Police Plan and once prepared send a copy to the SPA for comments 
within a specified time, thereafter the published plan is also laid before the Scottish 
Parliament (ibid). 
There have been questions around just how local will local policing become, and how 
much input will Local Authorities have in setting the strategies and priorities for their local 
areas. Traditionally Local Authorities have been linked to policing since the late 18th 
century, however now that Police Boards have been abolished the task of holding the 
Chief Constable to account, and overseeing resources for policing within a local area has 
passed onto the SPA, leaving the Local Authority, some would argue, with very little voice 
(Scott, 2012; Fyfe, 2014). 
 6.3.2 Local Authorities 
Under the previous tripartite arrangements Local Authorities had a say in the direction of 
policing within their local areas, they not only ensured that resources were made 
available for policing, but they also conveyed policing concerns from the local electorate 
to the Chief Constable of the local force area (Scott, 2012: 137). Now however, the extent 
of how much input they may have in local policing has become a source of tension. For 
example the Reform Act states that a copy of the Strategic Police Plan must be sent to 
Local Authorities whereupon they are invited to comment (Legislation.gov.uk, 2012), 
however, it does not specify what will happen if they disagree with the plan, a point also 
highlighted by Oag, (2012a) and Scott, (2012;2013). Fyfe (2014:10) also point to another 
potential area of tension with regards to Local Policing Plans which have to take into 
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account the national Strategic Police Plan, but also any priorities identified by CPPs. A 
tension potentially exists “around the balance between a ‘bottom up’ and a ‘top down’ 
approach to setting local priorities and objectives” (Fyfe, 2014: 10). 
There exists under section 45 of the Reform Act a scrutiny role for Local Authorities 
whereupon they can ‘monitor and provide feedback to the Local Commander on the 
policing of its area’ (Legislation.gov.uk, 2012). Feedback may include forwarding their 
views of any local policing matters, recommend improvements, and specify measures it 
wishes the Local Commander to include in the Local Police Plan. However, under 
subsection (6) a request may be referred up to the Chief Constable if the Local 
Commander thinks the requirement ‘might prejudice the carrying out of any operation by 
the PSS or the prosecution of offenders’ (ibid). This means in effect that any Local 
Authority requests can essentially be vetoed by the Chief Constable if he so wishes, 
further removing some oversight from Local Authority purview. Terpstra and Fyfe (2015: 
532) argue that although the Reform Act entails ‘local policing’ the ‘institutional 
infrastructure’ in place for the local governance of the Police is weak. It has in effect 
moved from governance to what is now referred to as scrutiny and engagement (ibid: 
534). 
 6.3.3 Scrutiny of the Police 
A scrutiny committee has been established under the new remodeled community 
planning structure in Burnside, called the Safe Burnside Group, and it is a sub-group of 
the of CPP Strategic Board, and able to co-opt suitable persons to assist in its function. Its 
main role is to scrutinize and review the Police and Fire and Rescue plans and the Safer 
Communities plans (Burnside, 2014b). When the Safe Burnside group first came into 
existence there was some confusion amongst its members as to its specific function. A 
number of participants when asked if it was to replace the function of the now defunct 
CSP within Burnside; often referred to it in relation to scrutiny of the two services only. 
However, at the Safe Burnside Group meeting on the 22nd of August 2013, it became 
apparent that not everyone was clear on their new roles within the remodeled CPP 
structure, including the roles and remit of those involved on the Safe Burnside Board; 
discussions took place regarding the changing role of the group and how they would have 
to think beyond the role of scrutiny (Safe Group Partnership meeting 22/8/13). This is 
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probably related to a lack of guidance within the Reform Act, as local scrutiny structures 
and processes have been left up to each Local Authority to decide on; with the result that 
different layers and forms of scrutiny now exist across the 32 Local Authority areas 
(Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015). 
For example, in Cartside scrutiny of the Police, Fire and public safety now exists under the 
“Public Safety Sub-Committee” (C011). In Avon Isle there appeared to be some confusion 
regarding the existence of a scrutiny committee or its function, for instance, the local 
Councillor at first said they did not have one, and then was unsure if they did saying “[…] 
If they have they haven’t told me, but then they haven’t told me a lot of things” (A008). In 
this case there appears to be a disconnect between the local and the local - between a 
mainland Council area in Avonside and this Councillor on Avon Isle itself, who seemed to 
be operating within a sort of silo mentality, insofar as they all had their own committees 
and jobs to do, and generally left the policing to the Police – albeit with perfunctory 
consultation within the CSP and through its thematic groups. However, the local 
Community Safety Co-ordinator stated that the Local Authority and its elected members 
would perform this function through the “Performance Review and Scrutiny Committee” 
(A001 – 1st).  
There appeared to be some ambivalence towards the new scrutiny arrangements 
amongst some elected members within the case study areas around the perception of a 
loss of localism. The following quote is quite lengthy, but it may explain some of the 
disquiet amongst Local Authorities;   
“[…] in the past you had separate Police authorities that would then be responsible for 
scrutinising and holding the Chief Constable and a force to account...the Police 
Authority would then hold the Chief Constable ultimately and the force to account for 
any budgetary demands, also for operational issues etc., without going into detail of 
individual operations of course but in a general term. Now with the single force you've 
still got a Scottish Police Authority, but that's not really accountable to Local 
Authorities or to the communities, it’s more accountable to the Scottish Parliament […] 
But, the scrutiny is completely on a different level, it’s not that we can decide what 
their budgets are, we can't determine what they should be doing. Obviously what we 
can do is try and sit down and agree what we believe for the City and on a localised 
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level, the Local Policing Plans and Local Fire Plans, and make an input in that sense, but 
a proper scrutiny I would say is lacking from the current set up” (B015) - Councillor – 
Burnpark Area Partnership – Burnside.   
 
The Councillor did say they had an input up to a degree to get their point across about 
certain issues, but it was the Police who finalise the document that they believe reflect 
the greatest needs of a specific local area (B015). It is clear that Local Authorities have 
lost significant input in terms of local accountability when it comes to setting local 
priorities and improving funding for specific policing initiatives. There was also a concern 
that Police priorities may not converge with Council priorities and if this is the case how 
will an agreement be obtained. However, the Chair of the Safe Group intimated that the 
Police could change their plans if asked;  
“When they were drawing up the first plans for Burnside under the new structure […] 
they got a lot of comments, and they changed it, believe it or not. One of the big ones 
was hate crime; we felt there wasn't enough priority given to hate crime […] So, the 
cops took it away and came back and said they would reword it to make sure that was 
in there, which was good” (B006) - Councillor – Chair Safe Group/Chair VAW – 
Burnside.   
It was clear that some form of Scrutiny Committees and Groups were being established 
within the case study areas, however, there were still concerns being expressed around 
accountability and a loss of localism with regard to the governance of policing in 
particular. 
 6.3.4 Local Policing and Multi-Member Ward Plans 
The topic of ‘local policing’ had become an area of tension, with some participants 
expressing concerns about the possible loss of local accountability. This perceived loss of 
localism was highlighted by a number of participants within the case study areas. For 
instance, a Licensing Standards Officer in Avonside (who was also a former senior Police 
officer) admitted he was against a national Police service; 
“[...] For me there is a lot of negatives about going national in my personal 
opinion...basically, it is with the point of view that everything is determined from the 
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centre […] there's no kind of local decision making at all, there's no autonomy” (A015) - 
Licensing Standards Officer – Avonside.   
However, according to the PSS they have taken into account local sensibilities, and they 
have in essence gone a step further than what was required within the Reform Act, and 
this was pointed out by a senior Police officer in Burnside who discussed how the former 
Chief Constable Stephen House had volunteered to provide Multi-Member Ward Plans 
alongside Local Policing Plans – a point also highlighted in the Apex Scotland Annual 
Lecture (Apex Scotland, 2013: 3); 
“[…] So what you've got is a Police Scotland Plan for the whole of Scotland - a strategy. 
You've got 32 Local Policing Plans for each individual divisional area to cover the 
Councils, and then Multi-Member Ward Plans. So there's 36 Multi-Member Ward Plans 
for the Burnside Police area [...]” (B003)  Police Chief Inspector– Safe Group – 
Burnside. 
 
In essence the PSS will have 32 Local and 353 Multi-Member Ward Plans (MMWP) 
alongside the Annual Plan (ibid; SPA, 2013), which also take into account the Scottish 
Government Strategic Priorities and the SPA three year Strategic Police Plan 
(Legislation.gov.uk, 2012). See Table 6; which lists out the priorities for each plan during 
2013-14. As you can see many of the objectives match up, with a couple of slight 
variations or outliers in the MMWP, but even then, they are ostensibly similar priorities. 
Avon Isle for example, has road safety as one of its priorities; despite the fact it has been 
acknowledged as not an issue on Avon Isle (Police Scotland, 2014a).   
 
Table 6: Annual, Local and Multi-Member Ward Policing Plans 2013-14 
Police 
Scotland 
Annual 
Police 
 Plan 
2013/14 
 Five ‘Golden 
threads’ 
 affecting all 
communities 
Reducing 
violence 
crime and 
antisocial 
behaviour  
(ASB) 
Reducing 
road 
casualties 
and 
fatalities  
 
Protecting 
people at 
their most 
vulnerable 
(particularly 
victims of 
domestic 
abuse and 
children 
Dealing 
professionally 
with major 
events and 
crimes 
 
Contributing 
to a resilient 
Scotland 
 
  
Main  
Objectives of 
Annual 
Police Plan 
Violence, 
Disorder 
and ASB 
Protecting 
the public 
Road safety 
and road 
crime 
Serious 
organised 
crime and 
Terrorism 
Major 
events and 
resilience 
Public 
confidence 
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Avonside 
LPP  
2013-2014 
Violence. 
Disorder 
and ASB 
 
Protecting 
people 
 
Acquisitive 
and road 
crime 
 
Serious crime 
and 
responding to 
national 
events 
 
 Increase 
public 
confidence 
and local 
engagement 
 
 
Avon Isle  
MMWP 
 Nov 2013 
 
Violence 
and ASB 
 
Public 
Protection 
 
Road Safety 
and 
Enforcement 
 
Major crime 
and Terrorism 
 
  Acquisitive 
Crime 
 
 
Burnside LPP  
2013-2014 
 
Tackling 
violence, 
disorder 
and ASB 
 
Protecting 
People 
 
 Tackling  
Serious 
Organised 
Crime  
 
 
and 
responding 
to National 
Events 
Increasing 
Public 
Confidence 
and Local 
Engagement 
 
 
Burnpark  
and City 
 MMWP 
 Nov 2013 
 
 
Assault 
and 
violent 
crime 
 
Drunk and 
disorderly 
behaviour 
 
 Drug use and 
drug dealing 
 
  House-
breaking  
and theft 
 
Cartside  LPP  
2013-2014 
 
ASB, 
Disorder 
and 
violence, 
Tackling 
Domestic 
abuse 
 
 
Protecting 
the public 
 
Road policing 
and road 
crime 
 
Serious  
Organised 
Crime  
Groups 
 
 Community 
confidence 
and 
engagement 
 
 
Cartside East 
MMWP  
Nov 2013 
 
ASB, 
Violent 
crime 
 
 
Protecting 
people 
and places 
 
Making roads 
safer 
 
 
Disrupting 
organised 
crime 
 
  Crimes of 
dishonesty 
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The PSS have said that they consult with the local public and Local Authorities in terms of 
setting their strategic priorities and objectives. It has also been highlighted by some Police 
participants that they would not put in place a ‘one size fits all’ type of plan - also 
highlighted in the Apex Scotland Annual Lecture (Apex Scotland, 2013: 2) - though on the 
face of it, the plans are fairly similar. The three case study sites are a mixture of dense 
urban, smaller urban/commuter, and small/urban remote/island communities, and it was 
quite clear that some participants were concerned that the new single service may not 
take this into account; particularly in Avon Isle. There was also a perception by some that 
as the former Chief Constable was from Strathclyde – the largest force in Scotland, and 
one of the largest forces throughout the UK, that what was happening to the PSS was a 
form of ‘Strathclydification’ (Fyfe, 2014), insofar as the Strathclyde model of policing had 
become the template for the whole of Scotland or as the former Police officer from 
Avonside now referred to it as; 
 
“It is kind of Strathclyde versus the rest of the world now - it's kind of StrathGlasgow 
that runs Scotland if that makes sense at all” (A015) - Licensing Standards Officer – 
Avonside.  
 
However, in Avonside ‘a one size fits all’ policing approach was generally thought not to 
be possible due to the difference in geographic areas; especially island communities. One 
representative from the voluntary sector on Avon Isle CSP claimed; 
 
“I don't think in an area like Avon Isle they can allow that to happen, because I worked 
with the Police for nine years in the island and local knowledge is absolutely 
everything. Especially on the islands, because Police officers can't disappear at night to 
go and live somewhere else the way they can in the mainland, they have to live side by 
side, so they could be standing having a quiet drink in a bar next to the guy that they'd 
locked up the night before” (A002) – Rape Crisis – Avonside.   
 
When you have a hierarchical organisation such as the Police then performance 
management can become an issue, with many commentators asserting that policing in 
many aspects has become performance by numbers, or a tick the box exercise. Fyfe 
(2014: 11) argues that over two thirds of Local Authority areas have since the 1st of April 
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2013 increased substantially their stop and search activity, with some areas having an 
increase of 400%. This in turn prompted the SPA to launch a scrutiny review on the 
practice, which recommended that the PSS must ensure a balancing act between search 
powers and the rights of individuals (Fyfe, 2014: 11). Trying to find a balancing act 
between reactive policing and community engagement was discussed by a representative 
of the third sector in Burnside; 
 
“I think there are likely to be a number of national policing initiatives which will then 
show up in many localities. So if I could take as an example of that - Strathclyde Police 
had for a number of years quite a proactive strategy around stop and search.  […] we 
probably see an increase of that stop and search strategy now being rolled out across 
Scotland.  Now that obviously has implications on a localism agenda because if you’ve 
got a national strategy which is around stop and search and maybe quite proactive, 
while at the same time you’re trying to develop a localism community engagement 
strategy, then those don’t always match easily with one another […]” (B010) - Chair of 
Third Sector Forum/SCPP – Burnside. 
Although there has been a renewed scrutiny on the role of stop and search activity it has 
none the less still been rolled out across Scotland, and as you can see from table 7 below, 
only a small percentage of the searches were consensual. The positive searches were in 
the main related to drugs or alcohol and a total of 226 weapons were found, and only one 
non-positive search was related to terrorism (Police Scotland, 2016); 
 
Table 7: Stop and Search Quarterly report April-Sept. 2016 
 
 Statutory Consensual Positive Search 
Avonside 458 25 110 
Burnside 7503 274 1822 
Cartside 318 16 125 
Force total 20665 888 6708 
Source: Police Scotland (2016) 
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In terms of community engagement this could have a negative impact on local 
communities as one participant from Burnside stressed; 
 
“[…] they can have something like one in five of the people they stop are carrying an 
offensive weapon. Now I have said or would say back to that, that means that four out 
of five aren’t and you wouldn’t get elected on being 20% right. So we should be able to 
be more intelligent” (B010) - Chair of Third Sector Forum/SCPP – Burnside.   
 
The re-structure of PSS was also thought to affect some communities more than others, 
for example, plans to restructure policing in Avon Isle caused a lot of upset within the 
local community. One major cause for concern was the removal of the senior Police 
Inspector post from the island. Policing was to be dealt with remotely from the mainland. 
This annoyed most of the islanders who thought they were being treated unfairly in terms 
of a) they would be losing a valuable colleague/neighbour, and b) a senior Police officer to 
deal with any major incidents.  
 
This issue was discussed at a packed Area CPP meeting on the 3rd of December 2013, 
whereupon the Police officer in attendance tried to assure the islanders that they would 
be perfectly able to direct policing from the mainland. This angered more than a few local 
Community Councillors at the meeting, who thought that the Police were trying to change 
their borders without informing or consulting locally, one Community Councillor declared 
that this sounded like the issue was already a ‘fait accompli –  despite consultation’ (Avon 
Isle Area CPP meeting, 2013).  
They argued that the Police were failing to take into account the stretch of water or boats 
being cut off if they had an incident (the island is 30 minutes from the mainland by ferry); 
particularly if the weather was bad, which highlights the difficulties of commanding an 
emergency remotely (Avon Isle Area CPP meeting, 2013).  
However, the Police spokesperson said they had a Police Officer trained in response, and 
they were confident that they could deal with emergencies and remote control; further 
adding that this was not about one man – it was about the whole structure. Nonetheless, 
it was felt by the community that a desk sergeant was not a suitable replacement for an 
experienced Police Inspector (Avon Isle Area CPP meeting, 2013). Furthermore, Police 
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Scotland admits in their Local Policing Plan for the area that incidents happening in 
remote areas and islands, which are only ‘accessible during the day in good weather 
present unique policing challenges’ (Police Scotland, 2013a: 14). This was discussed by 
the former Police officer in Avonside, who had previously worked on the island; 
“It's a busy, busy island, and although it doesn't appear to be on thousands of calls, 
they are busy - the officers there - and they do need leadership, and the sergeants 
need leadership as well ,and they're not going to get that from somebody that stays in 
Ridgeway (on the mainland), and that's from personal experience […]” (A015) - 
Licensing Standards Officer – Avonside.    
An elected Councillor in Cartside who at first praised the new structure on the grounds 
that is was questionable as to just how effective the old Board structure actually was, 
nonetheless also criticised a lack of consultation between the Police and the Council over 
actions taken on Public Counters in particular;  
“[…] when Police Scotland took the decision to review the Public Counters I don't think 
there was enough advance consultation on that with elected members, and indeed 
when they're talking about withdrawing Wardens in terms of parking […] there wasn’t 
enough consultation regarding that and that is to be regretted […]” (C014) - Councillor 
– Community Planning and Regeneration Committee – Cartside. 
It is clear that there are a few teething problems in terms of the new structures, which 
could result in some increased tension between the national and local governance of 
community safety, both in terms of accountability and a perceived loss of localism, which 
was more apparent in Avonside and Cartside. However, one elected Councillor in 
Burnside thought communities would now have more of a chance to discuss Local Police 
Plans;  
“Under the old structure where we had Area Committees we didn't see the local plans 
so this is new that they are going to have these Local Police Plans and discussed at that 
level, and I think that's really positive, because it does bring community voices in more 
to sit round the table, to be discussing those things. They did previously do 
questionnaires to ask the public and they still do that, but there wasn't really a forum 
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for discussion about the outcomes before they were finalised, so I think that is really 
positive” (B004) - Councillor – Safe Group/CSB Chair – Burnside.  
Nonetheless, bringing community voices round a table to discuss things will only be 
pertinent if they are actually heard and their concerns are duly noted and acted on in 
Local Police Plans. One other area of concern was highlighted in Burnside in relation to 
tensions that may occur between national and local agendas, not so much around a 
disagreement of priorities, but more to do with a national policing agenda failing to 
engage with localities, which does further add fuel to the fire around a loss of localism;  
“One of the things that I've noticed that has kind of happened is that some officers I 
think have been moved to a Police Scotland perspective and what we’re getting is 
there's a bit of a... how would you put it, there's a bit of a kind of gap in partnership 
working between what's happening at a national level and what's happening at a local 
level, and the impact of that can be quite significant [...] So for example the ‘No Knives 
Better Lives’ campaign, they were doing street stencilling which we've a zero tolerance 
for in Burnside, but it’s almost like there's a national agenda now and that's not 
filtering down to a local level” (B020) - Chair of City Centre Alcohol Action Group – 
Burnside. 
 
Prioritising national agendas ahead of local ones could lead to a perception that there is 
less local accountability, less local input, which could have consequences in terms of an 
erosion of trust between communities and local partnerships. The PSS may argue that this 
is not the case. However, this last section will examine some areas of concern with regard 
to community accountability in the governance of community safety. 
 
  6.4 Community Accountability  
 
Pollock and Sharp (2012: 3063), point out that there has been a desire from central 
government throughout the UK to ‘revive civic society’ by putting power and control in 
the hands of communities.  In Westminster in 2008 there was the launch of ‘Communities 
in control: real people, real power’, followed in 2009 by the Scottish Government when 
they launched their action plan on ‘community empowerment’. These initiatives grew 
from deep concerns regarding citizen apathy and the belief that including communities in 
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decision- making would have a real impact on society; hence the push towards active 
citizenship especially within the confines of community planning, crime and disorder or 
Community Safety Partnerships. 
 
However, despite the political rhetoric there has been widespread criticism directed 
towards the extent of any real community engagement. In Scotland, for example, one of 
the key findings of the Christie Commission was that there is a need to put ‘communities 
at the heart of community planning and public service reform’ (Audit Scotland, 2013a: 
19), this was aimed towards CPPs in particular. Not only were services to be redesigned 
around the needs of citizens, but they were also to involve local communities and their 
elected representatives, and above all be democratically accountable to the people of 
Scotland (S.G., 2011b: 81). Christie was not advocating for a new direction within 
community planning, rather he was identifying that one of the key aims from the original 
statutory guidance for CPPs was not being met, for example, ensuring people and 
communities are genuinely engaged around decisions on public services, which may have 
a direct effect on them (Scottish Executive, 2004: 1).  
 6.4.1 Community engagement/consultation 
Davidson and Elstub (2014) writing on deliberative and participatory democracy in the UK 
have argued that people are becoming disillusioned and disenfranchised by the prevailing 
political institutions and decision making practices; this has been evidenced by the 
marked decline in voter turnout and trust in politicians in general (ibid). If Politicians are 
to regain the trust of local communities then there would have to be a real effort to 
encourage citizens to engage more in political decision making. For this to happen, it has 
been implied that power has to be decentralised from the top levels of government down 
to the Local Authority/community level, at which point individuals may be able to 
influence issues which affect their local community (Patsias et al., 2013). 
It could be argued that within the concept of participatory democracy there are varying 
degrees or levels of community engagement within local governance structures. Many 
policy documents post Christie refer to the importance of engagement, but are quite 
ambiguous in terms of its implementation. For example the Scottish Government 
Statement of Ambition stresses the value of solid foundations for CPPs based on 
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understanding their communities by being able to “provide genuine opportunities to 
consult, engage and involve them” (Scottish Government, 2012d), however, it does not 
comment on the extent or level of engagement this should entail. The same could be said 
for the Audit Scotland report ‘Responding to Challenges and Change – An overview of 
Local Government in Scotland’ (Audit Scotland, 2013c). However, while it does not go so 
far as to suggest how CPPs should engage, it does assert that there is a variability in the 
effectiveness of community engagement whereupon there is a failure to link up 
engagement activity and consultation with decision making in order to improve services 
(Audit Scotland, 2013c: 10). 
This was evident within some of the case study sites when key stakeholders were asked 
about the levels of community engagement within CSPs. The concept of engagement took 
on various forms ranging from direct engagement to it being indirectly facilitated through 
various actors/groups or agencies, as this participant from Avonside explained; 
“So for example, Avonside Police they carry out community surveys, they attend local 
Tenants’ and Residents’ Groups in relation to local neighbourhood issues, so that's 
intelligence and information that they will feed into the community safety planning 
process. Housing Associations obviously through their work with Tenants’ and 
Residents’ Groups and their own service delivery will feed in their knowledge and 
information, so it's based upon community engagement, but in some ways is maybe 
indirect [...]” (A001 - 1st) - Community Safety Co-ordinator – Avonside.  
Key community safety issues were incorporated within the Avonside SOA, which were 
adjudged to have been selected through a ‘bottom up’ process (A001 - 1st). However, in 
terms of engagement ‘bottom up’ can be quite an ambiguous term. For example, it could 
imply that there is direct engagement with the community or it could be through various 
street level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980). When asked if it was bottom up in terms of a 
community group being involved with the CSP it was stated that various partners 
provided data and added information from their own individual perspectives and that 
information was then analysed. However, they also took into account engagement via the 
local Area Community Planning Groups (through which it was thought led to a strong 
decentralised community focus on services) and by individual services with groups such as 
Tenants’ and Residents’ Association’s in Community Councils and so on. Community 
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engagement in this sense is basically being filtered through third party organisations or 
the public/private sector, as the previous participant states;  
“[...] engagement isn't necessarily the CSP as an entity directly engaging, but it's fed 
into - rather than replicating engagement that takes place already in different shapes 
and forms” (A001 - 1st) - Community Safety Co-ordinator – Avonside.   
The CPP Partnership Manager in Cartside stated that community consultative groups 
engaged with communities at the early level of the CPP; because they needed to engage 
strategically. This took place through Area Community Planning Forums; which are made 
up of representatives from Community Councils, Regeneration Groups, Development 
Trusts and other local groups. Community engagement did not seem to take place 
through these forums in a structured or consistent fashion, for example, it was stated;  
 
“We would use them if we want to talk to our communities, we would use then as a 
stepping off point if you like [...] i.e. If we wanted to go and talk to them about the new 
SOA, we would request through the local group whether or not they want to hear it 
basically. And that very often is a jumping off point” (C001 - 1st) - Community Planning 
Partnership Manager – Cartside.   
 
When asked how they specifically consult around community safety it was stated “What 
we do around community safety is pretty much reactive actually” (C001 - 1st). In other 
words if a local community wanted to find out what was happening in terms of alcohol 
and drugs in their local area, then a member of the Alcohol and Drug Partnership would 
go out to speak to them;  
 
“I think it does need to be a little much more proactive and that's very much where we 
see our implementation of the next SOA, is much more about where we've got to this 
point, we think these are areas of activity we need to get better at, how can we work 
together to improve those [...]” (C001 - 1st) - Community Planning Partnership 
Manager – Cartside.  
 
Community engagement in Avonside and Cartside (with respect to community safety) 
was arguably based more on the occasional consultative level, as opposed to a more fully 
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devolved form of participatory democracy/active citizenship. One criticism levelled at this 
type of engagement views it as merely ‘tokenistic’ in gesture (Arnstein, 1969; Ercan and 
Hendriks, 2013). In Burnside, as previously reported, organisational reform within the 
community planning process had attempted to improve community engagement insofar 
as local communities (at least in terms of representation from Community Councils) were 
not only being heard, but that they also had a voice and a vote on local planning 
decisions; 
 
“I think if it beds in and you get that engagement,  in other words people can see that 
what they say locally does happen [...] you can change the way services are by the way 
Police are in there, or Fire and Rescue whatever, because you've got them round that 
table” (B006) - Councillor – Chair Safe Group/Chair VAW – Burnside.  
  
Having discussions round a table may improve communication between different 
actors/organisations and local community representatives, but it does not necessarily 
mean that those organisations will change their strategic objectives. For instance, in 
Burnside Community Council representatives have voting rights on Area Partnerships and 
sectoral CPPs (but not at the strategic level). However having a voice and a vote and being 
able to exercise that privilege is very much dependant on the capabilities (or social 
capital) of each individual, particularly if the vote is not always left open to deliberation;  
 
“The last meeting the non-Council reps didn't have a lot to say, and I think they need 
to sort of find their voice as well, cause (sic) they've got an equal say and they've got a 
vote” (B011) - Councillor – Chair of NWCPP – Burnside.  
 
“I've only been involved in two occasions so far where we've went to a vote [...] but 
they've made it quite clear that... if we’re going to have votes on issues that are 
extremely small all the time we’re going to be there all day and all night, so a lot of it 
will be literally put through on round the table nod […]” (B013) - Community Councillor 
Burnwood CC – Burnside.  
It is clear that Community Councillors have a voice in Burnside (to an extent), however it 
can also potentially be shaped by knowledgeable others; 
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“We are all instructed basically to avoid a vote at all costs, because we’ll need to go 
ahead on the basis of consensus […] so what we do is we try and get agreement of a 
way forward is probably the best way to describe it” (B011) - Councillor – Chair of 
NWCPP – Burnside.  
 
Pollock and Sharp (2012:3066) comment on how the institutional mechanisms in which 
communities are engaged and empowered in the first place, often act as a mode of 
subjection, in that they ‘encourage alignment with institutional and government 
objectives’ (ibid: 3066). If community representatives within Burnside CPP framework 
truly mean to affect change and become active citizens then they will need to develop a 
stronger voice at partnership meetings in order to ensure active participation within the 
decision making process. Nonetheless, they did appear to have more of a voice within the 
community planning process in Burnside compared to Avonside and Cartside, who did not 
(at the time of the interviews) have a vote at any level of the community planning 
process. In the Cartside CSP there did not appear to be any representatives from the 
community, and the Area Commander for the Police in Cartside (who also chairs the CSP) 
confirmed that currently no Community Council were represented on the CSP, but added;  
 
 “For the Partnership Group of the new CPP there's going to be ten community 
representative groups and five elected members.  So the elected members essentially 
are the Chairs of the Community Councils in the main, and if that's not the case then 
the community partners themselves will, so essentially the Community Councils will be 
represented on the groups that report to the Community Planning Partnership” (C011) 
- Area Commander Police – Cartside.  
There may well be an increase in community participation (to the extent that they are 
represented by a select few) within CPPs in Cartside, however, it remains to be seen if this 
will actualise as genuine participation to the point that they can affect the decision 
making process.  However, allowing citizens to attend and take part in partnership 
meetings is one thing, but actually achieving that could be another, for example, you 
cannot force citizens to turn up and actively take part in formal discussions.  Van Steden 
et al., (2011) found in their study in Amsterdam that active citizenship is difficult to 
achieve, for example, it may be unrealistic to establish informal crime prevention 
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mechanisms in urban areas due to the fact that “strong homogenous groups of people 
have never existed” (van Steden et al., 2011: 436). 
This statement finds some foothold within some of the case study areas in terms of a 
perceived apathy by certain sections of the community to actively engage with agencies 
or Community Councils about matters that may concern them. At an Area Partnership 
meeting in Burnside it was noted that there was no members of the public present to 
observe what was happening (Area Partnership meeting 30/5/13). A Chief Inspector of 
Burnside Police later stated; 
 
 “that's replicated all over the areas in Scotland that I've worked in [...] we'd have our 
quarterly local Area Partnership meeting, where it would be the full Council 
representation of elected reps (sic) for five wards and very seldom did we ever even 
get the local newspaper turning up and no members of the public” (B003) – Police 
Chief Inspector – Safe Group – Burnside.   
 
In instances like this more importance may be placed on the views of street level 
bureaucrats (front line workers) who in their capacity to engage with hard to reach 
groups may possess first-hand knowledge of local community need when there is no 
obvious representation from local communities (Lipsky, 1980; Durose, 2011). This is 
thought to be particularly difficult in areas where there are mixed communities within a 
mixed economy of Council houses, homeowners and private lets. It was suggested that in 
the past when Housing schemes were predominantly Council owned there was a sort of 
unity of purpose compared with today – stronger bonding social capital (Putnam, 2000), 
whereas now, if there is a unity of purpose it is usually single issue based.  
 
Van Steden refers to studies in the UK and the USA that have shown that active 
participation is more likely to take place in neighbourhoods that are defined as middle 
class with low crime rates and strong community networks. This means that paradoxically 
active citizenship flourishes in privileged low crime communities compared to high crime 
under-privileged communities who arguably need it the most. This was also noted by 
Patsias et al., (2013) in their study on participatory democracy in Montreal. Consequently, 
middle class communities and residents generally have a greater capacity to connect with 
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formal institutions and thus are able to ‘exploit wider resources of power’ – ‘bridging’ 
social capital (van Steden et al., 2011: 436).  
 
In Avon Isle consultation or direct engagement often meant the same thing for some 
agencies. There were ‘events’ organised twice a year in the local Pavilion, with various 
agencies taking part; they basically set up stalls and waited for the community to come 
and engage with them, which was then reported as a form of community consultation. 
Engagement was also thought to occur when draft community plans or the draft SOA 
went out for public consultation. However, this could quite often be described as 
tokenistic in gesture (Arnstein, 1969) as it is arguable that the strategies have already 
been decided. Furthermore, it is often reliant on the wider community being able to 
access consultation documents online; 
 
“I know there are some people that haven't even got access to online to view, and that 
kind of thing. But, there probably is, but I can't remember, hard copies in some of the 
libraries, or available at your Council office. But that's just for the big ones the SOA and 
what have you” (A003) - Group Commander Fire Service – Avonside.  
Consultation in this sense is left in the hands of the public, or in the hands of Community 
Councils; a recognised mechanism in terms of accountability within local governance 
structures.  Their views must accurately represent the views of their local community, and 
accordingly they must try to represent and secure the involvement of all sectors of the 
community (Scottish Government, 2009b). However, this leaves open to question the 
effectiveness of Community Councils – for example, how well attended are they? How 
well organised are they? And how is the wider community they represent consulted in 
general? For instance, does the wider community realise that a Community Council exists 
within their neighbourhood, and if they did, how is this form of consultation viewed? For 
instance, some consultation events have been referred to as little more than ‘tick the box’ 
exercises by some participants. One participant in Cartside described (in great 
consternation) how a civil servant came from Edinburgh to speak about ‘community 
empowerment’ but then informed them that they only had one month for the 
consultation exercise;  
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“Once again you're here on a box-ticking exercise, it's all done and dusted'. I said, 'My 
Community Council is meeting right now, and we will not meet again for another 
month, this is holiday time, I couldn't possibly call a special meeting between now and 
then' and I heartily got a clap for saying what I said. A lot of the stuff is box-ticking 
exercises to say (bangs table), we’ve said it to them [...]” (C012) - Cartside Licensing 
Forum – Cartside. 
Levels of consultation will vary between different agencies and actors ranging from local 
events to online self-participatory surveys as a form of wider community engagement. 
However, this means that some hard to reach communities or communities in general 
largely fail to take part, either through a lack of knowledge of the process, or through a 
lack of capacity to engage in the first place.  There is also the added problem of how 
representative are Community Councils as some participants in the case study areas 
pointed out; 
  
“[...] the bigger question is - are Community Councils the most representative around? 
- They ought to be, but they aren't always” (B004) - Councillor – Safe Group/CSB Chair 
– Burnside.   
 6.4.2 Active Citizenship 
Carr (2012: 398) argues that community action is essential for improving  civility and for 
strengthening control, and writes about the benefits of collective efficacy in two US cities, 
which he describes as the linkage of ‘trust and cohesion’ to mutual prospects for control. 
However, he argues that there has been no real attempt to analyse the different levels of 
action or how much agency an individual has within a community in terms of negotiating 
order, or how or when it varies. He views negotiated order as a mixture of aims and 
inputs, whereby individuals residing in communities, have a say on defining what order is, 
and actively try to achieve these aims. Order in this sense is negotiated because there is a 
clear attempt by citizens to campaign for safety and act together with institutions and 
other individuals to create it. However, not all citizens have the same input in negotiating 
order. Carr (2012) refers to four ideal types; citizen partner, citizen associate, citizen 
bystander and citizen opponent. The first two possibly resonate with the descriptions of 
some active participants within the case study areas;   
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“I think what historically has happened with Community Council’s is, without being 
disrespectful, it’s a typical member of the community that comes forward, so it tends 
to be people either who have had an issue or maybe have a community development 
background, or something like that, so they're used to kind of raising issues about the 
community, but there'll be members of the community that'll go nowhere near a 
Community Council and it would be interesting to hear their opinion […]” (C009) - Lead 
Officer for Cartside ADP.   
 
This was possibly the case in Avon Isle, where one respondent from the Avon Isle Elderly 
Forum (white, middle class) was the only consistent representative on the local 
Community Safety Forum. Furthermore, they had been asked to join the Forum by the 
local Councillor and then asked to sit on the local Alcohol and Drug Partnership (ADP) 
despite the fact that they had little knowledge around drug and alcohol issues. The 
respondent commented on being on both partnerships;  
“Personally I get more out of the Safety Forum meetings - the ADP the Councillor asked 
me to take that and he asked me to come along - I did say to him that's it's not my - 
you know - I've no...but the more you get into it you realise you could be helping 
people with your input, because I could be the actual member that lets them know the 
things that are going on in the town” (A011) - Community Representative - Avon Isle 
Forum for Older Voices.   
This resonates with Carr’s (2012: 408) description of a citizen associate in that this 
community representative was in the position to pass on their subjective local knowledge 
as an objective assessment of a local community; “to be the eyes and ears of the police” 
(ibid: 408). This raises questions about how organisations such as the Police view the 
representativeness of the wider community in general. Harkin (2015) in his study on 
public consultation forums in Edinburgh found that there were concerns that the Police 
viewed Forums (sometimes with as little as three community members in attendance) as 
a ‘proxy for the wider community’ (ibid: 736). Van Steden comments that some active 
local residents are drawn into the culture of the Criminal Justice System in order to 
contribute to the control of individual behaviour. This often benefits the Police and other 
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agencies (information/intelligence), but can lead to what is described as a “Big Brother 
society colonised by spies and snitches” (van Steden, 2011: 437). 
Burnwood Community Council (CC) in Burnside was one of the Councils on the 
Burnpark/town centre Area Partnership; representing a largely middle class area in the 
city centre (the other being Burnpark). Their representative (a local business person) also 
represented the other Community Councils in the sectoral CPP, and in the Community 
Council Liaison Group; which worked with the democratic services on Burnside City 
Council. Burnwood CC was proactively involved with the Local Authority and the Police 
regarding licensing applications for pubs, restaurants and fast food outlets, and also 
provided local intelligence on crime and criminality. Crime was associated with low level 
drug dealing as the area is dominated by upmarket cafe/bars and restaurants; therefore 
cocaine was the drug of choice amongst some city revellers. Begging was regarded as a 
major issue either from ‘junkies’ or ‘organised’ Romanian beggars;   
 
“[...] but Romanians in particular, we can feed that back into say ‘look, this is the 
vehicle they drive, this is how they arrive at the city, you know, they rotate the beggars 
every week [...] so we can feed that back into them” (B013) - Community Councillor 
Burnwood CC – Burnside.    
 
Burnwood CC’s participant according to Carr’s (2012: 408) assessment would more likely 
be described as a citizen partner in view of the fact that they not only report back on 
crime, but actively take part in solving local problems within their area. In contrast to 
Burnwood – Burnpark CC lies on the outskirts of the city in an area which could be 
described as socially disorganised as it consists mainly of part Council/part private let flats 
within a working class or for some a deprived working class area. This Community Council 
was started by the Chair (and her husband who represents the CC on the Area 
Partnership); because they had an issue with a derelict site opposite them. Since then 
they have been content to deal with local concerns where and when they arise – if at all, 
however, they seemed quite put out by the new governance arrangements, which they 
felt was imposing more on their time, compared to when they first started;  
“we got together with people, like minded that wanted to sort of kind of get in, and at 
that point it was going to be for our wee comfort zone, but gradually you get more and 
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more people imposing on your time [...]” (B016) - Community Councillor – Chair of 
Burnpark CC – Burnside.  
This was in reference to planners asking to come along to meetings to give presentations 
and the amount of extra work this entailed via the Area Partnership. Under the old Area 
Committees they did not have much input, but now under the new structure they were 
expected to take more responsibility and have a more active role, which these elderly 
respondents found particularly off putting;  
“That's the paperwork he took to his last meeting, now he's got to sit and go through 
all that before he actually goes to a meeting. To us that's never been involved in all of 
these [...] I mean I know it impacts on the area, but to me it's setting up committees, 
and people's voluntary time, and the other people are getting paid thousands of 
pounds to do all these jobs” (B016) - Community Councillor – Chair of Burnpark CC – 
Burnside.   
Burnpark CC appeared to be weaker compared to Burnwood CC in terms of capacity, 
commitment, and connections to the local community, and they did not have a set 
process of contacting the community (unlike Burnwood who have their own website and 
facebook pages), it seemed to occur on an ad hoc basis – “in the local dairy” (B017) as it 
was half-jokingly suggested. Burnpark CC participants could be described as citizen 
associates’ (Carr, 2012), however, they could also be described as citizen bystanders’ in 
that they accept the role of the Police in producing law and order and only provide 
information when asked. On the face of it, they have less bridging social capital than 
Burnwood CC both in terms of capacity, commitment and connections to other 
organisations (Putnam, 2000). Putnam asserts that the “touchstone of social capital is the 
principal of generalised reciprocity” (ibid: 2000: 134) and an effectual type of generalised 
reciprocity is strengthened by solid networks of social exchange, for example, co-workers, 
friends within a tight knit community. However, there is a difference between meeting 
and trusting someone in the local ‘dairy’ because you’ve been acquainted for years, and 
trusting someone you meet on a casual basis (in partnerships). Trust that is embedded in 
strong social ties and wider networks is referred to as thick trust, whereas, thin trust in 
the generalised other (a casual acquaintance) also requires some form of shared network 
and notions of reciprocity, but, thin trust is judged to be more valuable insofar as it 
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expands our notions of trust beyond the list of people we know personally (Putnam, 
2000: 136). Therefore, Burnwood CC’s extensive social networks arguably built on thin 
trust are more effective compared to Burnpark CC’s dense networks of thick trust in 
securing more resources for their local community.  
 6.4.3 The Usual Suspects 
A key criticism levelled at community organisations, such as Community Councils, 
Residents’ Associations, Community Partnerships etc., is that it attracts the usual suspects 
(Lowndes and Sullivan, 2006), typified either by their backgrounds in community 
development, or social class (van Steden, 2011; Patsias, 2013), and age. This resonates 
within the case study areas wherein all of the community representatives interviewed (or 
observed at partnership meetings) have been between the ages of 50 to 75 years old, all 
of them were white, and most of them were middle class.  In terms of representation 
Community Councils are supposed to make efforts to encourage under–represented 
groups, including young people to either participate or attend (minimum age to be a 
Councillor is 16 years).  However, in reality this was not the case within the case study 
areas;  
“age wise they tend to be all retired, our secretary he's young - he's in his thirties, 
there are one or two there that are maybe late fifties early sixties [...] we don't have a 
teenager or even anyone in their twenties” (A012) - Community Councillor – Avon Isle 
Community Council.     
Other hard to reach groups (homeless) would also not qualify as Community Councillors 
as you must have residency within the area you represent and be named on the electoral 
register (Scottish Government, 2009b). In terms of engagement young people and other 
minority groups often feel that they are talked at rather than talked to, and community 
safety initiatives are not often planned with input from these marginalised groups, who 
are quite often the targets of initiatives. According to Carr (2012: 408) they can be 
described as citizen opponents’ – defined as generally alienated from the accepted norms 
of law and order, this smallest group potentially has a top-heavy effect on criminal justice 
policy and on negotiated order. Consequently, according to van Steden (2011: 437) the 
quest for community safety is in danger of doing more harm than good in terms of 
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exacerbating conflict through enforcement rather than looking for solutions amongst all 
members of a community (van Steden, 2011: 437).  
Participation is also inhibited by local government legislation, for example, to take part in 
Community Councils or Area Partnerships – you must be registered on the electoral roll. 
This rules out a lot of people who either have never voted or are not registered because 
of past debts incurred during the poll tax years. The Scottish Government has stated that 
it plans to bring in legislation banning Councils from using the electoral roll to chase 
historical debts (Carrell et al., 2014). Burnside Council have written off arrears or have a 
five-year cap on pursuing debtors, whereas other Scottish Councils have recovered 
£400,000 in unpaid poll tax arrears. Carrell et al., (2014) writing for the Guardian said a 
majority of the Councils plan to use the updated electoral roll to chase other debts in an 
effort to offset some of the cuts to Council budgets enforced on them through austerity 
measures. Bureaucracy and a lack of capacity may be another factor inhibiting local 
residents from taking part in participatory democracy;  
“With the Burnpark City Partnership and with the Northwest Sector Partnership 
they're making the representatives put forward a register of interest.  I've no problem 
with that and my colleagues they've no problem with it, however, if you're a wee 
family living in social housing [...]and somebody says to you that you have to fill out a 
register of interest, the first thing they're going to say is ‘what?’ and you say ‘well you 
have to tell us if you've got any directorships or shareholdings or if you've got any 
conflicts, do you work in any businesses that's got a conflict?’ You've then lost those 
people completely, you've just lost them, they're gone and they'll just tear up anything 
you've got and throw it away” (B013) - Community Councillor Burnwood CC – 
Burnside.    
It is clear there are a number of issues which may deter community participation in local 
democratic processes ranging from the exclusion of youth (owing more to a lack of active 
engagement rather than deliberate omission), to institutional mechanisms that may act 
as a mode of deterrence (register of interests) to participatory democracy (Pollock and 
Sharp, 2012). In turn this may lead to more active reliance on Carr’s (2012) citizen 
partners’ and citizen associates’ – more reliance on the usual suspects (Lowndes and 
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Sullivan, 2006) in negotiated order; rather than active  engagement with all members of 
the local community. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
Within the governance of community safety a number of issues have emerged, which 
may ultimately impact on local service delivery and community accountability. Due to 
fiscal austerity measures a number of governance changes have been put in place 
(influenced by the Christie Commission), which has instituted a reform, not only of, Local 
Authority Community Planning Partnerships (CPP’s), but also the centralisation of eight 
regional services (Police and Fire) into two separate national entities. There are concerns 
that the Scottish Government’s intensive centralisation agenda (focused on national 
outcomes and objectives) may impact on localism; especially with respect to policing 
(Scott, 2012; 2013; Fyfe, 2014). Furthermore, regulatory policy levers such as the National 
Performance Framework and the Single Outcome Agreement call for local CPP’s to pay 
cognizance to the Scottish Government’s overall vision and strategic objectives (Cairney 
et al., 2015; Cairney, 2015b); they do however state that Local Authorities have the 
discretion to determine how to achieve them within a localised setting (Cairney et al., 
2015). However, achieving this balance is arguably difficult when attention is focused on 
an ‘ethos of doing more with less’ (Scottish Government, 2010:2), which may ultimately 
force a hard pressed public sector to focus not only on quantifiable measures (or 
initiatives) in line with the national agenda, but also have an impact on the types of 
services available to local communities.    
Accountability is therefore a complex issue within the governance of community safety, 
and consequently questions were asked around themes (based on 
responsibility/accountability, and benefits to communities) set within the bespoke 
framework influenced by Hudson and Hardy’s (2002: 51) ‘partnership assessment’ tool. 
This in turn allowed the researcher to ask the case study participants about the overall 
responsibilisation process, which in turn may help to address some of the research aims 
with respect to how the reform process in general impacts on local accountability. 
Further issues were examined around consultation practices, perceptions on localism 
(post reform), and the impact of community safety strategies on local communities. 
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Consequently, a number of issues arose within the domain of community safety, with 
respect to problems around blurred lines of accountability with respect to Third Sector 
Organisations (TSO’s), Third Party Policing, Police Reform, and Community Accountability, 
which will be commented on in turn.  
  6.5.1 Third Sector Organisations  
TSOs can make a significant contribution to the lives of the most vulnerable people within 
our communities, however, the ‘continuing move from small, no-strings-attached grants 
to large contracts and service level agreements’ (SCVO, 2014), may create tensions 
around the financial accountability of TSOs in relation to reliance on one donor (in this 
case the public sector). This in turn could lead to donor dependency; which could 
arguably result in less accountability to local communities if organisations align 
themselves to a dominant policy position (in order to obtain funds) rather than 
advocating on behalf of wider societal interests (Sgueo, 2015: 11). Agencies are obliged to 
pay cognizance to what is required of them as an organisation, however, within complex 
governance arrangements they are often in partnership with a broad range of state and 
non-state actors who also have their own internal and external regulatory frameworks in 
place (Fenwick et al., 2012), which may impact on the core aims of smaller agencies to the 
point that they may feel obliged to change their own organisational goals/organisational 
form (Carmel and Harlock, 2008). 
 
This was evident to some extent within some of the TSO’s in Burnside in particular, who 
had been informed that, not only, would they have to change their work practices in 
order to secure Local Authority funding, but they would also have to align themselves to 
the Council’s ‘arms-length’ external organisation (ALEO) ‘Burnside Life’. In this case 
tensions may also emerge with respect to perceptions of asymmetrical power relations 
(McCall and Rummery, 2017), and ‘enforced co-operation’ (Grix and Phillpotts, 2012:12) 
as opposed to equality in partnership working. There are also issues with respect to 
ALEO’s being potentially one step removed from Council control (apse, 2011); as could be 
the case for Community Safety Burnside – are they accountable to the Council, the Police, 
their Board, or other private interests?  
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There were also concerns expressed in Avonside and Cartside with respect to the 
difficulties smaller TSO’s have in keeping pace with larger organisations in order to secure 
funding in the first place. For example, Rape Crisis received far less funding than Women’s 
Aid from the Scottish Government, and had to adapt their services and utilise scarce 
resources in order to access other funding streams, which could have an impact on the 
type and number of services available to local communities. According to the SCVO policy 
manager; charities will have to adapt or ‘think outside the box’ in order to secure more 
funding sources as existing (and predicted future cuts) from the public sector are already 
having an impact on services (Burne, 2014). TSO’s on the whole may struggle within the 
domain of community safety based on perceptions of a lack of status. For example, in 
Avonside and Cartside Rape Crisis had problems around their youth programme – TESSA – 
with respect to dominant agencies such as the Police (in Avonside) and the Council (in 
Cartside) either duplicating their service, or trying to take it over due to its apparent 
success. This is further compounded by a lack of voice for the third sector on strategic 
decision making, which arguable goes against the principles of ‘community planning’. 
However, this may change in Burnside as the Third Sector Forum now has a seat at the 
strategic community planning level; nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether or not 
their voices will be heard. 
Within the governance of community safety organisations (including the public sector) 
should be held accountable for the types of services available to the public. For the most 
part there is scrutiny around performance management, best value, but this does not 
always equate with good value in terms of what is available to local communities in terms 
of tailored services. What it may do however is create an ‘institutional and normative 
order’ on an otherwise distinctive terrain (Carmel and Harlock, 2008: 156). On the other 
hand, there is often a lack of scrutiny for some organisations – particularly those who do 
not buy into service level/single outcome agreements, such as religious organisations like 
the ‘Street Pastors’ who have internal accountability to their own organisational ethos, 
but lack accountability to Local Authorities and more crucially to local communities. 
  6.5.2 Third Party Policing 
There are a number of issues around the concept of Third Party Policing - partnership 
between the Police as the first party and an external entity as the third party, whereby, 
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legal powers of the third party are used to control crime and disorder (Mazzerolle, 2014: 
342). And a number of key aspects were highlighted including the ‘individualistic notion of 
responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996; 2001), whereby, citizens’ rights are commensurate 
with their civic obligations (Gilling, 2007: 40). Although a number of third sector legal 
powers were utilised throughout the case study areas with respect to Licensing laws, the 
concept was predominantly associated with the Housing sector. In this case 
responsibilisation lies with Housing with respect to the extension of the governance of 
crime control over some forms of incivility by regulating the conduct of others (Flint and 
Nixon, 2006: 940). Rose (2000) referred to this as ‘ethopolitics’, whereby the moral 
standards of local communities are subjected to scrutiny in line with constructed norms 
of what is deemed acceptable behaviour. Foucault refers to the construction and 
targeting of particular populations to be governed as a “key aspect of governmentality” 
(cited in Flint, 2002: 620). Power for Foucault is not always expressed in an overtly 
negative form, in this sense it can be conceived as prohibitive rules and regulations, which 
nonetheless could also be viewed as productive in terms of the wider social network 
(Foucault, 1980), through the setting of ‘normative standards of behaviour’ (Flint, 2002: 
620; Lukes, 1974; 2005). However, there is arguably a debate around what is an accepted 
norm with respect to the classification of antisocial behaviour. Flint (2002: 631) argues 
that there are limitations to the extent to which Housing Officers can advocate a 
responsibilisation ethos on social housing tenants. He cites one Housing Officer in his 
study, who questioned the ethics of demanding social housing tenants wash common 
stairs, when increasingly this is not required in owner-occupied properties (ibid: 631). 
However, non-compliance can often result in eviction in cases where prolonged bouts of 
‘perceived’ antisocial behaviour are deemed to violate tenancy agreements (Flint, 2002). 
All of the Housing agencies within the case study areas had used eviction as a legal lever 
in particular cases.  
 
Housing Officers are increasingly expected to ‘police’ the behaviour of their tenants. This 
was particularly relevant in Burnside when a Community Improvement Partnership (CIP) 
was established by Housing, the Police, and the Fire service – in an effort to not only 
assess risk, but to arguably control tenant’s behaviour. This raises a number of issues with 
respect to blurred lines of accountability. For example, within the CIP agencies are trying 
to co-opt others to assess risk (Fire Service acting as a social worker; or Health agencies 
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assessing fire risk). Housing Officers now also operate as part of an informal intelligence 
service – passing on information to the Police (often based on hearsay evidence), which 
could lead to net-widening as more individuals are drawn into the Criminal Justice 
System. This could result in a lessening of bonding social capital within particular 
communities; brought about by a decline in social trust (Wallace and Pichler, 2007) and 
the social exclusion of the ‘other’ (Crawford, 1997; Gilling, 2007). 
 
However, the single most fundamental accountability issue concerns who is ultimately 
held responsible for policing - the Police or those co-opted into policing functions. Ad hoc 
Police partnerships in this sense do not sit well with conventional notions of democratic 
governance. The institutional and legal apparatus set up to control and make accountable 
how the Police use their powers do not necessarily affect how other actors use them, 
especially if they are not state agencies (Mazzerolle and Ransley, 2006: 185). For example, 
this is evident amongst private security firms employed to patrol Housing estates and/or 
other business premises. Similarly, in Britain the Access to Justice Act 1999 has devolved 
some policing powers to non-Police actors involved in amongst other things the transport 
of prisoners, immigration centres, and prison custody (Mazerolle and Ransley, 2006: 184). 
In this sense agencies that employ coercive policing tactics are not subjected to the same 
strict protocols and their actions lack accountability.  
  6.5.3 Police Reform 
With the advent of the Police Reform Act It is clear that some tensions have emerged in 
the case study areas with respect to a loss of localism, consultation practices, and a 
perceived erosion of Local Authority accountability mechanisms. For example, 
Community safety was situated within CPPs in the form of CSPs and their associated 
thematic partnerships. The Police have been traditionally viewed as lead agencies within 
CSPs, however within the new national policing agenda, local Police Commanders have 
also to take into account national priorities, which had raised some concerns amongst a 
number of participants in the case study areas. In the past Local Police Authorities had 
the power to hold the Chief Constable and the (local) Force to account (with respect to 
budgetary demands/operational issues in general terms). However, Police Scotland was 
now answerable to the new Scottish Police Authority; who in turn is answerable to the 
Scottish Parliament, leading to perceptions of a loss of accountability to Local Authorities 
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and local communities; and implications for political interference in policing (Scott, 2013). 
Terpstra and Fyfe (2015: 532) have pointed out how the ‘institutional infrastructure’ in 
place for the local governance of the Police is weak, it has in effect moved from 
governance to scrutiny and engagement. 
A number of participants discussed the scrutiny arrangements with respect to Local Police 
Plans; one elected Councillor from Burnside thought they did have room for manoeuvre 
and discussed how they had asked the local Police Commander to change their local plan 
to incorporate more on ‘hate crime’ (B006). One other Councillor also reiterated that they 
could sit down and discuss what should be prioritised at the local level – they had input to 
a point, but added that “proper scrutiny is lacking from the current set up” (B015), and 
that ultimately the Police will finalise the document. Within the Reform Act local Councils 
are ‘invited to comment’ on Local Plans, however, this is potentially problematic, as it 
does not stipulate what will happen if they disagree (Scott, 2012; 2013; Fyfe, 2014). 
Furthermore, any requested changes to Local Police Plans can be vetoed by the Chief 
Constable – if it is thought to interfere with national priorities – removing further 
oversight from Local Authorities. There was evidence of Scrutiny arrangements being put 
in place throughout the case study areas; however, there appeared to be some confusion 
around exactly what this entailed (especially in Avon Isle), possibly related to a lack of 
guidance within the reform act (Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015). 
Other issues emerged around national priorities superseding local ones – further 
reinforcing perceptions around the loss of localism. For example, this was most evident 
with respect to fears that Police Scotland may adopt a ‘one size fits all’ approach. 
However, they have tried to allay those fears by putting in place structures to produce not 
only Local Police Plans, but Multi-Member Ward Plans (MMWP) for all 353 wards in 
Scotland (Apex Scotland, 2013: 3); a point reiterated by one participant in Burnside. 
Nonetheless, Anderson et al., (2014: 6) point out that Local Authorities do appear to be 
weaker in terms of influence, and in some areas national and local priorities appear to be 
aligned. There is evidence of this in Table 6, which appears to show that on the face of it, 
MMWP are fairly similar to both the Local and the Annual Police Plan (based on national 
strategic priorities). There were other concerns expressed around an apparent gap 
between local and national priorities. For instance, with respect to the ‘No Knives Better 
Lives’ campaign in Burnside (B020), and the impact of increased ‘stop and search’ 
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activities on local community engagement initiatives (B010). One participant in Avonside 
thought local policing was now based on the former Strathclyde policing model – a 
Strathclydification (Fyfe, 2014), which raised concerns on how this apparent ‘one size fits 
all’ approach would impact on island communities (particularly Avon Isle). 
Participants in Avon Isle were also very vocal in expressing their annoyance towards the 
restructure of local policing at a packed Area CPP meeting (held in December 2013), with 
respect to the loss of the of the Senior Police Inspector post; with policing on the whole 
to be directed from the mainland – this they argued was decided without proper 
consultation. A lack of advance consultation was also commented on in Cartside with 
regard to the review of Public Counters and the possible withdrawal of Parking Wardens.  
Within the Policing Principles (Reform Act) it is stated that partnership working is a key 
element of policing (Scott, 2012: 136; Apex Scotland, 2013: 9), it also underlines the 
importance of localism (Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015). However, if it is thought that 
consultation is little more than tokenism (Pollok and Sharp, 2012) insofar as citizens are 
heard, but lack the power or knowledge on Police reform (Fyfe, 2014) to ensure their 
views will be taken into consideration (Arnstein, 1969), then it may impact on trust – a 
key component required to build social capital, which is a key social policy aim with 
respect to encouraging citizens to be involved in local decision making (Head, 2007).  
  6.5.4 Community Accountability 
The Christie Commissions desired more accountability within local governance structures, 
and argued that one of the key aims of CPPs were not being met - ensuring people and 
communities were genuinely engaged (Scottish Executive, 2004: 1). Davidson and Elstub 
(2014) argue that in order to regain trust and be accountable to local communities then 
politicians must make a real effort to engage with citizens. However, as previously 
highlighted policy documents can be quite ambiguous in terms of how engagement is 
implemented. For example, while they may advocate that opportunities should be 
provided to consult, engage or involve communities, they generally do not state the 
extent or level of engagement required.  
Consequently, although there was an effort to engage with local communities within the 
case study areas - by both the public sector and other organisations, it was often 
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haphazard in the sense that reliance was placed on local communities to engage with 
them; rather than the other way round. Consultation when it happened could be 
interpreted, and was interpreted by some participants as ‘tokenistic’ in gesture (Arnstein, 
1969; Ercan and Hendriks, 2013); ‘a tick the box exercise’. For instance, engagement 
events in Avon Isle generally took place twice a year in the local Pavilion – in essence they 
waited for the community to come to them. Or as one participant pointed out the 
community could access documents online – provided of course they have the capacity, 
or the resources (social capital) to do so (A003).  This was also the case in Cartside where 
engagement (if it took place at all) was through Area Community Planning Forums – 
provided local communities declared they wished to know more about particular policy 
decision making processes. One participant in Cartside reinforced a belief that 
consultation was tokenistic in gesture, when he described how Community Councils were 
asked at short notice (within a month) to consult their local communities on the concept 
of community empowerment – during a holiday period, which they declared was just not 
possible stressing “[…] a lot of the stuff is box-ticking exercises to say (bangs table) – 
we’ve said it to them […]” (C012). 
Interviews had taken place during a period of structural reform within all of the case 
study areas; therefore, how communities are engaged in the future may change. 
However, community engagement as a priority seemed less visible in Avonside and 
Cartside, compared to Burnside, who had put in place new governance structures 
designed to include local communities within a more participatory decision making 
process. However, this was arguably through the direction of knowing others, set within 
institutional mechanisms whereby communities are encouraged to vote a certain way 
(Pollock and Sharp, 2012). For instance, in Burnside, Community Councils now had a vote 
on Area Partnerships, and on sectoral CPP’s (but not at the strategic level of decision 
making), but one Community Councillor pointed out how it was made quite clear by 
knowledgeable others that deliberation took too long, and therefore voting “[…] will 
literally be put through on round the table nod” (B013). This highlights how community 
representatives perhaps lack the capacity (social capital) to actively participate within 
local governance structures. Pollok and Sharp (2012: 3066) comment on how 
‘institutional mechanisms’ in which communities are engaged in the first place often act 
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as a mode of subjection, in that they encourage ‘alignment with institutional and 
government objectives’ (Ibid: 3066).  
One other cause for concern was how representative were Community Councils in 
general. Community groups for the most part were peopled by the ‘usual suspects’ – 
white, middle aged/elderly, middle class (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2006). Therefore, they 
often precluded those who would have a vested interest in community safety initiatives 
(homeless, ethnic minorities, targeted young people etc.), who either did not know about 
the structures; were not interested according to some; or were precluded through 
legislative means (election roll, register of interest). This means that community 
consultation/representation is often contingent on the viewpoints of those select few 
who often have a desire to take part in local governance, or as van Steden (2011) argued 
those active local residents who have a desire to control the behaviour of others. This was 
arguably the case for one participant in Avon Isle who sat on two partnerships, and 
expressed how they could “be the actual member that lets them know (the Police) the 
things that are going on in the town” (A011). Harkin (2015) highlighted how Community 
Forums (often with as little as three in attendance) were often viewed by the Police in 
particular as a ‘proxy for the wider community’ (ibid: 736), and this appeared to be the 
case within the case study areas. 
A disparity also appeared to exist between local community participants with respect to 
capacity (social capital) to engage in local governance (in Burnside in particular). For 
instance, in deprived areas often with diverse ethnic communities, and a mix of private 
lets, social housing, and home ownership, it is perhaps more difficult to establish strong 
bonding social capital (Putnam, 2000) with homogenous groups of people, who may 
share the same aims with respect to community safety (van Steden et al., 2011). This 
appeared to be the case in Burnpark. Community Council participants in this area 
appeared to lack the knowledge and capacity to engage effectively on behalf of their local 
communities. Two participants (husband and wife) railed at the amount of policy 
documents they were expected to read and more importantly understand; claiming 
people in the Council got paid thousands for this, and they were expected to do it for 
nothing. There was a sense that these Community Council members were not only lacking 
in capacity, but also bridging social capital (Putnam, 2000), insofar as they did not have 
sufficient contacts, resources, or technological prowess to aid them in their endeavours.  
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In this case more importance was perhaps placed on the viewpoints of those street level 
bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980) in attendance (Police, elected Councillors etc.) who may claim 
to speak for hard to reach groups (Durose, 2011). This was in contrast to the Burnwood 
community participant (a local businessman) who represented a middle class area 
populated in the main by a professional class. This participant not only had the cultural 
capital (skills and knowledge) to advance his community needs (online forums/websites 
etc.), but crucially more bridging social capital (Putnam, 2000); links to other 
organisations/agencies to ensure their voices are heard. In other words privileged low 
crime communities often benefit the most from active citizenship compared to high crime 
neighbourhoods who arguably need it more (Patsias et al., 2013); those who possess 
more social capital have the capacity to exploit wider resources of power (van Steden et 
al., 2011: 436).  
It is clear that the planned governance changes within the governance of community 
safety and the Reform Process in general have not met the stated aims of the Christie 
Commission – a desire for more accountability within local governance structures. This is 
most evident in perceptions of a loss of localism/local autonomy/consultation with 
respect to Police Reform throughout the case study areas. This is possibly exacerbated by 
the blurring of accountability within some partnerships – in particular the Community 
Improvement Partnership in Burnside, where actors take on policing/social work roles 
despite their lack of training to the contrary. However, more crucially, community trust 
could decline further if the reform process in general adopts tokenistic measures with 
respect to active community consultation/engagement (relying on the usual suspects); or 
in the case of policing adopts a ‘one size fits all’ philosophy that neglects to take into 
account the diverse nature of local communities, both with respect to geographical 
location, and community capacity to engage in the first place. 
  
230 
 
Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusions 
  7.1 Introduction 
Community safety partnership working evolved differently in Scotland (see chapter 2) 
compared to England and Wales (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008; McAra and McVie, 2010; 
Mooney and Scott, 2012; Croall, 2006; Croall et al., 2010). This was partly related to 
Scotland’s distinct legal system, but arguably stemmed more from its’ distinctive civic 
culture (ibid). Nonetheless, there have been many (ideologically driven) areas of policy 
convergence in Community Safety Partnerships; (as previously stated in chapters 2 and 4) 
with respect to managerialism, and the adoption of a punitive penal agenda directed 
towards young offenders, and the targeting of antisocial behaviour within local 
communities. Similarly, within the Criminal Justice System there have been many areas of 
policy divergence; the Children’s Hearing System (McAra, 2007; McAra and McVie, 2010; 
Croall, 2006), and the retention of penal welfarism (McAra and McVie, 2010) during the 
Thatcher era in particular. However, post devolution this divergence was arguably tested 
under a New Labour inspired Scottish Executive who encapsulated the Blairite 
responsibilisation ethos (McLaughlin, 2002a: 89) around crime prevention and community 
safety, by situating it within the statutory framework of Local Authority Community 
Planning Partnerships (Henry, 2009). This arguably placed a somewhat contradictory 
emphasis on both centralisation and localism (McAra, 2007), which has continued to an 
extent under the current SNP government. In this case through the simultaneous 
promotion of community empowerment/local accountability, within the austerity-driven 
centralised reform process, which has witnessed the amalgamation of eight regional 
Police and Fire services into two distinct, and arguably contested national entities within 
local governance structures. 
The purpose of this study was to look at the governance of community safety in Scotland 
during a period of central and local government fiscal/structural reform; principally 
through the role of Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) embedded within the 
community planning structure of three geographically distinct Local Authority areas – 
known as Avonside, Burnside and Cartside. A comparative case study approach was 
adopted and a bespoke interview framework was created based on Hudson and Hardy’s 
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(2002) ‘partnership assessment tool’ (PAT) for effective partnership working (see Chapter 
3), and the following research questions were posed: 
 What role do CSPs play in the governance of community safety in contemporary 
Scotland? 
 How will the planned governance changes and reform processes affect CSPs in terms 
of local accountability? 
 How will performance management cultures within central/local government, and in 
particular within the Police, affect CSP priorities and/or goals? 
 How do the organisational aims and culture of CSP partners, who possess different 
levels of power and influence, effect or determine the strategic priorities of CSPs? 
 
Although constructing these research questions within a bespoke framework helped the 
researcher to focus on the main aims of the thesis; looking at the complexities of 
partnership working during a period of significant reform. They were nonetheless meant 
as a guide that allowed the researcher to look at the impact of policy on practice within 
the governance of community safety in Scotland. The questions within the interview 
schedule were developed in line with the seven headings constructed within a bespoke 
framework (see chapter 3.2), which allowed us to focus on particular areas of partnership 
working in relation to governance structure, strategic decision making, power, 
organisational culture, commitment and accountability mechanisms; which in turn 
allowed us to address the research aims. Consequently, a number of contemporary 
themes began to emerge (throughout the case study areas); in relation to the reform 
process in general, for example, with respect to the changing role of CSP’s within planned 
governance changes, and the pressures this has placed on multi-agency partnership 
working. After briefly commenting on the themes that arose from the empirical data 
collected within this thesis, this chapter will then comment on and summarise the key 
findings to emerge within the case study areas, before reflecting on the implications of 
these for policy and practice at both the local and national level for policy makers. This 
thesis will then close by highlighting future opportunities for further research. But, first 
this chapter will consider the usefulness of the thesis’s theoretical framework, notably 
with respect to the influence of Hudson and Hardy’s PAT; and especially with respect to 
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their six so-called ‘partnership principles’, and how these principles may apply within the 
domain of community safety partnership working (Hudson and Hardy, 2002: 52). 
 
  7.2 Hudson and Hardy’s six principles of partnership working 
 
As has previously been stated a bespoke framework was developed not for evaluation 
purposes but, to act as a useful framework to guide the direction of qualitative 
interviews, in an effort to address the research questions/aims. Nonetheless, Hudson and 
Hardy’s six key ‘partnership principles’ highlight what they believe to be the success (or 
failure) criteria for generic partnership working (ibid). When examined within the context 
of community safety partnership working within the case study areas - a number of issues 
appear to surface, and a number of key points will be briefly commented on under each 
principle heading. 
 
  7.2.1 Principle one: Acknowledgment of the need for partnership 
 
Some of the key points reflected in this principle refer not only to recognition for the 
necessity of partnership working, but also recognition that partners must appreciate their 
interdependency for collaboration to be successful, and awareness by partners that some 
‘core’ business of agencies does not require partnership working; otherwise there is a 
danger that one agency may step into the domain of another in a manner that is 
perceived as unacceptable or threatening (ibid: 54). However, despite all this some 
barriers may be too formidable to overcome than others, even if some partnership 
working is achieved; leading to the necessity to identify and address ways to overcome 
them (ibid: 53).  
 
The points raised here were addressed and answered to some extent throughout the 
thesis, for example, with respect to participants acknowledging the need for partnership 
working; especially in relation to tackling ‘wicked’ issues such as crime and disorder 
(chapter 2 and 5) hence the need for CPP/CSP’s in the first place. Although, in Burnside 
community safety as a concept was relegated to ‘other matters’ to be discussed within 
the new community planning structure, signalling the demise of this particular thematic 
partnership. Interdependency was also evident; especially within issue specific 
233 
 
partnerships/co-located hubs etc. (chapter 5 and 6), particularly with respect to the 
management of risk. However, this also highlighted some areas in need of development 
with respect to attracting key partners (Health/Education), but also engaging more 
substantially with community organisations in particular. As to ‘not stepping on an 
agencies toes’, and being aware of an agencies  ‘core’ aims and obligations, this was 
perhaps highlighted with respect to TESSA a successful youth initiative duplicated by the 
Police (in Avonside), and its attempted takeover by Council actors (in Cartside). Also, the 
development of MATAC’s throughout the case study areas (in Cartside in particular); 
mostly associated with a general unease about the direction their partnerships were 
taking, and with confidentiality issues in terms of information sharing (chapter 6 and 4). 
This highlights one of the formidable barriers to partnership working still to be negotiated 
throughout the case study areas (chapter 5).   
 
  7.2.2 Principle two: Clarity and realism of purpose 
 
This highlights the need to identify shared values and principles, and if agencies have 
enough in common to sustain a long term relationship. Once this is agreed more specific 
aims and objectives need to be defined; goals, aims and objectives that lack both clarity 
and obtainability will diminish enthusiasm and commitment. The notion of collaborative 
capacity is relevant here; which refers to the level and amount of action a partnership 
arrangement can endure without a loss of commitment. This is relevant to both tangible 
resources (i.e. funding) and those less tangible (i.e. status or autonomy). ‘Embryonic 
partnerships’  can be a delicate process at the organisational, professional or individual 
level, and there needs to be awareness of perceived threats to boundaries and practices 
(ibid: 55). 
 
For the most part shared values and objectives were usually identified in the case studies 
(mainly by statutory agencies) through the SOA; usually described as a bottom up process 
(chapter 4 and 5). However, this potentially created an imbalance within the decision 
making process not only between statutory signatories required to pay cognizance to a 
prescriptive framework, but also between others not required to do so (third sector and 
community organisations); which sometimes proved problematic with respect to 
accountability (Chapter 6) or shared visions - especially when partners with more 
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status/power often set the course and strategic direction of community safety (chapter 
5). 
  7.2.3 Principle three:  Commitment and ownership 
Partnership working is only sustainable if the understandings and agreements developed 
through principles one and two are not only supported, but reinforced. This includes from 
the top level down. Ideal inter-agency commitment reflects not only the development of 
connections between key decision makers; leading to greater trust, but also commitment 
needs to be consistent and seen to be so. This does not imply that wider ownership is any 
less significant, but well-developed strategies still need clear links between the macro and 
micro levels of organisational practices to ensure that operational staff adhere to shared 
agreements; especially if there is a perception that shared activities may encroach on 
traditional organisational boundaries. This highlights, not only, the importance of key 
personnel (who have the ability to drive forward change), but also how the loss of key 
individuals could potentially damage the ongoing commitment and purpose of a networks 
existence (ibid: 56).  
 
Commitment to partnership working is arguably reinforced by legislation such as the Local 
Government in Scotland Act 2003 (Scottish Executive, 2004) and other policy levers 
(Christie etc.) that remind some partners of their statutory obligations (chapter 4). 
However, as the evidence throughout the case study areas has shown (chapter 5), 
commitment is not easy to maintain within ‘austerity localism’ (Featherstone et al., 2012); 
especially if there is a perceived gap between the local and the national (chapter 6) in 
terms of national priorities superseding local ones to the point that some organisations 
may retrench back to their core activities. 
 
  7.2.4 Principle four: Development and maintenance of Trust 
This is viewed as arguably the most obvious and most elusive of principles to reinforce 
effective partnership working, although joint working is still possible with very little trust, 
more successful partnerships endure longer where trust is present. However, its 
generation is often hindered by disputes around territorial boundaries, or claims to 
professional competencies, or access to resources. Trust is not easily won, which means 
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its maintenance is an ongoing and reciprocal task, and a key aspect of this is in relation to 
sensitivities on status; which means avoiding perceptions around ‘senior or junior 
partners, or ‘core’ or peripheral groups’ (ibid: 58), which could lead to a lessening of 
commitment. Maintaining commitment means trying to avoid situations where one or 
two partners set the agenda, or define the language within partnership working, which is 
sometime unavoidable when there are lead agencies, however, being sensitive to all 
agencies requirements and beliefs can offset areas of tension and mistrust,  together with 
acknowledging their existence in the first place (ibid: 57-59).  
The problems and maintenance of trust was discussed by participants in relation to a 
number of issues, for example: doing what you say you will do; reciprocity; personality 
issues; building relationships; overall commitment, with one participant in Burnside 
highlighting how building trust and confidence was not easy won, but easily lost (chapter 
5). However, a number of issues emerged which could hinder its development in relation 
to perceptions of ‘core’ partners within a peripheral group (MATAC chapter 4), or with 
respect to unequal aspects of status/power within decision making (chapter 5). 
Nonetheless, the fact that most participants acknowledged potential barriers to 
partnership working - information sharing/confidentiality in particular –  exist in the first 
place (chapter 5), means that there is scope to address this throughout the case study 
areas.  
  7.2.5 Principle five: Establishment of clear and robust partnership arrangements 
This refers to the need that partnership working is not encumbered by overly complex 
structures and processes, which may reflect a partner’s defensiveness about their own 
interests and insecurity about points of mutual trust. In consequence too much 
bureaucracy may result in frustration among partners leading to a further decline in 
commitment to partnership working; especially if it is seen as marginal to organisational 
interests. Partnership working should therefore be as clear and unambiguous as possible, 
with each partner knowing, not only, what they are responsible for, but the accountability 
of their actions. Furthermore, there needs to be an understanding around the types and 
availability of resources each partner brings to the table, not just financial/material 
resources, but those less tangible – experience, knowledge, power and legitimacy; 
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especially in relation to community groups whose involvement confers a local legitimacy, 
which may otherwise be lacking (ibid: 59-60).   
The reform process throughout the case study areas involved the reorganisation of 
complex governance structures (chapter 4), which may prove cumbersome for some 
partners more than others. This was possibly more evident in Burnside (chapter 4 and 6) 
as some community participants seemed to struggle with the added burdens brought on 
by excessive governance bureaucracy (Burnpark Area Partnership). Accountability 
practices within the case study areas were not often clear, leading to blurred lines of 
accountability (chapter 6); especially between the public and the third sector (different 
accountability mechanisms), and its impact on localism (centralisation and the impact of 
police reform), which could detract from the overall partnership process.  
  7.2.6 Principle 6:  Monitoring, review and organisational learning 
Finally, this refers to the more reflexive elements of partnership working, wherein review 
is viewed as integral to individual agency planning and management processes, which 
may lead to discussions around levels of commitment, or the costs and benefits of 
partnership working to individual partners; especially if it is not viewed as core work. 
Monitoring, reviewing and learning are therefore viewed as a vital part, not only, in 
relation to performance assessment, but also with respect to ongoing commitment and 
the generation of trust. Success criteria needs to be made clear and agreed upon by the 
partnership itself. If evaluations do not occur then valuable lessons may be missed that 
could inform partnership working elsewhere. Furthermore, being open about possible 
problems may demonstrate awareness and a desire to overcome potential barriers to 
future partnership working (ibid: 61-62).  
Monitoring has existed within the Scottish Community Safety Network since its inception; 
especially in relation to guidance, with the creation of ‘partnership toolkits’, and research 
(chapter 4) highlighting problematic areas in need of attention (SCSN, 2012: 2013). 
However, this is often left up to key actors related to ‘Partnership and Governance’ to 
access and review. Within the individual case study areas, performance and review was 
often discussed in relation to key policy levers (chapter 4), or commitment to 
organisational strategies (policing in particular). However, it was highlighted (in Cartside) 
that local strategic assessments (in relation to community planning) were absent, which 
237 
 
reinforced the necessity of the MATAC policing model in order to marry up local and 
central strategic priorities. However, there did not appear to be any generic review on the 
overall efficacy of community safety strategic decision making within partnership 
structures (especially Avonside and Cartside who still retained a CSP), with respect to 
successful active community engagement, and consultation,  or whether partnerships 
were meeting the key aims of the Christie Commission (chapter 6). 
Utilising aspects of Hudson and Hardy’s (2002) PAT as the basis for a bespoke framework, 
allowed the researcher to probe into areas deemed not only essential, but also 
potentially problematic within partnership working in order to ascertain how community 
safety as a concept, is not only maintained, but also viewed within the  three case study 
areas. This in turn has highlighted some enduring themes, but also led to the emergence 
of some key themes, which will be highlighted within the conclusions. This next section 
will address some of the points raised within the research questions. 
7.3 Partnership working within the governance of community safety 
Much has been written around the concept of governance (chapter 2) with respect to 
how public policy delivery has shifted from ‘big’ government to governance (Grix and 
Philpott, 2011: 4) through networks and partnerships, which has arguably led to an 
erosion of central Government power (ibid); leading to a fragmented public service 
delivery, wherein Government capacity to steer public policy is weakened – the state has 
essentially become ‘hollowed’ out (Rhodes, 1997). New Labour’s modernisation process, 
sought to reduce the fragmentation inherent within the previous Conservative 
Government’s ideology of market individualism (Stoker, 1999), by returning some 
measure of power and political autonomy back into the hands of local government. 
However, this re-investment in local authority control was to be held in check by the tight 
reigns of partnership working, often set within prescriptive regulatory systems (Carnwell 
and Carson, 2009).   
This was most evident within the domain of Crime and Disorder Reduction/Community 
Safety Partnerships in England and Wales (Hughes, 2002; Hope, 2005; Loveday, 2006; 
Gilling, 2007). This thesis did not set out to compare CSP’s throughout the UK – that is not 
its aim. However, as the literature has highlighted, post-devolution - CSP’s in Scotland 
arguably developed from New Labour’s flag-ship crime control policies (Crawford, 1997; 
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Gilling, 2007; Henry, 2009), wherein central government ultimately ‘steer’ (Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1992) local crime prevention/community safety through regulatory frameworks 
(in this case the NPF, SOA, and Statement of Ambition). This would support Holliday’s 
(2000) assertion that while the state may operate within an often fragmented, complex 
environment, it is nonetheless, not as disabled as Rhodes (1997) ‘hollowed’ out thesis 
would suggest.  
This assertion is supported to some extent within the case study areas. For example, 
CSP’s have since the 2003 Local Government in Scotland Act, been inextricably linked to 
local community planning structures. These structures are in turn shaped by central 
government policy levers (chapter 4), which have the power to make actors/agencies 
behave in a particular way (Dahl, 2002; Bachrach and Baratz, 2002; Lukes, 2005). In this 
case the roles of CSP’s within the governance of community safety in Scotland are not 
only conditioned by the necessity of partnership working (Hudson and Hardy, 2002; 
Powell and Exworthy, 2002; Rummery, 2002; McConnell, 2004; Gilling, 2007; Carnwell 
and Carson, 2009; Henry, 2009), but also set within the contradictory aims of 
centralisation and localisation (McAra, 2007). This was apparent within the case study 
areas when a number of participants commented on local community safety objectives 
being ostensibly bottom up. However, powerful statutory agencies also had to take 
cognizance of national outcomes, which meant that quite often an ‘institutional bias’ 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 2002) occurred in that strategic agendas were quite often set 
within time frames (Mayo and Taylor, 2001) benefitting the most powerful partners in the 
partnership (Rummery, 2002: McCall and Rummery, 2017: 59); the Police in particular.  
During the research process, all three case study areas were in the midst of a centrally 
directed reform process linked to fiscal austerity. Featherstone et al., (2012: 178) argued 
that within ‘austerity localism’ it is usually the default actors with the most ‘resources, 
expertise and social capital’, who routinely provide facilities and services; and this was 
supported to some extent within the case study areas. This meant that some community 
safety partners (third sector/smaller agencies/organisations) who participated within the 
partnership process, quite often bowed (Harkin, 2015) to the wisdom/authority of 
powerful organisations with respect to ‘shared’ priorities and goals. In essence this could 
be perceived more as a compliance model of partnership working, rather than a 
partnership based on equality. That is not to say that all partners had disparate goals, on 
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the contrary co-located issue specific partnerships, with respect to antisocial behaviour, 
alcohol and drugs, Housing (Community Improvement Partnership), for the most part 
worked well (barring enduring problems related to information sharing/confidentiality, 
and blurred lines of accountability). However, within the new structures Police Scotland 
intelligence-led MATACS (chapter 4) had become the operational template for community 
safety, which had the potential to alienate those agencies more focussed on long term 
welfarist approaches to prevention, rather than short term reactive approaches favoured 
by the Police. The planned governance changes within a fiscal austerity driven reform 
process highlighted a number of issues within the governance of community safety and 
much has been discussed in chapters 2-6, however, some issues pertinent to the main 
aims of the research will be briefly commented on below, in relation to the impact of: 
reinforced top-down performance management regimes; organisational culture; and local 
accountability.  
  7.3.1 The impact of performance management cultures on community safety 
Many commentators have discussed the impact of private sector managerialism on the 
public sector (Hood, 1994; Hughes, 1994; Shafiri and Bovaird, 1995; Clarke and Newman, 
1997; James, 2001; Newman, 2001; Heffernan, 2002), – more specifically as a departure 
from ‘old’ public management command and control (Brodkin, 2011), to forms of 
governance focusing on the three E’s (Shafiri and Bovaird, 1995) – economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness (see chapter 2). Loveday (2006) argues that it is used as a mode of 
intervention by central government through the use of monitoring, which in effect 
challenges the professionalism of public sector actors, in this case by establishing 
performance management frameworks – which effectively steer public sector behaviour 
(Brodkin, 2011).  
This is arguably the case within the case study areas; especially within CPP/CSP’s. For 
instance, although policy levers such as the Christie Commission and the NPF/SOA were 
ostensibly to be viewed as a balance between local and national priorities, this was, more 
often than not, difficult to achieve by public sector organisations beset by cuts to 
personnel and services. This was most likely to impact on Council agencies that may – 
through expediency – focus on key performance indicators deemed achievable in the 
short term, as opposed to long term proactive community safety solutions advocated by 
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Christie (chapter 4). Similarly, this was also the case within Police Scotland as rigorous 
performance management regimes, more often focused on reactive short term measures 
rather than proactive long term initiatives (Mackenzie and Hamilton-Smith, 2011; 
Hamilton-Smith et al., 2013; Fyfe, 2014) within the governance of community safety. 
For example, priority may be given to short term initiatives focusing on antisocial 
behaviour, or on more quantifiable aspects of risk management; as was the case in 
Burnside and Cartside in relation to intervention and the management of young offenders 
(chapter 5).  Building social capital is a key social policy aim with respect to active 
citizenship/participatory democracy, but if local communities’ feel they are targeted 
unfairly by reactionary initiatives such as ‘stop and search’ then this may impact on trust - 
a crucial component essential to building social capital (Head, 2007).  Consequently, 
community safety partnership working may be viewed with suspicion, resulting in less 
participation from those communities who arguably need it the most. Participation may 
also be affected if negative opinions persist around equality and status within partnership 
working.  
  7.3.2 The impact of organisational culture/power differentials within CPP/CSP’s 
As has previously been discussed partnership working (chapter 2 and 5) is often espoused 
within social policy arenas as a positive concept associated with trust (McCall and 
Rummery, 2017), equality and reciprocity (Mayo and Taylor, 2001) and to a large extent 
this was how it was viewed within the case study areas (especially by statutory agencies). 
However, it was also clear that there existed an imbalance of power throughout the 
community planning/community safety structure with respect to strategic decision 
making, resource allocation, and active participation. 
 
There exists a hierarchy within CPP/CSP’s and it is generally accepted by most participants 
that whilst Local Authorities are the lead partners, the Police have the greatest resources 
available, and a clear mandate to tackle crime and disorder (McCarthy and O’Neill, 2014: 
249). Nonetheless, the concept of partnership working evokes notions of equality and 
working towards common goals; especially during times of fiscal crisis. However, 
commitment to it may falter if it is perceived that strategic decision making is to the 
benefit of some partners (particularly the Police) over others; especially if it is linked to 
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centrally driven performance management frameworks (Mackenzie and Hamilton-Smith, 
2011; Hamilton-Smith et al., 2013; Fyfe, 2014).  
As previously discussed (in chapter 4) this was evident in Cartside  with respect to 
MATACS, wherein social welfarist actors/agencies involved with the public/third sector 
were asked to comply with a  centrally driven intelligence led policing model with respect 
to decision making. In this sense powerful agencies with a strong organisational 
culture/identity (such as the Police) arguably benefit more than others from partnership 
working (Rummery, 2002: McCall and Rummery, 2017: 59), especially if they have 
jurisdiction in terms of service delivery (Irvine, et al., 2002), and social capital in terms of 
resources (Coleman, 1988).  However, non-police agencies may retrench from the 
partnership process if it is believed that their organisational aims conflict with, rather 
than complement the strategic aims of a partnership. This was a possible outcome in 
Cartside, when some participants voiced their disquiet about the new CSP structure being 
too Police led; which may resonate in other Local Authority areas it was being rolled out 
to. However, while non-police actors/agencies may not totally withdraw from the 
partnership process (given the stated desire to increase partnership working within social 
policy); they may nonetheless fail to effectively engage with its strategic objectives.  
A dominant organisational ethos is not restricted to the Police. The Council have put in 
place governance mechanisms, which may unintentionally reinforce an ‘institutional bias’ 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 2002), that favours governmental aims ahead of others. This may 
be achieved through resource allocation. This was evident in Avon Isle, Burnside and 
Cartside when TSO participants acknowledged they often had to adapt/change their 
services to access funding streams with strict criteria attached to them (chapter 6). This 
could be viewed as an exercise in efficiency insofar as Local Authorities are ensuring that 
local communities have appropriate services in place. It could also be viewed as 
problematic in that the appropriate services are ones deemed essential by a local Council 
(driven by austerity) as opposed to what is deemed necessary by local communities. Or 
that resources are awarded to those organisations with the necessary skills to “put 
together partnership bids” (Rummery, 2002: 242) based on social capital, rather than 
their capacity to deliver services to communities in need. 
Much has been highlighted in social policy/academic literature with respect to community 
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engagement/active participation; or its lack thereof. Local communities – despite social 
policy protestations to the contrary - are routinely marginalised within Local Authority 
decision making processes. Or as Coleman et al., (2002) argued engagement is often 
directed towards those considered reliable and responsible. For the most part those 
deemed responsible are those who attend community meetings; who are often there 
with respect to furthering their own narrow agendas (Edwards, 2002; Farrow and Prior, 
2006). This was apparent within the case study areas to some extent, when many 
community participants discussed community safety more often in relation to a narrow 
personal perspective, as opposed to notions of security from the wider community (ibid).   
For the most part active participation was assigned towards a particular type of 
community representative within the case study areas usually identified through age and 
social class (generally elderly, white, middle class ) – commonly described as the ‘usual 
suspects’ within academic literature (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004; van Steden, 2011; 
Patsias, 2013). This was compounded further dependent on capacity to engage 
effectively, which was more evident in Burnside, in relation to social background and 
demographic area. Active participation was more prominent in Burnwood (middle class 
business area) possibly in relation to greater bridging (inclusive) social capital (Putnam, 
2000; Campbell and Sacchetti, 2014); insofar as this participant was more assured and 
had more connections to the wider community planning network in general, compared to 
the participant from Burnpark (deprived area) who focused on much narrower local 
community connections; bonding (exclusive) social capital (ibid).  
Although Burnside had put in place governance structures to let community 
representatives actively engage in participatory democracy (Patsias et al., 2013; Davidson 
and Elstub, 2014); for instance, allowing them to vote on the Area Partnership/Area CPP, 
it nonetheless, did not include active participation at the strategic level. Avonside and 
Cartside had far less community engagement, insofar as engagement was restricted to 
being heard (no vote) on local structures, but no participation at the strategic level. 
Community engagement appears to be an enduring problem within social policy, as Hart 
et al.,(1997) have previously argued – the success or failure of local projects, is often 
determined by local communities, yet they often have little or no say at the strategic level 
(cited in Foster, 2002: 186).  
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A number of themes have been highlighted throughout this thesis in relation to 
partnership working within the governance of community safety, including some 
enduring themes in relation to barriers to effective partnership working (chapter 5) – 
associated with information sharing (Perrie 6 et al., 2006; Lennox et al., 2012: 132). 
However, there was evidence that some of these problems were being negotiated to 
some extent through co-location (chapter 5), and issue specific partnerships (Child 
Protection; Community Hubs; CIP). However, some historical difficulties in relation to 
engaging Health as a statutory partner remain (Clarke and Rummery, 2002), and a 
number of participants commented on this with respect to community safety throughout 
the case study areas, insofar as Health “[…] doesn’t sit at the table” (C003). Some 
contemporary themes also began to emerge related to austerity and the reform process 
in general, which will now be summarised in the conclusions below. 
  7.4 Conclusions: Key Themes, Implications for policy and practice, and future research 
  7.4.1 The changing role of Community Safety Partnerships   
Evidence from the data has shown that CSPs (in Avonside and Cartside) had arguably 
changed their role from a more proactive social welfare model to a reactionary 
intelligence led multi-agency tasking (MATAC) model favoured by Police Scotland. 
Burnside also appears to have adopted a tasking model within Community Safety 
Burnside. Two competing arguments appear to have developed as to why this change has 
emerged. For example, one participant within Community Safety Burnside (former Police 
analyst) intimated that MATAC’s had been implemented in accordance with the former 
Chief Constable’s (Stephen House) desire to improve local accountability; perhaps 
influenced by his opinion that no ‘partnership should go unreviewed’ (Apex Scotland, 
2013: 9). In this sense community policing was to be delivered locally through multi-
agency tasking forums.  MATAC’s emerged in the case study areas in direct response to 
Police reform; effectively by dividing the functions of existing CSP’s into two distinct areas 
- steering/strategic planning and operational (see chapter 4). However, concerns were 
expressed by participants in Cartside that this Police Scotland initiative would essentially 
drive national objectives ahead of what was needed locally. This was reinforced by a 
prevailing opinion that the Police had only ‘invited’ those actors/agencies onto the 
MATAC who could operationalise objectives in line with both the SOA, and Police 
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Scotland’s national priorities. This possibly chimes with Coleman et al.’s, (2002) study 
(chapter 2) insofar as there appears to be a construction of responsibilisation directed 
towards those partners thought to be more ‘reliable’ in relation to furthering Police 
performance management regimes as opposed to the partnership as a whole. This could 
lead to some unintended consequences for CSP’s if this is rolled out across all Local 
Authority areas (included those highlighted in this study); insofar as those 
actors/organisations more supportive of proactive community safety type initiatives, may 
withdraw from the MATAC if it is perceived to be – in the words of one participant – “too 
policey” (C012).  
  7.4.2 A dichotomy within the ethos of partnership working 
Austerity measures had created a dichotomy within CPP/CSP’s that simultaneously 
exalted the necessity of partnership working while forcing agencies to retrench back to 
their core activities, which in turn reduced attendance and trust; a necessary component 
within partnerships and networks. The global financial crisis has had a major impact on 
public services throughout the UK principally in the form of deep spending cuts (Oxfam, 
2013). As a result the UK and devolved Governments have had to put in place a number 
of austerity measures (see chapters 4 and 5); which have impacted on all three case study 
areas with respect to partnership working in general. This has created a dichotomy of 
sorts insofar as a number of participants have espoused the efficacy of partnership 
working, which is in keeping with the dominant public policy discourse mentioned in 
chapter 2 – with respect to the necessity of solving ‘wicked issues’ (McGarvey and 
Cairney, 2008; Ferlie, et al., 2011) that no single agency should tackle on its own 
(Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Hudson and Hardy, 2002; Durose and Rummery, 2006). A 
number of participants have also asserted that fiscal austerity measures have added to 
this necessity by ‘forcing’ agencies to work together due to a lack of resources. However, 
a significant number of participants also claimed that the opposite was true – insofar as a 
lack of resources would also impact on their ability to engage in partnership work in the 
future; especially if it did not meet their immediate aims. This could result in a snowball 
effect in that those partners who do attend on a regular basis will invariably have the 
power to set future agendas (Bachrach and Baratz, 2002: Lukes, 1974; 2005) possibly in 
line with their own goals, which may reduce trust and dissuade cash strapped agencies 
from taking part. If austerity measures continue to put pressure on overstretched 
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agencies already under a burden to ‘do more with less’ (chapter 4), then this could 
squeeze out partnership working, as agencies retrench back to deal with core issues. 
7.4.3 Partnerships more likely to adopt national initiatives in a localised setting 
Partnerships were more likely to adopt national initiatives in a localised setting in an 
effort to meet key targets through the ethos of achieving more with less. Key targets 
were often set within prescriptive performance frameworks (NPF, SOA, Statement of 
Ambition etc., see chapter 4), which could result in making Local Authorities/partnerships 
operate in a particular way. A hard pressed public sector may find it easier to adopt a 
centrally driven direction (steer) with regard to national priorities and the management of 
risk, rather than setting an innovative direction that navigates a course between localism, 
engagement, consultation and social inclusion. For example, with respect to the SOA – 
utilising an outcome approach is often difficult to achieve within a system focused on 
performance measurement and best value. How, for instance, can you prove that a long 
term community safety initiative is having the desired effect or that you are measuring 
what matters? For a strained public sector it is often easier to measure what you can 
visually see or experience (graffiti removal, stop and search, ASBOs etc.), or, meeting 
quantifiable targets through the management of risk with respect to reoffending (Innes, 
2004) through diversionary initiatives, signposting, cautions etc. This was evident 
throughout the case study areas as short term initiatives were often utilised to target 
local antisocial behaviour (which could involve cautions or dispersal tactics); described by 
one elected Councillor in Burnside as ‘an old person’s agenda’ (B011) designed to get 
young people off the streets. In both Burnside and Cartside youth initiatives were often 
framed within the language of deterrence – Positive Changes in Cartside and One 
Burnside in Burnside - both initiatives were aimed at targeting young people who were 
first time offenders or on the periphery of offending. The Persistent Offender Project in 
Burnside reportedly saved the Criminal Justice System in excess of £10 million a year 
(Chapter 5), which may explain why a focus on the assessment of risk, which may provide 
‘cashable benefits’ is more attractive within the governance of community safety as 
opposed to more generic youth initiatives that are harder to quantify, but more 
conducive to community engagement. The same focus on risk was apparent within Avon 
Isle – although in this case initiatives were directed towards the elderly; with more 
generic youth initiatives losing out (disco’s/sports/youth events). 
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  7.4.4 De-prioritisation of community safety within the case study areas 
Within the governance of community safety there appeared to be a de-prioritisation of 
community safety within Burnside in particular, but also throughout all the case study 
areas in light of cuts to local community safety initiatives. There appeared to be a slight 
shift within the governance of community safety that perhaps signalled the de-
prioritisation of community safety as a localised concept (chapter 4). For example, in 
Avonside there was a loss of local voice on community safety issues when all five local 
CSPs were disbanded in favour of one overarching strategic and operational MATAC.  This 
arguably will have considerable impact on rural communities within this geographically 
diverse case study area; especially island communities such as Avon Isle, who may prove 
resistant to a ‘one size fits all’ approach – particularly with respect to policing (Fyfe, 
2014).  In Burnside reform went further and the CSP was removed from the overarching 
CPP structure in its entirety. In effect community safety as a thematic concept was no 
longer to be discussed – it was to be mainstreamed throughout the newly reformed 
structure, with most operational work being taken up by Community Safety Burnside 
(arms-length external organisation), which could raise issues with respect to blurred lines 
of accountability, scrutiny and a fragmented service delivery (chapter 6). Further concerns 
were highlighted with respect to the loss of key services (noise team in Cartside) and an 
apparent focus on short term reactive quantifiable police led initiatives throughout the 
case study areas in comparison to longer term preventative initiatives supported by the 
Christie Commission.  
  7.4.5 Blurred lines of accountability 
Within the governance of community safety a plurality of actors were involved in policing 
antisocial behaviour, which in turn created blurred boundaries with respect to scrutiny 
and accountability (chapter 6). This was most apparent in the social housing sector, 
wherein residents were subjected to a responsibilisation ethos (Garland, 1996) set within 
a moral discourse on the regulation of the conduct of others (Flint, 2002; Flint and Nixon, 
2006). In essence, Housing Officers were more often than not responsible for the policing 
of antisocial behaviour within the environment of their tenancies, by utilising legal levers 
to ensure compliance – often referred to as Third Party Policing (Mazzerolle and Ransley, 
2006; Mazzerolle, 2014). This was evident throughout the case study areas, but most 
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apparent in Burnside (Community Improvement Partnership); wherein other actors also 
stepped out of their traditional roles with respect to the management of risk; for 
example, Fire Officers assessing social housing not just for fire risk, but for domestic 
abuse, or signs of neglect. In Cartside and Burnside Street Pastors (a religious based third 
sector organisation) also reported on risk (vulnerable women in particular within the 
night time economy); and reported to the Police any behaviour they judged to be 
aggressive and antisocial. While this has proven to be advantageous to the Police in 
particular, and to those tenants plagued by incivility, it nonetheless, opens up questions 
with respect to blurred lines of accountability; for example, the Street Pastors are not 
subject to public scrutiny unlike the Police and other public sector organisations. 
However, a more fundamental question with respect to democratic governance is at issue 
here – who is ultimately held responsible for policing – the Police or those co-opted into 
policing functions (Mazzerolle and Ransley, 2006). As more actors are subsumed into 
private policing roles, this also raises important questions around the social exclusion of 
marginalised groups, and democratic accountability within the governance of community 
safety. 
  7.4.6 The Impact of Police Reform on Localism 
The creation of a National Police Service appeared to have had a major impact on 
CPP/CSPs within the case study areas; in terms of a loss of Local Authority accountability, 
loss of local services, perceptions of a loss of local accountability and community 
engagement. Under the new Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 accountability for 
policing has now moved from the local to the national (see chapter 6); wherein 
accountability has in effect moved from governance to scrutiny and engagement 
(Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015). This move was met with scepticism from some participants 
throughout the case study areas; particularly elected representatives who were yet to be 
convinced that local priorities would not be superseded by national ones. In a move to 
offset local community fears a framework had been put in place to create not only Local, 
but also Multi-Member Ward Police Plans. However, as previously highlighted (in table 6) 
the local priorities outlined in each case study area are ostensibly similar to those 
outlined in the Annual Police Plan. This perhaps reinforces concerns amongst local 
communities that Police Scotland (despite consultation) were not fully taking into account 
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local concerns, and instead were relying on ‘a one size fits all’ approach germane to 
national objectives; despite assurances to the contrary (Apex Scotland, 2013). 
This was most evident in Avon Isle when local residents voiced their concerns around a 
loss of localism at a packed Area Community Planning meeting in December 2013. A 
perception seemed to persist that Police Scotland had adopted a dominant former 
Strathclyde Police Model – ‘StrathGlasgow’ now effectively ran Scotland – or a 
Strathclydification had occurred (Fyfe, 2014); which is perhaps more germane to large 
urban conurbations rather than rural communities. Concerns were also expressed in 
Burnside about an apparent gap between the local and the national with respect to Police 
Scotland implementing national initiatives without local consultation. A lack of 
consultation was also cited in Cartside with respect to the removal of Police counters. It 
appears that fears exist throughout the case study areas, despite Police Scotland 
assurances, that local concerns – while noted – may be superseded by national policing 
priorities, which ultimately has the potential to reduce, not only, local accountability, but 
community trust in the long term. 
  7.4.7 Potential decline in community engagement/community trust 
Community engagement or community trust could decline further if the reform process 
(particularly in policing) adopts a ‘one size fits all approach’ and neglects to take into 
account- not only the diverse nature of local communities, but also geographical location, 
together with aligning engagement to the usual suspects (Chapter 6). As previously stated 
there are concerns particularly with respect to Police reform that community consultation 
in particular is merely tokenistic in nature (Arnstein, 1969). For instance, given the speed 
of the reform process, one could possibly question the robustness of community 
consultation in general. For example, a number of participants associated public 
consultation with community groups, for example, Resident Associations, or Community 
Councils. However, evidence from the case study areas suggests that these were in the 
main unrepresentative of the wider local community. This was a point echoed by Harkin 
(2015: 736) who found that some groups with as little as three members of the public in 
attendance were often held by the Police as a ‘proxy for the wider community’. This holds 
true for government (both local and national) consultations, which were also in the main 
conducted through Community Councils. This raises questions around representation, 
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community engagement, and local accountability. Throughout the case study areas there 
were genuine concerns expressed by most participants (including the Police) around 
community engagement, or to put it more precisely – the lack of it. For the most part this 
was put down to the apathy of the public, but, it could equally be associated with a lack 
of awareness of social policy in general – particularly in relation to Police Reform; a point 
echoed by Fyfe (2014). If ‘informed’ decisions are made by select members of local 
communities, or in their absence by knowing street level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980) 
around community safety issues, then this can potentially lead to a decline in trust by 
those members of the community who need to be engaged with the most; young people, 
hard to reach groups, or those who are usually the target of initiatives in the first place.  
  7.5 Implications for future policy 
The findings of this thesis have shown that there are enduring problems associated with 
ongoing austerity/reform and engaging communities in a meaningful way. Policy levers 
such as the Christie Commission and the ten year SOA have tried to ensure that 
partnerships genuinely engage with local communities in an effort to tackle long standing 
‘wicked issues’ such as crime and poverty. However, this research has demonstrated that 
while there may be a ‘will’ for partnership working to succeed, quite often this is not 
backed up with a ‘way’ for it to happen. The ongoing fiscal crisis has had a significant 
impact on all sectors involved in partnership working, which may have an impact on 
future social policy aims built around effective collaboration, partnership working, 
community engagement and local accountability; as espoused by the Christie 
Commission, and latterly by the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015.  
 
For example, evidence from the case study areas has demonstrated that effective 
collaboration is often restricted to local issue specific co-located partnerships (Hubs, 
Community Improvement Partnership, etc.), which have a distinct focus and are usually 
Police led in terms of analysis and local intelligence. However, this usually attracts those 
actors who share similar aims. Within CSP’s - MATACs have emerged as the operational 
arm of CSPs, which are a national initiative based on intelligence led policing. While this 
may favour national priorities, it may also impact on local collaboration insofar as some 
agencies/actors may withdraw from the process due to trust issues, with respect to 
confidentiality, and fears that their core aims are not being met. Consequently, efforts 
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must be made at the local and the national level to address some of the issues raised by 
non-policing organisations; especially with respect to ensuring measures are put in place 
to adopt Christie’s long term preventative agenda – as opposed to short term Police led 
initiatives that favour measurable national objectives. 
 
The Christie Commission advocates partnership working as an answer to achieving ‘more 
with less’, as a necessary function within  the constraints of contemporary public 
finances. However, while many participants shared this sentiment - attempts to 
participate were quite often thwarted by ongoing cuts to the public sector. Many 
participants stated that they neither had the time nor the resources to adequately engage 
in partnership working, which created a dichotomy of sorts. This raises questions for 
policy makers with respect to, not only, the efficacy and quality of partnership working, 
but also in relation to the types of services available to local communities. It is clear that 
partnership working remains a key concept within the Scottish Government and much is 
expected of it within the framework of local community planning. However, one area 
needs to be addressed with respect to an apparent disconnect between top down 
strategic direction, and bottom up implementation in terms of resources and continued 
commitment within local structures. 
 
Another key area to be addressed is with respect to local community engagement. If it 
happened at all, it was mostly related to those select few who attend Community 
Councils, or through organisational survey’s, which arguably do not gather opinions from 
all sections of the community. Community engagement is a key governance theme; 
however, it is often left up to localities on how this is achieved. This has led to a 
fragmented approach throughout the case study areas with some CPP’s engaging more 
than others. This may be resolved if there were clearer directions by policy makers at the 
national level – outlining specifically how communities were to be engaged, and within 
what time limit; particularly hard to reach groups. However, this also requires resources, 
which may be problematic in terms of ongoing fiscal austerity measures impacting on 
Local Authorities. However, unless significant work is done to ensure that local 
communities – particularly communities who lack the capacity to engage – are truly 
involved in the planning process, then the issues highlighted in this study will continue to 
be problematic.  
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It is clear that there is a desire within Scottish social policy at the national level to increase 
community ownership, community engagement, active citizenship etc. and this is to 
continue under the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015, wherein Local 
Authorities are now required to prepare and publish Local Outcome Improvement Plans 
(LOIPs), which must set out their local outcomes to be prioritised for improvement (SCSN, 
2016). However, LOIPs much like Single Outcome Agreements must also take cognizance 
of national outcomes. This in effect means that the same problems (highlighted in this 
thesis) may persist; especially in relation to a focus on short term quantifiable outcomes 
related to centralised key performance targets, rather than investment in long term 
proactive approaches more difficult to quantify. This is also the case for Community 
Justice Outcome Improvement Plans (CJOIPS) as set out within the Community Justice 
(Scotland) Act 2016 (Scottish Government, 2016). This has implications at the local level in 
that local communities may have services provided out of fiscal necessity rather than 
local need.   
 7.5.1 Key challenges for policy makers 
 
From the findings of this thesis one can present a number of key challenges for policy 
makers going forward, principally: 
 
 To define and outline a standardised community engagement framework within social 
policy in an effort to actively increase community participation within local 
community groups and local community planning structures. 
 To put in place structures that will increase the capacity of local communities in order 
for them to participate in the above. 
 To signpost more clearly how, where, and why it is important to engage in local 
participatory democracy.  
 To increase participation at the strategic level for those actors/agencies most affected 
by strategic policy decisions. 
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7.5.2 Implications for future research 
This research study adopted a comparative case study approach, which looked at the 
implications of policy and practice with respect to community safety partnership working 
at the local level. An emphasis was placed on engaging with those key stakeholders most 
likely to offer explanations around policy and practice within a partnership setting; 
including those community representatives available for the study. However, policy 
makers and practitioners may appreciate research based around the implementation of 
LOIPS and CJOIPS and the Community Empowerment Act that seeks to identify and 
formalise emerging best practice that addresses some of the challenges posed above.  For 
example, researchers may be interested in utilising a mixed methods approach 
(quantitative surveys, focus groups, individual interviews) that seeks to identify why 
active participation is difficult to achieve within local communities. Practitioners could 
also engage in practice-led or action research (McNish, 2013); to critically reflect if they 
are achieving the required statutory aims based around active community participation.  
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Appendix A 
 
Interview schedule for CSP’s/CPPs  in Case Study Areas 
 
Partnership Origins 
How many partners are there on the CSP and who are the Lead agencies? 
Have you worked in partnership with any of these agencies/organisations before? 
Power Structure/ control 
Is there a vertical chain of command? 
Who sets the organisational strategy/targets  of CSP’s? 
Are chosen strategies based on vertical or horizontal inter-organisational decision-making 
practices? 
How much bureaucracy is involved within the CSP structure and process? 
How is the CSP/or your input into the CSP financed? 
Has austerity measures affected partnership working and/or services? 
Co-ordination and Steering  
What resources can/does your organisation bring to the partnership? 
What if any community safety initiatives are there? 
Are initiatives allowed a specific timescale or are they ongoing? 
Do you have a commonality of purpose with other organisations in the CSP? 
How is your organisations role defined within the CSP? 
Given that the police are a lead agency, how will their amalgamation into one police force this 
April, affect working arrangements within the CSP? 
Communication/commitment  
How do you share information with other organisations? 
Are all organisations willing to share specialised knowledge with other organisations within the 
CSP? 
What barriers are there to effective communication within the CSPs? 
Who organises and sets the agenda for partnership meetings and do you always attend them? 
Is the level of commitment to the partnership the same from all partners? 
Would your agencies commitment to the CSP be affected if a key individual changed their role 
within the organisation/or left the organisation? 
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How do you build and sustain a level of trust within the partnership? 
Organisational culture 
Does your agency have an equal status within the CSP? 
Is partnership working relative to the ‘core business’ of your agency? 
Has your agency ever been in conflict over the setting of strategies/goals within the CSP? 
Are CSP strategy/goals driven by any one agency? 
Has your agency ever experienced any difficulty in working with other agencies, and if so how was 
this resolved? 
In your opinion would partnership working benefit if agencies worked from the same location? 
How beneficial would it be to see how other agencies conduct their ‘core business’? 
Responsibility/Accountability 
Who is responsible overall for the CSP process? 
Who is your organisation accountable to internally? 
Who are they accountable to externally? 
How is performance measured? 
Is it difficult to measure all types of performance? 
Do you consult the local community and if so how are they consulted? 
How much input do local communities have on CSP strategies? 
Are community groups represented in partnership meetings, and if so by whom? 
How are they chosen? 
Are young people engaged in the CSP process? 
Benefits to the community 
Are local communities given any feedback on CSP success or failures? 
Have local communities experienced a drop in crime/anti-social behaviour? 
How else have CSPs benefitted local communities? 
Would you say the strategies chosen by the CSP are given the same level of importance by local 
communities? 
How is success measured? 
Have any initiatives been put in place for young people? 
Have any initiatives been put in place for other members of the community? 
In your opinion is there a question I have not asked you that I should have asked? 
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